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INTRODUCTION
The task is daunting: Spur economic growth in developing
countries. Much attention has focused on bringing economic pros-
perity to transitional economies, including Russia and other former
Soviet bloc countries, such as Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
Developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa have also
been the subject of reform programs, many of which have been
controversial, designed to promote economic growth through
privatization, political change, and other means. Today, all eyes are
on Iraq and Afghanistan. A recent article in the Wall Street Journal,
titled Taking Iraq Private, summed up what many view as central
to promoting economic growth in Iraq and elsewhere: Create
property rights, the rule of law, and other institutions that will
encourage private investment and foster free markets.' While I
agree with the article's premise, its title is a misnomer. The goal is
less about taking developing countries private than it is about
taking them public.
One solution for spurring economic growth in the developing
world is to promote securities markets. An established body of
empirical studies shows, as one might suspect, a link between the
development of capital markets and economic growth.2 The basic
intuition is straightforward: Robust capital markets allow busi-
nesses and entrepreneurs to tap into the financial resources needed
to increase output, invest in new technologies, fund research and
development, build new factories, hire more workers, and exploit
business opportunities domestically and abroad. The question, then,
becomes: What policies best promote securities markets as a means
of economic prosperity in developing countries?
When it comes to promoting equity markets, the question is
often rephrased to ask: What accounts for the Anglo-American pat-
tern of finance, characterized by dispersed share ownership and the
separation of ownership and control in the United States and the
United Kingdom, and how can developing countries replicate this
1. Robert McFarlane & Michael Bleyzer, Taking Iraq Private, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2003,
at A10.
2. See infra note 32.
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achievement? Suggesting the difficulties of achieving broad and
deep stock markets in which shareholders are willing to hold
minority stakes in companies, concentrated ownership structures
are more typical around the globe.3
The "law matters" thesis claims that the law has a central role to
play in the development of equity markets. In short, the law is
essential to securing the property rights of shareholders. Strong
legal protections shield shareholders, especially minority share-
holders, from having their investments expropriated by insiders,
including directors, officers, entrepreneurs, and controlling share-
holders. Unless shareholders are protected from agency problems,
such as excessive executive compensation, insider trading, self-
dealing transactions, and shirking, they will be discouraged from
investing. Those who do invest will pay a discount for shares in
order to compensate them for the risk of opportunism they are
otherwise forced to shoulder. By protecting shareholders from
insider abuses, the law can instill in shareholders the confidence
needed to invest, thereby leading to thicker and more highly
valued equity markets. The "law matters" thesis is supported by an
extensive body of empirical studies, led by the work of La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny.4
Moving beyond whether law matters in concept, the practical
question becomes: "What law?" Because the United States by all
accounts has the world's thickest equity markets, with over 7500
issues trading on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ
alone,5 attention often turns to the United States when policy-
makers and others spearheading reform fashion corporate gover-
nance agendas for developing countries. Indeed, the "law matters"
thesis holds out the possibility that if developing economies craft
a corporate law regime like that of the United States, they can
3. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence
in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 642 n.2 (1999)
(collecting citations to empirical literature).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 24-25 (9th ed.
2003) (citing MARSHALL E. BLUME, THE STRUCTURE OF THE U.S. EQUITY MARKETS (The
Wharton School, Univ. of Pa., Working Paper No. 02-16,2002), available at http://fic.wharton.
upenn.edu/fic/papers/02/0216.pdf.
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achieve developed securities markets. But is the U.S. approach to
corporate governance right for developing countries?
One danger of transplanting U.S. corporate law to developing
economies is that it might not fit with the "importing" country's
economic structure, political system, social order, or cultural
values. To be sure, the resulting "transplant effects" of any such
misfit are important. My focus, however, is the other side of the
transplant coin-namely, whether a market-based system of
corporate governance, like that found in the United States, ade-
quately protects shareholders in developing countries so as to
promote equity markets there. Posed differently, to what extent
should the government displace private ordering with more
substantive regulation of corporate governance in developing
countries?
U.S. corporate law, and Delaware corporate law in particular,
reflect an enabling approach to corporate law made up largely of
default rules that parties can opt out of to privately order their
governance affairs. The law on the books is supplemented by the
judge-made law of fiduciary duties, designed to ensure that directors
and officers, who are charged with managing the corporation's
business and affairs, exercise their authority over the business with
due care, in good faith, and in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders. While far from trivial, Delaware corporate
law provides shareholders relatively few protections from insider
abuses.6 Indeed, Delaware corporate law affords directors and
officers a great deal of discretion in managing the business free from
the interference of shareholders and judges. The gaps in the law are
filled by a host of other formal and informal mechanisms that hold
management accountable. The market for corporate control and
incentive-based compensation, such as stock options, are frequently
cited as examples of the nonlaw components that contribute to the
U.S. corporate governance system. At bottom, instead of depending
primarily on substantive corporate law to protect shareholders,
the market-based approach of U.S. corporate governance relies
on markets, contracts, and norms, supported by a host of other
institutions, to discipline directors and officers.
6. See infra note 60.
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Not every country has the institutional makeup that allows it to
eschew a more heavy-handed corporate law regime and still develop
thick equity markets. Most developing countries lack the institu-
tional mix that makes a market-based corporate governance system,
with an enabling corporate law, workable. For example, the U.S.
governance model presupposes that developed capital markets
already exist, but they obviously do not exist in developing econo-
mies. The bottom line for most developing countries is that import-
ing a corporate law regime along the lines of the U.S. model, or
otherwise depending on a market-based model of governance, is not
a viable option. More to the point, importing U.S. corporate law falls
far short of replicating the U.S. system of corporate governance in
developing countries, leaving many of the most important parts
behind.
The alternative I recommend for developing countries is a
mandatory model of corporate law that fixes key features of cor-
porate governance-such as banning self-interested transactions,
capping executive compensation, requiring shareholder approval for
significant acquisitions, mandating the payment of dividends, and
granting shareholders a limited put right and the right to make
proposals that bind management-in order to protect shareholders
from insider abuses and mismanagement. As compared to the U.S.
governance system, the mandatory governance model I envision
further restricts directors' and officers' discretion in managing the
enterprise and allocates to shareholders additional authority,
allowing shareholders to hold management more accountable and
to exert more direct control over the business and how it is run.'
Law matters in developed countries, but it really matters in
developing countries where the institutional infrastructure that
otherwise protects shareholders is nascent or simply nonexistent.
Having said this, a caveat is in order. To the extent that corporate
7. For a discussion of the differences between the mandatory model of corporate law that
this Article proposes and the related "self-enforcing" model of corporate law proposed by
Bernard Black, Jonathan Hay, and Reinier Kraakman, see infra notes 243-48 and
accompanying text. The self-enforcing model is an important initial step toward stronger legal
protections for shareholders, but the mandatory model goes further. It is considerably more
restrictive of management, contemplates that shareholders will have more direct say over the
business, and provides fewer opportunities for the private ordering of internal corporate
affairs.
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governance reform is part of a larger privatization effort and move
toward free markets, the more visible hand of the government in
corporate governance matters should not extend further into the
private sector to steer capital flows, prop up businesses, or favor
certain industries or companies through subtle or not-so-subtle
forms of industrial policy.
Although my focus is on corporate governance reform, and even
more narrowly on the transplantability of the U.S. model of cor-
porate governance to developing countries, the analysis offers
several broad lessons that can promote successful reform of all
types. First, a country's legal regime, including the law on the books
and formal enforcement mechanisms, is simply one part of a much
more complex set of formal and informal institutions. The law must
fit with a country's broader institutional mix, and legal reform
should therefore be considered in its larger context. Second, conduct
can be shaped in lots of ways. When market mechanisms are
inadequate, such as when market or contracting breakdowns occur,
there is a strong argument for more state-sanctioned law. On the
other hand, as institutions develop, it might be appropriate for the
government to scale back the legal regime to allow people greater
flexibility in organizing their economic, political, and social affairs.
Third, a systems approach to reform, which attempts to understand
the relationships among as many parts and subparts of a system as
possible, should impress on policymakers and their advisors the
difficulties of reform. Consequently, policymakers should be better
able, and more willing, to consider a range of options, including
those that might have been rejected elsewhere. Also, by engaging
the complexities of reform, which is part and parcel of a systems
approach, policymakers might demonstrate more humility in
crafting reform programs. Fourth, early success is essential, and the
benefits of reform should not be overpromised. Policymakers have
few chances to get it right before political support for reform might
wane, derailing the prospects for meaningful change. Finally, there
is no one approach that works best everywhere. The right gover-
nance regime for a country depends on its institutions and its goals.
This Article begins in Part I by exploring the "law matters" thesis
and the prospect for transplanting U.S. corporate law to developing
countries. Part II asks: "What is U.S. corporate governance?" A
[Vol. 45:10551060
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systems approach pieces together the key components of the U.S.
governance system that complement each other to create a whole
that is greater than the sum of its parts and that depends on
relatively little substantive corporate law to protect shareholders.
The systems analysis also makes clear that an enabling corporate
law, such as the Delaware corporation code, is not readily trans-
plantable to developing countries. More generally, Part II demon-
strates, as others have pointed out, that institutions matter.s Part
III further develops the argument that a market-based model
of governance is not feasible for developing countries. Part IV
proposes a framework for corporate governance reform in developing
countries that is premised on a mandatory model of corporate law,
the very regime the United States has rejected. In so doing, the
analysis calls into question the likelihood of the worldwide conver-
gence of corporate governance to the U.S. model as many have
predicted in light of increasingly competitive global capital and
product markets.9 Part IV ultimately pushes beyond the theoretical
case for more law protecting minority shareholders, offering several
specific suggestions for policymakers to consider in crafting the
corporate law regimes of developing economies.
I. THE COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEBATE: DOES LAW
MATTER?
When will ownership and control separate? 0 In other words, what
are the preconditions for dispersed share ownership and thick
equity markets? Two things are needed for securities markets to
exist: willing buyers and willing sellers. Investors must be willing
8. See infra notes 168, 172.
9. For more on the corporate convergence debate, see, for example, Douglas M. Branson,
The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL
INTL L.J. 321 (2001); Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from
Australia, 17 TRANSNATL LAW. 13 (2002); Coffee, supra note 3; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing
Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. ComP. L. 329 (2001); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439
(2001); Brett H. McDonnell, Convergence in Corporate Governance-Possible, But Not
Desirable, 47 VILL. L. REV. 341 (2002).
10. The separation of ownership and control was, of course, made famous by Berle and
Means. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed., Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc. 1968) (1933).
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to invest, and managers, entrepreneurs, and controlling sharehold-
ers, who we can think of as "insiders," must be willing to sell stakes
in their companies for securities markets to develop. Investors will
be reluctant to invest if they are not confident that insiders will not
expropriate their investments by paying excessive compensation to
executives, filling key positions with friends and family, engaging
in self-dealing transactions, trading on inside information, shirk-
ing, or stealing." In other words, investors will withhold funds if
they are not adequately protected from agency problems.12 The U.S.
securities markets provide a vivid case in point, as investors with-
drew after the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and elsewhere. 3
Shareholders are especially subject to the risk of expropriation
because of the firm-specific nature of their investments and the fact
that they are last in line as a company's residual economic claimant,
thereby only receiving a return on their investments after other
claimants, such as employees and creditors, are paid.'4 Even if
investors are willing to invest, there are no assurances of thick
securities markets. The premiums investors demand to protect
11. For discussions of various types of insider expropriation, see, for example, Stephen J.
Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1657, 1660-63 (2002); John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country
Evaluation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2151, 2157-59 (2001) [hereinafter Coffee, Do Norms Matter?];
John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities
Market Failure, 25 J. CORP. L. 1, 24-25 (1999) (hereinafter Coffee, Privatization]; Simon
Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REv. 22,22-26 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2000).
12. Although investors are accustomed to pricing business risks, it is more difficult to
price the risk of being exploited by insiders. Even if investors invest, they will demand a
premium to compensate them for the risk of opportunism and mismanagement and, as a
result, market valuations will be lower and securities will be less liquid.
13. During the period from March 2000 to July 2002, the Wilshire Total Market Index fell
over $7 trillion. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET. A HISTORY OF
THE SEcURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 623-24 (2003).
14. For more on the firm-specific nature of shareholders' investment and their status as
a corporation's primary residual economic claimants, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,403 (1983); Troy A. Paredes, The Firm
and the Nature of Control: Toward a Theory of Takeover Law, 28 J. CORP. L. (forthcoming
2004); BERNARD S. BLACK, CORPORATE LAW AND RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS (Berkeley Olin Program
in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 27, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author);
see also infra note 211 and accompanying text (explaining how nonshareholder constituencies
are better able to protect themselves from the risk of expropriation). For a contrary view
based on the "team production" model of the firm, see, for example, Margaret M. Blair & Lynn
A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247 (1999).
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against the risk of expropriation might be so great that insiders,
particularly those who have no intention on siphoning off private
benefits, refuse to sell stakes in their companies at the demanded
discounts."5 Even if willing buyers and sellers can be found at
reduced share prices, the resulting equity markets will suffer from
fewer offerings, less liquidity, and, of course, lower valuations,
compromising the ability of companies to raise capital.' 6
A. Law Matters
From this vantage point, protecting shareholders from insider
abuses is a sine qua non of thick equity markets, the hallmark of
which are widely held companies with dispersed share ownership
structures (i.e., the separation of ownership and control). 7 The
immediate question, then, is: How can shareholders be protected
adequately from insider expropriation so as to encourage them to
invest in companies? Many economists and legal academics contend
that the law has a central role to play in protecting shareholders,
especially minority shareholders, and thus in influencing corporate
finance and ownership structures around the globe.' According to
15. This rings of the classic "lemons" problem. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for
"Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); see also
Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets,
48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 838 (2001) (explaining that in a "lemons equilibrium" with weak
securities market institutions, honest companies will often refrain from issuing shares to the
public). For more on this point, see LUCIAN ARYE BEBCHUK, A RENT-PROTECTION THEORY OF
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (Natl Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7203, 1999), available at httpJ/www.nber.org/papersw7203.pdf.
16. Plus, even if shares are successfully sold to the public, those shares might eventually
reaggregate into the hands of a controlling or majority shareholder if the private benefits of
control are large enough. See, e.g., BEBCHUK, supra note 15.
17. To be clear, this is not to suggest that strong shareholder protections are alone enough
for securities markets to develop.
18. For consideration of the "law matters" thesis, see, for example, Choi, supra note 11;
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1 (2001); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common
Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (2001); Mark J.
Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV.
539 (2000); THORSTEN BECK ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE: WHY DOES LEGAL ORIGIN MATTER?
(Univ. of Minn. Working Paper, 2002), available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract=355820; BRIAN
R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE LAW AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE: A DARWINIAN LINK?. (June 2002),
available at http/s/srn.com/abstract= 317661 (hereinafter CHEFFiNS, DARWINIAN LINK]; BRIAN
R. CHEFFINS, LAW AS BEDROCK: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AN ECONOMY DOMINATED BY WIDELY
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these proponents of the "law matters" thesis, law matters in that
strong legal protections give shareholders comfort that insiders
will be less able to expropriate their investments, thereby instilling
in shareholders the confidence needed for securities markets to
develop. Moreover, when laws are in place, parties can rely less on
personal and family relationships when transacting, allowing them
to engage in transactions with strangers. Strong legal protections
for shareholders expand the available pool of capital for businesses
and entrepreneurs and facilitate contracting by shoring up share-
holder rights. At its core, the "law matters" thesis expounds strong
and enforceable shareholder property rights as a basis for promoting
securities markets and economic growth.
Something akin to the "law matters" thesis has been at work in
the United States recently. Congress and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as the major stock markets,
have adopted a number of historic corporate governance and
accounting reforms to shore up investor confidence in the aftermath
of the recent corporate scandals. The cornerstone of the reforms, of
course, was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.19
In addition to its theoretical underpinnings, the "law matters"
thesis has the backing of an impressive body of empirical research,
most notably the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV).20 In a series of influential studies,
LLSV have examined the relationship between the degree of
shareholder protection and securities market development for
nearly fifty countries. 21 LLSV have developed an "antidirector rights
HELD PuBLIc COMPANIES (Aug. 2001), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=279350
[hereinafter CHEFFiNs, LAW AS BEDROCK]; EDwARD GLAESER & ANDREI SHLEIFER, LEGAL
ORIGINS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8272, 2001), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8272.pdf; KATHARINA PISTOR ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES (European Bank for Reconstruction & Dev., Working Paper No. 48,
2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=214648; see also infra note 20.
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
20. See Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World,
55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN.
471 (1999); La Porta et al., supra note 11; Rafael La Ports et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL.
ECON. 1113 (1998) [hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]; Rafael La Porta et al.,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997) [hereinafter La Porta et al.,
Legal Determinants].
21. See La Porta et al., supra note 11 (summarizing earlier studies); La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, supra note 20; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 20.
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index" that measures the shareholder protection of a country based
on six factors: (1) the ability of shareholders to mail their proxy
votes; (2) whether shareholders are required to deposit their shares
prior to the shareholders' meeting in order to vote them; (3) the
existence of cumulative or some other form of proportional voting;
(4) whether minority shareholders are able to challenge perceived
director oppression in court or otherwise; (5) the ability of share-
holders holding fewer than ten percent of a company's shares to call
a special shareholders' meeting; and (6) whether shareholders have
preemptive rights.22 LLSV also measure the extent of law enforce-
ment for each country, using the following as proxies: the efficiency
of the judicial system, the rule of law, corruption, and accounting
standards."
LLSV report two core findings: first, countries with stronger legal
protections for minority shareholders have broader, deeper, and
more highly valued stock markets as measured by stock market
capitalization, the number of publicly traded companies, and the
number of initial public offerings;24 and second, common law legal
systems provide shareholders stronger legal protections that result
in thicker stock markets than are typically found in civil law
countries.25 Not only does substantive corporate law matter, legal
origin appears to matter too.
26
22. See La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 10-11. LLSV developed a similar "creditor rights
index" to study the relationship between strong creditor protections and debt financings. See
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 20, at 1122-25; La Porta et al., Legal
Determinants, supra note 20, at 1133-39.
23. See La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 8-12; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra
note 20, at 1140-45. For an important extension of LLSVs original empirical studies to
include several factors other than the law on the books that impact the development of
securities markets, see Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the
Transplant Effect, 47 EuR. ECON. REv. 1 (2003); PIsTOR ET AL., supra note 18.
24. See La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 15-16; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra
note 20, at 1151-52; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 20, at 1137-39.
25. See La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 13-15; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra
note 20, at 1151-52; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants, supra note 20, at 1137-39. LLSV also
find that French civil law countries provide the least protection, with German civil law and
Scandinavian civil law countries somewhere in the middle.
26. For interesting empirical studies showing that corporate governance affects firm value
across companies within a single country, in addition to affecting the development of equity
markets across countries, see, for example, BERNARD S. BLAcK ET AL., DoEs CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AFFECT FMS' MARKETVALUES? EVIDENCE FROM KOREA (John M. Olin Program
in Law & Econ., Stanford Law School, Working Paper No. 237, 2003), available at httpl/
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The "law matters" thesis claims to solve a puzzle that has seized
comparative corporate governance scholars lately: Why do the
United States and the United Kingdom have dispersed share
ownership structures, while countries throughout the rest of the
developed world, including Germany and Japan, have concentrated
ownership?2" The separation of ownership and control was supposed
to win a "Darwinian struggle" over concentrated ownership,28 and
some boldly declared the "end of history" for global ownership and
governance patterns as the Anglo-American model of dispersed
share ownership and shareholder primacy-the idea that directors
and officers should run the business in the best interests of
shareholders-would ascend worldwide, if it had not already.29 The
logic propelling dispersed ownership to its alleged dominance is
straightforward. First, as companies increase in size to exploit
economies of scale, they would be forced to turn to outside sources
of capital. Second, separating ownership and control would allow
companies to hire professional managers who could run the business
better than shareholders.3 To the extent the separation of owner-
ship and control offers capital-raising and managerial advantages,
pressure to converge to the Berle and Means firm marked by
dispersed share ownership has mounted in recent years as capital
and product markets have become increasingly global and competi-
tive. The predicted convergence, however, has not occurred. In
ssrn.comlabstract=311275 (reporting evidence that corporate governance affects the market
value of Korean public companies); Bernard S. Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter? A
Crude Test Using Russian Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131 (2001) (studying the effects of
corporate governance on the market value of Russian firms).
27. For extensive consideration of this question, see, for example, MARKJ. ROE, POLITICAL
DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (2003);
Black, supra note 15; Coffee, supra note 18; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9; La Porta,
Legal Determinants, supra note 20; McDonnell, supra note 9; Roe, supra note 18; Mark D.
West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and
the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527 (2001).
28. See, e.g., Cheffins, supra note 9, at 13-18; Coffee, supra note 18, at 3.
29. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9.
30. For discussions of the specialization of function whereby managers run the enterprise
and shareholders bear risk as a company's residual claimants, see generally Eugene F. Fama
& Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 307-17
(1983); CHEFFINS, LAW As BEDROCK, supra note 18, at 23-30; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003)
(arguing in favor of director primacy in exercising managerial control over the company, free
from shareholder interference).
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advanced economies other than the United States and the United
Kingdom, companies frequently have a controlling shareholder,
such as a family, a bank, a corporate group, or the state, that not
only holds a large block of stock but that exerts considerable
influence over the company. According to the "law matters" thesis,
strong minority shareholder protections in the United States and
the United Kingdom account for these countries' dispersed owner-
ship structures; investor protections in the rest of the developed
world are supposedly inadequate for equity markets to develop to
any significant degree."1
The "law matters" thesis has even more profound implications for
developing economies. A growing literature shows a link between
economic growth and capital markets. The basic relationship is that
robust capital markets enable businesses and entrepreneurs to tap
into the financial resources necessary to commercialize innovations,
expand production, and invest in capital improvements and new
technologies.32 In addition, developed capital markets can promote
savings and a more efficient allocation of an economy's resources
to more productive uses as investors search for the highest returns.
However important it might be to further equity markets in more
31. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 15:
In sum, the evidence has proved to be broadly consistent with the proposition
that the legal environment shapes the value of the private benefits of control
and thereby determines the equilibrium ownership structures. Perhaps the main
implications of this evidence for the study of corporate governance are the
relative irrelevance of the Berle and Means corporation in most countries in the
world and the centrality of family control.
The flip side is that concentrated ownership will occur where legal protections do not
adequately protect investors, because investors need blockholders to monitor management.
For more on concentrated ownership and the blockholder model of finance, see, for example,
William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corporate Governance and the
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213
(1999) [hereinafter Bratton & McCahery, Case Against Global Reference]; William W. Bratton
& Joseph A. McCahery, Incomplete Contracts Theories ofthe Firm and Comparative Corporate
Governance, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 745 (2001); Reinhard H. Schmidt & Gerald Spindler,
Path Dependence, Corporate Governance and Complementarity, in CONVERGENCE AND
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., forthcoming
2004).
32. For discussions of the data linking capital markets and economic growth, see, for
example, Black, supra note 15, at 831-38; Choi, supra note 11, at 1660-94; Frank B. Cross,
Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1737, 1769-70 (2002); La Porta et al., supra note
11, at 16-17.
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advanced economies, the stakes are higher and the challenges
are greater when it comes to creating strategies for promoting
securities markets in developing countries such as Ghana, Nepal,
Indonesia, Romania, Turkey, and Colombia, not to mention Iraq and
Afghanistan. The "law matters" thesis offers a clear policy prescrip-
tion that calls for developing countries to adopt laws and create
enforcement mechanisms that will protect shareholders from insider
expropriation to create thick equity markets as a means of economic
prosperity. This is an extremely difficult task, a point to which I
return later.
The "law matters" thesis has detractors who assert that factors
other than law are key to dispersed share ownership. In Mark Roe's
view, for example, politics matter more than law in explaining the
separation of ownership and control, at least in developed econo-
mies.3 Together with Lucian Bebchuk, Roe has also argued that
because of path dependence, a country's starting point strongly
influences its corporate governance and ownership structures; in
other words, history matters.34 Culture has also been identified as
shaping a country's corporate governance and finance patterns.35
John Coffee and Brian Cheffins make related claims that market-
based investor protections through bonding mechanisms and
self-regulation, such as stock exchange listing standards, account
for dispersed ownership in the United States and the United
Kingdom.36 Coffee also posits, with Cheffins in agreement, that the
33. See ROE, supra note 27; Roe, supra note 18.
34. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution
in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-46 (1996); see also Schmidt & Spindler,
supra note 31 (explaining path dependence in corporate governance in terms of
complementarity).
35. See generally Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-
Cultural Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001); AMIR N.
LicHT, LEGAL PLUG-INS: CULTURAL DISTANCE, CROSS-LISTING, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REFORM (Interdisciplinary Ctr. Herzliyah-Radzyner School of Law, Working Paper, 2003)
[hereinafter LicHT, LEGAL PLUG-INS], available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=386320; AMIR N.
LICHT ET AL., CULTURE, LAW, AND FINANCE: CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE LAWS (Interdisciplinary Ctr. Herzliyah-Radzyner School of Law, Working Paper,
2001), available at http/ssrn.cornabstractf277613.
36. See Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control
in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459 (2000); Coffee, supra note 3; Coffee, supra note
18; CHEFFINS, LAW AS BEDROCK, supra note 18, at 15.
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causal chain might not flow from legal protections to robust
markets; rather, investors and other interested groups might
demand greater legal protections after entering a burgeoning
market and becoming a more powerful political constituency."
Curtis Milhaupt offers an amalgam of the above views, contending
that an economy's broader property rights institutions explain
financial structures." Finally, the fear of corruption matters. If a
country suffers from widespread corruption, its substantive law can
do little to foster securities markets. Corruption in the legal,
economic, or political system of a country stymies, if not blocks its
economic growth.39
Even those who share the "law matters" view debate why legal
origin is important. A leading explanation is that common law
judges can use flexible fiduciary duties to root out more effectively
insider abuses by filling the inevitable gaps left by statutes. Civil
law judges, on the other hand, are relegated to interpreting the
relevant code and have less flexibility to apply general standards of
loyalty, due care, and good faith to fill problematic gaps.4 ° Roe
captures the claim this way: "Wheeler-dealers run rings around the
civil law judges, who read the legislative texts too narrowly; those
wheeler-dealers cannot easily run rings around the tough common
law judges, who, with the bludgeon of open-ended fiduciary duties,
eventually catch up with the thieves."41 An alternative-and more
37. See Coffee, Do Norms Matter?, supra note 11, at 2171; CHEFFINs, LAw AS BEDROCK,
supra note 18, at 50; see also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction The Evolution
of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2122-23 (2001)
("Law and its enforcement may not determine the structure of corporate groups; rather,
important corporate and financial groups in a given society may drive the development of
legal institutions and enforcement practices by affecting the demand for law, at least in part
through norm creation and destruction.").
38. See generally Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145 (1998).
39. For more on corruption, see infra notes 271-77 and accompanying text. For an
extensive analysis of the impact of corruption, see Daniel Kaufmann, Rethinking Governance:
Empirical Lessons Challenge Orthodoxy, available at http'J/ssrn.com/abstract=386904 (Mar.
11, 2003). LLSV do account for corruption in their studies, although the law on the books is
their central focus. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 10-11.
40. Interestingly, if the advantage of the common law tradition over the civil law tradition
is rooted in the law of fiduciary duties, fiduciary duties are not included in LLSV's
"antidirector rights index." La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 10-11.
41. Mark J. Roe, Institutional Foundations for Securities Markets in the West 4 (2002), at
httpJ/www.econ.nyu.edu/user/frydmanr/Roe-AER2003.doc.
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political--explanation of the significance of legal origin is that
common law countries have greater respect than civil law countries
for individual autonomy over governmental authority. Accordingly,
property rights are more secure, particularly from state expropria-
tion, in common law systems, and the state is less intrusive in
economic and commercial affairs, leaving these matters to the
private sector.42
Whether law matters more than politics, history, culture, or any
other factor is debatable. At the very least, law plays a significant
role in protecting shareholders; and, as I argue below,43 law has an
essential role to play in promoting securities markets in developing
economies, even if other factors are largely responsible for the
separation of ownership and control in advanced economies.
Assuming that law matters and that financial development spurs
economic growth, the challenge for policymakers is to operationalize
the "law matters" thesis by enacting laws appropriate to fostering
dispersed ownership and broad and deep equity markets. But what
does an "appropriate" legal regime look like for a developing
country? What particular legal protections matter to shareholders?
As is often the case, policymakers fix on the U.S. models of corporate
governance and finance for guidance."
B. Transplanting U.S. Corporate Law
The "law matters" thesis is encouraging because it suggests
that developing countries can achieve financial development and
economic growth by adopting a corporate law regime similar to
the United States, which has the broadest and deepest securities
markets in the world.45 In recent years, many developing coun
42. For more on the debate over the significance of legal origin, see BECK ET AL., supra
note 18; Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 5-10; La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 9-12;
Mahoney, supra note 18.
43. See infra Part IV.A.
44. See infra note 47.
45. As Lynn Stout described: "[I]t is a tempting prospect to think that, by modifying their
rules to more closely approximate U.S.-style corporate law, such nations might spur the
process of economic development." LYNN A. STOUT, ON THE EXPoRT OF U.S.-STYLE CORPORATE
FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO OTHER CULTURES: CAN A TRANSPLANT TAKE? 2 (UCLA School of Law,
Working Paper No. 02-11, 2002), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=313679. Strong legal
shareholder protections are particularly important in developing countries; however, financial
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tries, often at the urging of influential organizations, such as the
World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development,46 have reformed their corporate governance struc-
tures to better protect minority shareholders from insider abuses.
Frequently, these efforts involve enacting corporate law reforms
that reflect many of the key features of U.S. corporate law. 7
Numerous countries are considering corporate governance re-
forms or will need to soon as part of a broader economic reordering
toward freer markets. One high-profile reform effort occurred in
Russia, where leading U.S. academics helped craft the country's
corporate law regime along the general lines of the United States'.'
Economic reforms in Iraq are sure to receive even greater attention,
and it is a reasonable bet that corporate governance reforms in
Iraq, once the rebuilding of the country reaches that stage, will
be informed by, if not based on, the U.S. approach to corporate
governance.49
development and economic growth depend on more than strong law.
46. See CTR. FOR INTL PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, INSTITUTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
DEVELOPING, EMERGING AND TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: A HANDBOOK (2002), available at
http:/www.cipe.org/programs/corp..gov/index.htm [hereinafter CIPE HANDBOOK]; ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(1999), available at http/Avww.oecd.org; THE WoRLD BANK GROUP, PRIVATE SECTOR
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY-DIRECTIONS FOR THE WORLD BANK GROUP (2002), available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/PSDStrategy-April%209.pdf (Apr. 9, 2002).
47. See Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 6; Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution
of Corporate Law: A Cross-Country Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 791, 839 (2002);
MARGARET M. BLAIR, SHAREHOLDER VALUE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE: A POST-ENRON REASSESSMENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 2 n.3
(Georgetown Univ. Law School, Working Paper No. 334240, 2002), available at
http'//ssrn.comlabstract=334240; LICHT, LEGAL PLUG-INS, supra note 35, at 62; see generally
Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9 (alleging the end of history for corporate law as
corporate governance regimes around the globe converge to the shareholder-oriented U.S.
model); CIPE HANDBOOK, supra note 46. Even when countries do not adopt U.S.-style
corporate law, individual companies can in effect adopt it for themselves by cross-listing on
U.S. stock exchanges. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3.
48. The Russian reforms were ultimately less successful at encouraging investment and
promoting capital markets than anticipated. For an extensive discussion of Russian reform
efforts, see generally Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance:
What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000); Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova,
Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 211
(2003); Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from Russian
Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720 (2000).
49. As the Wall Street Journal recently reported, "Remaking Iraq's economy in America's
image has been doctrine in Washington since well before the war." Neil King, Jr., Selling
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But U.S. corporate law might be inappropriate for promoting
equity markets in developing countries.5 ° Transplanting the law of
the United States, or any other country, has the benefit of being
relatively easy and inexpensive, in comparison to crafting statutes,
rules, and regulations from scratch.5 ' There are, however, dangers
with legal transplants. As a result of any number of differences
between the "importing" and "origin" countries, including different
economies, political systems, and social structures, as well as
unique value systems and priorities, an "importing" country might
not be ready to receive the transplant.5 2 Further, the "importing"
country simply might not understand the law it is importing and
how it is supposed to work.5" As a result, the transplant might not
take root or might evolve differently in the "importing" country than
in the "origin" country.54 In any case, the transition to a new regime
Iraqis on Selling Iraq: U.S. Pushes Iraq to Put State Firms on the Block; Skeptics Warn of
Unrest, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003, at A4.
50. For important work addressing corporate law transplants, see, for example, Berkowitz
et al., supra note 23; Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effects on
Developing Economies, 50 Am. J. COMP. L. 97 (2002); Pistor et al., supra note 47; HIDEKI
KANDA & CURTIS J. MILMAUPT, RE-EXAMINING LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: THE DIRECTOR'S
FIDUCIARY DUTY IN JAPANESE CORPORATE LAW (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
219, 2003), available at http'/ssrn.com/abstract=391821; KATHARINA PISTOR & CHENG-GANG
XU, FIDUCIARY DUTY IN TRANSITIONAL CIVIL LAW JURISDICTIONS: LESSONS FROM THE
INCOMPLETE LAW THEORY (ECGI Working Paper No. 01, 2002), available at http'/ssrn.com/
abstract=343480; STOUT, supra note 45.
51. See, e.g., KANDA & MILHAUPT, supra note 50, at 7 ("Why are legal transplants
ubiquitous? Several interrelated answers are possible. First and most obviously, they are a
cheap, quick and potentially fruitful source of new law ... and may be the only feasible means
of law reform in some instances ..... ). In the extreme, an "importing" developing country could
simply codify something like the Delaware General Corporation Law or the Model Business
Corporation Act.
52. See, e.g., id. at 9 ("We believe that Tit' between the imported rule and the host
environment is crucial to the success of a transplant.").
53. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 23, at 16-17 (discussing the importance of"familiarity"
with the transplanted law); Pistor, supra note 50, at 98 (explaining that law is a "cognitive
institution" that must be "understood and embraced not only by law enforcers, but also those
using the law").
54. As Jerome Frank stated:
Yet, although borrowing may sometimes be wise, often a danger lurks in
transferring a legal rule or practice to an alien culture. We may find a parable
in the fact that rabbits, harmless in their native habitat, when imported into
Australia turned out to be a menace to Australian farmers. We should note too
the biologist's report that "identical living cells develop differently in different
parts of the organism," and that, so some believe, cancer is caused by the
unregulated growth and spread of normal cells.
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can be socially disruptive and is likely to be rife with ongoing
challenges and unanticipated consequences-for better and for
worse. "[Transplanting] may give the importing country something
like the 'bends."'55
These questions of "macro-fit" 6 between the transplanted law and
an "importing" country's broader social institutions and political
economy certainly deserve considerable attention. But I want to
focus instead on the other side of the transplant coin: Would a
corporate law regime like the United States' adequately protect
shareholders in developing countries? 7 Asked differently, is a
market-based model of corporate governance right for developing
countries? My basic concern is that developing economies can suffer
serious economic setbacks if they inadvertently design a corporate
law regime that affords minority shareholders too few protections.
Although my analysis is couched in terms of transplanting U.S.
corporate law, the broader inquiry concerns the proper role of the
government in regulating corporate governance in developing
economies.
The "law matters" thesis places formal legal rules-the core of
which we might think of as the law on the books-at the forefront
of financial development. Placing as much emphasis on the law on
the books as the "law matters" thesis, however, raises problems.
One problem is methodological. LLSV's "antidirector rights index,"
for example, includes six items that, in and of themselves, do very
little to protect shareholders." This is not to say that the empirical
Jerome Frank, Civil Law Influences on the Common Law-Some Reflections on "Comparative"
and "Contrastive" Law, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 887, 915 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
55. Id.
56. The phrase "macro-fit" is borrowed from Hideki Kanda and Curtis Milhaupt. KANDA
& MILHAUPT, supra note 50, at 9.
57. The question I pose here is akin to Kanda and Milhaupt's concept of "micro-fit." Id.
("Micro-fit is how well the imported rule complements the preexisting legal infrastructure in
the host country."); see also Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Law from Scratch, in 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND RUSSIA: INSIDERS AND THE STATE 245
(Roman Frydman et al. eds., 1996) (developing a "self-enforcing" model of corporate law in
arguing against transplanting the enabling corporate law of the United States to emerging
economies); Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1911 (1996) (further developing a "self-enforcing" model of corporate law).
58. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 8 ("The specific 'anti-director'rights that [LLSV] identify
as the central factors distinguishing common-law from civil-law systems strike many
commentators as only tangentially related to effective legal protection for minority
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work undergirding the "law matters" thesis is not important; nor is
this to say that the law on the books does not matter. I am con-
vinced that law matters to corporate governance and finance; but
most corporate law scholars and attorneys would agree that the
legal rules the empirical research focuses on are not key features of
any corporate law regime, including U.S. corporate governance.
The real-life problems that arise by focusing on formal legal rules,
however, are more serious than the methodological ones. Much more
than the formal rules of the game matter, whether one is consider-
ing economic reform, political reform, or any other reform effort. The
law is but one part of a much more complex institutional mix that
must be taken into account. It is particularly important to bear
this in mind when considering whether to fashion a corporate law
regime in a developing country after the United States or, more
generally, when considering any market-based approach to corpo-
rate governance.59 As I explain more in the next Part, corporate law
on the books in the United States affords shareholders fairly weak
protections from insider abuses. It is not much of an overstatement
to say that, with a few notable exceptions, the Delaware corporation
code is largely beside the point when it comes to shareholder rights,
providing shareholders few legal protections. U.S. corporate law has
even been called "trivial."" In the U.S. system of corporate gover-
nance, shareholders are not protected primarily by formal legal
rules-and especially not by the protections contained in the
"antidirector rights index" -but rather by nonlegal mechanisms,
such as market pressures, contracts, and norms of good practice
that directors and officers follow. To the extent substantive cor-
porate law matters in the United States, it is not the law on the
shareholders."); Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law's Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 252 n.28 (2002)
(explaining that the items included in the index are "not likely to be near the top of most
American lawyers' lists of Delaware corporate law's most important legal protections").
59. For others arguing for a broader approach to corporate governance reform that focuses
on more than the formal rules of the game, see, for example, Berkowitz et al., supra note 23;
Milhaupt, supra note 37; Milhaupt, supra note 38; Pistor et al., supra note 47; PISTOR ET AL.,
supra note 18; see generally infra note 172.
60. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 542 (1990); see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1914 (explaining that
corporate law "plays a relatively small, even 'trivial' role" in the corporate governance regimes
of developed countries).
61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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books but the common law of fiduciary duties that judges craft.
Billions of shares exchange hands daily on the New York Stock
Exchange and NASDAQ, not because of strong laws on the books
that favor shareholders, but despite weak ones.
When attention focuses on the United States as a model of
corporate governance and thick securities markets, the question for
policymakers is whether developing countries can replicate the U.S.
corporate governance system, notjust whether they can enact a code
that resembles the Delaware corporation code or the Model Business
Corporation Act or that even codifies the common law of fiduciary
duties. Enacting corporate law along the lines of the U.S. model is
a far cry from developing a governance regime that protects share-
holders from expropriation. To recast this point, a market-based
model of corporate governance will not adequately protect share-
holders in developing countries unless a host of other institutions
exist that complement the law in holding insiders accountable. If
the entire U.S. governance system, or something approaching it,
cannot be recreated, simply transplanting one piece of it (i.e., the
law) might do more harm than good, especially when the "import-
ing" country's forgone opportunity to adopt a different regime is
considered. While corporate law scholars generally understand the
complexities of corporate governance, including the secondary role
substantive corporate law plays in the United States, I worry that
many, perhaps most, policymakers shaping corporate governance
reform in developing countries do not. 2 When developing a corpo-
rate governance reform agenda, focusing on a simplified model of
governance that emphasizes formal legal rules is problematic.
II. THE U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
What is the U.S. model of corporate governance? The answer is
not substantive corporate law, although to be sure, the law plays a
more important role post-Sarbanes-Oxley and other recent
regulatory reforms. Corporate law is one small part of a complex
U.S. corporate governance system comprising a wide array of
complementary institutions, incentive structures, constraints, and
62. Cf. CIPE HANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 10-12 (explaining that policymakers have
adopted a simplified model of corporate governance).
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practices that work together to create a whole that is greater than
the sum of its parts. 3 My purpose in this Part is to take inventory
of U.S. corporate governance-focusing in particular on Delaware,
the most influential state for corporate law'-by explaining the
relationship among key features of the U.S. corporate governance
system.65 Such a "systems approach" to understanding corporate
governance is important because no one part can be understood on
its own, outside the larger framework to which it contributes.66
Thinking of corporate governance as a system of complementarities
is especially useful when fashioning reform agendas for developing
countries because it sheds light on the transplantability of U.S.
corporate law and ultimately on the type of governance regime that
is most likely to promote equity markets in developing economies.
63. For an interesting recent discussion of the limits of corporate law, see Roe, supra note
58 (focusing on the limits of corporate law in controlling management (i.e., bad business
decisions) as compared to disloyalty). The general complementarities framework I employ
below to analyze U.S. corporate governance is not unique to me. For more on the closely
related proposition that institutions matter, see infra notes 168, 172 and accompanying text.
64. Delaware is the most important state for purposes of corporate law, not only because
the majority of public companies are incorporated there, but also because other states look to
Delaware corporate law for guidance. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani,
Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112
YALE L.J. 553 (2002).
65. For an extensive, but more general, discussion of the various laws and institutions
that are important to creating a corporate governance system that can support thick
securities markets, see Black, supra note 15. For a useful but more condensed description of
the U.S. corporate governance system than this Article offers, see Black & Kraakman, supra
note 57, at 1914-21.
66. For more on a "systems" approach to legal analysis, see generally Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CoRNELLL. REv. 479,480 (1997). LoPucki has summarized
a systems analysis as follows: "To 'analyze' a system is to break it down into its constituent
parts, to determine the nature and identity of its subsystems, and to explain the relationships
among them." Id. at 482-83.
67. Cf id. at 480 ("Restricting one's attention to particular aspects of reality reduces
complexity, making it possible to solve problems that otherwise would boggle the mind. The
disadvantage in restricting one's attention, however, is that it often screens out important
aspects and leads the analyst to the wrong conclusion.").
Each component of the U.S. corporate governance system that I identify is itself made up
of subsystems and so on, and any number of relationships among the various parts could be
highlighted in a systems analysis. Indeed, various scholars have analyzed pieces of U.S.
corporate governance in greater detail than I attempt to do here. Moreover, corporate
governance itself needs to fit into a country's larger political, economic, and social structures,
raising a host of tough questions that, for the most part, are beyond my present scope. The
analysis below, however, covers the core components of the U.S. system and captures its
overall complexity.
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A. The Formal Rules of the Game
Since the "law matters" thesis is our jumping-off point, I will
begin with Delaware corporate law. Delaware has opted for an
enabling approach to corporate law that affords corporate constitu-
encies-by which I primarily mean directors, officers, and share-
holders-flexibility to order their affairs privately." The asserted
benefit of private ordering is that it affords a corporation and its
constituencies the flexibility to adapt the company's governance
structure as appropriate to fit the company's particular governance
and business needs over time.69 This stands in contrast to a
mandatory model of corporate law, in which a fixed set of typically
more restrictive rules would be imposed on companies, reflecting a
"one-size-fits-all" approach to regulating corporate governance.7 ° If
all companies were the same, a mandatory "one-size-fits-all"
approach might make sense. The reality, though, is that companies
have different business needs, different corporate cultures and ways
68. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware's Corporate-Law System: Is Corporate America
Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A Response to Kahan & Kamar's Price
Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1257 (2001) (arguing in
favor of Delaware's enabling approach to corporate law); E. Norman Veasey, Should
Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate Governance Practices-Or Vice
Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2179 (2001) (describing the enabling model as being "based
on a few fundamental statutory guideposts and latitude for private ordering, with primary
reliance on self-governance centered around judicial decision making in applying fiduciary
duties to fact-intensive settings"); see generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL,
THE ECONOMIC STRUC n RE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991) (developing the contractarian approach
to the firm and corporate law). The U.S. approach is not only enabling insofar as the content
of corporate law is concerned, but also in that there is regulatory competition among the
states for corporate charters. Accordingly, to the extent that certain legal rules are
mandatory, parties can opt out of them by incorporating in other jurisdictions. The argument
that corporate law should be enabling is part and parcel of the contractarian model of the
firm.
69. For further development of this point in the context of the regulatory responses to the
scandals at Enron and elsewhere, see Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate
Governance, and Some Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
IMPLICATIONS (Bala Dharan & Nancy Rapoport eds., 2003).
70. For criticism of a "one-size-fits-all" mandatory approach to corporate governance, see
Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE's Director Independence Listing Standards,
30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370 (2002); Paredes, supra note 69; Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1
(2003).
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of doing things, and different people and personalities, all of which
are subject to change."'
Delaware's enabling approach is not without moorings, however.
The Delaware corporation code contains a number of key provisions,
although most are default rules that can be transacted around and
few of the provisions limit the expropriation of wealth by insiders to
any significant extent.72 In fact, one of the most important statutory
provisions is Delaware General Corporation Law section 141(a),
which provides that the "business and affairs of every corporation
... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of direc-
tors." 3 This provision provides an expansive grant of authority to
the board and, in effect, the officers to whom the board typically
delegates day-to-day managerial control.
This is not to say that shareholders do not have any "positive"
control rights over the corporation granting them direct input into
and say over how the corporation is governed or whether certain
business opportunities are pursued. Shareholders have the right to
vote for the board of directors, most importantly, and can make
recommendations on governance and business matters to the board
through the shareholder proposal process.7 4 Shareholders also have
the right to vote on certain mergers and on any proposed sale of
all or substantially all of the corporation's assets. In addition, a
company's articles of incorporation cannot be amended without
shareholder approval, and shareholders can vote to amend the
71. See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of
Attention: Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1491-92 (1984).
72. Often defaults turn out to be quite inflexible in practice as a result of., among other
things, endowment effects, anchoring and framing biases, and transactions costs. The
distinction between mandatory and default rules, therefore, is less sharp in reality than in
theory. For an interesting analysis of the psychological effects of default rules, see Russell
Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default
Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REv. 1583 (1998).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001). This provision is typical of other states. See,
e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1984).
74. Notably, nonshareholder constituencies, such as employees, have no legal authority
over a corporation's internal affairs, unless they also happen to be shareholders.
Nonshareholder constituencies, nonetheless, can often exert a great deal of pressure on
management. For interesting discussions of the role of employees in corporate governance,
see EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999);
see also Blair & Stout, supra note 14 (developing a team production model of the firm in which
shareholders do not have primacy over other corporate constituencies).
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bylaws. Shareholders, however, do not have any authority to
manage the day-to-day business directly or to set overall corporate
policy and strategy, unless granted such control in the certificate of
incorporation, which happens rarely, if ever.
The Delaware courts have further cabined shareholder control
rights by broadly interpreting the board's authority to manage the
business. The Delaware courts, for example, have held that
directors have the right to take defensive steps to fend off a hostile
bidder, which effectively blocks shareholders from selling their
shares, even though the bidder might have offered a significant
premium for the company.m In most instances, the board, and not
shareholders, also gets to decide whether to bring a derivative suit
against directors and officers who allegedly breached their fiduciary
duties.7" Deciding whether to sell the company to a hostile bidder or
to sue directors and officers are not, however, ordinary business
decisions akin to deciding whether to build a new factory, to hire
additional employees, or to enter a new line of business." Rather,
they are perhaps better characterized as "ownership" issues that
shareholders should have final say over because they directly affect
the right of shareholders to sell their shares and to enforce the
fiduciary duties management owes them."
75. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see generally ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR.
& ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSES (6th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2002). For recent
arguments in favor of expanding shareholder choice in the takeover setting by constraining
boards in adopting defensive tactics, see Paredes, supra note 14; Robert B. Thompson & D.
Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate
Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261 (2001).
76. For a discussion of the demand requirement in derivative litigation, see ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW §§ 15.1-15.3 (1986); CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERTB. THOMPSON,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 325-69 (4th ed.
2003).
77. See generally Paredes, supra note 14; Thompson & Smith, supra note 75.
78. See Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After
Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 5-6 (1985) (distinguishing"ownership" from "enterprise" issues).
Not to mention, of course, that directors and officers might find themselves in an inherently
conflicted position when evaluating a hostile bid that will result in their ouster or when
deciding whether to sue themselves or other members of the management team. For
arguments that the right to respond to hostile takeover attempts falls within the scope of the
right of shareholders to vote and sell their shares, see Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 819 (1981); Paredes, supra note 14; Thompson & Smith, supra note 75. For the view that
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Not only are the rights of shareholders to sell and sue restricted
in practice, but the shareholder franchise is also limited in
practice.79 For the most part, management controls the shareholder
voting process and sets the voting agenda, which heavily influences
results. The federal proxy rules' supplement shareholder voting
rights under state corporate law by granting shareholders limited
access to the company's proxy materials for the purpose of making
proposals for a shareholder vote; but even here, the board of
directors can omit many, if not most shareholder proposals from the
corporation's proxy materials and can ignore other proposals that
relate to how the business is run, even if they receive a majority
shareholder vote."' Finally, few shareholders, other than institu-
tional investors, own enough stock to make it worthwhile to monitor
the company actively. Likewise, the cost of complying with the
extensive disclosure requirements of the federal proxy rules as well
as the risk of liability for failing to comply can chill shareholder
communication and deter shareholders from waging proxy contests,
which can cost millions of dollars. In other words, coordination
difficulties and rational apathy frustrate shareholder efforts to
exercise their franchise, although proxy solicitation and shareholder
service firms, such as Institutional Shareholder Services and the
Investor Responsibility Research Council, have helped mitigate
the right to fend off a hostile bid falls within the scope of the board's authority to manage the
enterprise, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers:
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791 (2003); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom:A Response to Professors Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231
(1980). For a good recent summary of the debate between those who advocate shareholder
choice and those who support the board's right to respond to hostile bids, see Jennifer Arlen
& Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2004).
79. For a useful overview of the right of shareholders to vote, sell, and sue, see generally
Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting
Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 215 (1999).
80. For an overview of the federal proxy rules, see Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
FuNDAMENTALS OF SEcURITIES REGULATION 488-561 (4th ed. 2001).
81. See Shareholder Proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2003). Rule 14a-8 affords
shareholders limited access to their company's proxy materials. The company can omit
shareholder proposals in several instances, such as when the shareholder proposal relates to
the company's ordinary business or is not considered a proper subject of shareholder action
under state law, although shareholders can get around this by making precatory proposals
that are nonbinding on management. Id. For an overview of the shareholder proposal process,
see Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 80, at 510-33.
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these problems. This all having been said, the SEC has recently
taken important steps toward amending its rules under the federal
securities laws to allow shareholders to include shareholder-
nominated directors in the corporation's proxy statement.s2 Greater
shareholder access to the company's ballot for electing directors
could have significant implications for how corporations are run,
easing concerns arising from the fact that shareholders exercise
little control over the firm otherwise.
Given the far-reaching authority directors and officers have to
manage the business, which characterizes the separation of owner-
ship and control, the key corporate governance challenge is to
control agency costs. When the interests of directors and officers
conflict with the best interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers, the concern is that management will tend to act in its own self-
interest. For example, managers might decide to shirk, pay
themselves excessive compensation packages, have fancy corporate
jets and other perks, or build an empire by acquiring companies, all
to the detriment of the company and shareholder value.
Although fiduciary duties do not reallocate control to sharehold-
ers, fiduciary duties constrain management's exercise of its
authority and thus are a sort of "negative" control right that
shareholders exert over the business.' The fiduciary duty of care
requires managers to run the company with reasonable care. 4
Directors and officers, for example, are expected to spend the time
and effort needed to make prudent business decisions and to set an
appropriate course for the company. The duty of loyalty charges
directors and officers with acting honestly and prohibits them from
looting the company, engaging in self-dealing transactions unfair to
the corporation, or otherwise acting in their own self-interest. 5 The
concept of good faith is marbled into both the duty of care and the
82. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 48,626, Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 87,101, at 88,401 (Oct. 14, 2003).
83. Controlling shareholders also owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders. For more
on the complex relationship between controlling and minority shareholders, see F. HODGE
O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (2d ed.
1985).
84. See CLARK, supra note 76, §§ 3.4-3.5; O'ELLEY& THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 230-75.
85. See CLARK, supra note 76, §§ 5.1-5.4; O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 276-
324.
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duty of loyalty, although the Delaware Supreme Court-Chief
Justice E. Norman Veasey, in particular-has suggested that there
is a separate fiduciary duty of good faith.8" The sum and substance
of the fiduciary duty of good faith remains unknown, but one can
surmise that, when fleshed out, it will be more substantive in
nature than the procedural duty of care.
Fiduciary duties, like any other open-ended standard, are flexible.
The Delaware judiciary can accordingly develop corporate law in an
incremental fashion on a case-by-case basis, and can adapt the law
of fiduciary duties to respond to changes in business and gover-
nance. This results in what many believe to be a more efficient
law-one that is better tailored to the evolving needs of corporations
and their constituencies." A dark side, however, accompanies this
flexibility: uncertainty. Some have criticized Delaware corporate law
as too indeterminate." The concern should not be exaggerated,
however. Today, Delaware has a very well-developed body of case
law, making it more rule-like. More importantly, a very sophisti-
cated and experienced judiciary administers the law of fiduciary
duties against the background norm of shareholder primacy." The
86. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998); E. Norman Veasey, State-
Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional Responsibilities of Advisors,
28 J. CoRP. L. 441, 444-46 (2003).
87. For more on the efficiency of the common law generally, see George L. Priest, The
Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STuD. 65 (1977); Paul
H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977). Noteworthy in this
regard is the lack of any meaningful legislative response, to date, in Delaware following Enron
and the other scandals. The Delaware courts, however, are already reconsidering the law of
fiduciary duty and related principles in light of the recent abuses. See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding that certain social and personal ties
compromised the independence of directors on a special litigation committee); Leo E. Strine,
Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of the
Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1377-85 (2002) (discussing possible impacts of the
corporate scandals on the development of Delaware corporate law).
88. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205 (2001). But see Strine, supra note 68 (arguing in favor of the
flexibility of Delaware corporate law).
89. As Vice Chancellor Strine commented:
While the Delaware Model might subject firms to litigation, these firms readily
accept that risk as a cost of greater fleibility, especially because they know that
the litigation they face will have the following two characteristics: (1) it will
likely be administered by a Delaware judiciary well schooled in corporate law
and with a track record of producing rational results, and (2) it will be governed
by a body of statutory and decisional corporation law which articulates many
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combination of these factors limits the range of likely outcomes in
any given case; and the Delaware judges themselves seem to
recognize the need to avoid "wild doctrinal swings" that can
interfere with the private sector by injecting too much uncertainty
into economic and commercial affairs.9° The norm of shareholder
primacy is particularly important to shareholders if fiduciary duties
are to protect them against insider abuses or, for that matter,
against the interests of other constituencies, such as employees or
creditors, that might conflict with maximizing share value.9'
The efficacy of fiduciary duties in holding directors and officers
accountable, though, is limited. First, courts are reluctant to
second-guess management and, under the business judgment rule,
generally defer to directors and officers in the exercise of their
authority so long as they have acted in good faith and loyally.92 The
fiduciary duty of care, for example, is about procedural due care and
not substantive due care. Courts review the decision-making process
of directors and officers, but generally do not regulate the substance
of their business decisions. Although management is supposed to act
reasonably, directors and officers will not be held liable for faulty
norms that, if followed at a time of the transaction being litigated, can limit the
possibility of an adverse judgment.
Strine, supra note 68, at 1263.
The shareholder primacy norm has been called into question by some on both positive and
normative grounds. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 14; Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic
Reality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547 (1993); G. Mitu
Gulati et al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2000); Thomas A. Smith, The
Efficient Norm for Corporate Law:ANeotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 214 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy,
75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002). I have responded to a number of the critiques of shareholder
primacy elsewhere. See Paredes, supra note 14.
90. Veasey, supra note 68, at 2180 ("At the same time, courts should be reluctant to
interfere with business decisions and should not create surprises or wild doctrinal swings in
their expectations of directorial behavior."); see also William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope
of Delaware Corporate Law, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 70, 71 (2000) ("But the Delaware General
Corporation Law has survived and even though it is kept evergreen by careful annual
amendment, it continues to reflect its original commitment to private ordering, flexibility,
predictability and fairness.").
91. The debate over the value of Delaware's flexible approach to corporate law has
spawned an interesting empirical literature of late. See, e.g., Robert Daines, Does Delaware
Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, THE
DISAPPEARING DELAWARE EFFECT (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion Paper No. 391, 2002),
available at http'J/ssrn.com/abstract=345040.
92. See CLAR, supra note 76, §§ 3.4-3.5; O'KELLEY &THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 230-60.
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process unless they were grossly negligent.93 It is true that courts
more aggressively monitor the duty of loyalty, but the legal
sanctions for disloyalty and self-dealing remain relatively modest.
Generally, an abusing insider is required to pay a "fair price" for the
self-dealing transaction or to disgorge himself of any personal gain
arising from a corporate opportunity that belonged to the corpora-
tion.94 The duty of loyalty would discourage self-interested conduct
more strongly if it were backed by stricter legal sanctions. 5
This, of course, all assumes that shareholders can even bring a
suit for breach of fiduciary duty. As mentioned earlier, shareholders
face a number of procedural hurdles, most notably the demand
requirement, before they can bring a derivative action against
directors and officers for breach of fiduciary duty. 6 Even if a suit is
brought and won, management is still insulated from liability,
especially in duty-of-care cases, by exculpatory charter provisions
93. The duty of care generally requires directors to exercise reasonable care in performing
their duties. Courts are reluctant to find that a board has breached its duty of care. As
Professor Eisenberg has pointed out, although directors are supposed to "act reasonably,"
courts generally have adopted a more lax standard of review. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM
L. REv. 437 (1993) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Divergence of Standards]. Directors are rarely, if
ever, held liable for simple negligence. In most cases, directors will not be held liable for
breach of the duty of care unless they were grossly negligent. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). Accordingly, Eisenberg has suggested that the duty of care reflects
more of an aspiration or norm than a legal mandate. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law
and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1253, 1265-71 (1999) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Social
Norms].
The focus on the process of corporate decision making rather than its substance reflects two
key concerns: first, that with the benefit of hindsight, courts will tend to be too critical of
management and management will become too risk averse; and second, that judges lack the
business competency to challenge management's good faith business judgment. The business
judgment rule, further, reflects a hands-off approach that allows the parties to govern
themselves and to work out their disagreements and order their affairs without excessive
judicial interference. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1619 (2001) (explaining
that corporate law carves out a large swath of corporate conduct to be regulated by"nonlegally
enforceable rules and standards").
94. See, e.g., STOUT, supra note 45, at 5-8 (summarizing sanctions for breach of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty).
95. See id. at 6 (calling the duty of loyalty "toothless [").
96. Before bringing a derivative action, shareholders are generally required to make a
demand on the board of directors to initiate the suit on the corporation's behalf unless it
would be futile to do so. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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insulating directors from monetary damages," indemnification
rights,98 and directors and officers (D&O) insurance.
B. Why Do Shareholders Still Invest?
Given the limited protection Delaware corporate law provides
shareholders, especially when it comes to bad business decisions,"
why do shareholders still invest? In other words, what controls
managerial agency costs if corporate law does not? One well-known
answer is that corporations typically "bond" management in a way
that aligns management's interests with those of shareholders. Here
we can think of stock options, restricted stock, and other forms of
incentive-based compensation that encourage directors and officers
to maximize corporate profits.'
Markets also protect investors. Product markets, the market for
capital, the market for corporate control, and the market for
management are all said to discipline directors and officers to run
97. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 76,
at 260-65.
98. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2001); CLARK, supra note 76, § 15.10; OKELLEY
& THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 370-78.
99. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 58 (explaining the limits of corporate law in protecting
shareholders, especially against bad business decisions).
100. Of course, as we recently discovered with the wave of corporate scandals starting with
Enron, one way to raise earnings is to run the business better; another way is to "cook the
books." Incentive-based compensation was intended to ameliorate agency costs by aligning the
interests of directors and officers with the shareholders' interests. It turns out that the huge
equity compensation packages might also have created pressures to manage earnings. See
Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game," Remarks at N.Y.U. Center for Law & Business (Sept.
28, 1998), available at http'//www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt. At the
very least, tying compensation to stock performance might bias directors and officers to focus
too much on the short term, at the expense of more effective long-term business planning, in
an effort to beat upcoming earnings targets. For more on earnings management and the role
it played in the recent corporate scandals, see JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., WHAT CAUSED ENRON?:
A CAPsuLE SOcIAL AND ECONOMIc HISTORY OF THE 1990's (Columbia Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 214, 2003), available at httpJ/ssrn.comlabstract373581. The SEC has responded
to concerns about earnings management by, among other things, requiring more disclosure
regarding pro forma financial measures and earnings announcements. See Conditions for Use
of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, Exchange Act Release No. 47,226 [2002-2003 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 86,816 (Jan. 22, 2003). In addition, part and parcel of the
market-based U.S. governance system, companies have begun to structure compensation
packages so that they are tied to long-run performance.
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the business more profitably. 1 ' Lately, market pressures have
caused companies to revamp their governance structures in
response to concerns about corporate abuses. °2 The general logic is
that companies need to be run efficiently and managed properly to
succeed in a competitive marketplace. Further, if profits drop, a
company should face a higher cost of capital, which could further
impede its competitiveness against companies with lower cost
structures and perhaps less constraining debt covenants and less
burdensome principal and interest payments. If a company is not
run well or its governance is questionable, its shareholders can
always follow the "Wall Street Rule" and sell into the market,
putting downward pressure on the company's share price. At some
point the company might become a takeover target, in which case
the board and top executives are likely to be ousted. Short of the
company being acquired, the board might remove senior executives
if the company's share price continues to fall. It is also possible for
shareholders to elect new directors if they become dissatisfied with
the direction in which the incumbent board is taking the company.
Not only do managers worry about retaining their jobs, maximiz-
ing their bonuses, and keeping their companies competitive, but
they worry about their reputations. In addition to job loss, fewer
directorship opportunities, or a personal financial hit, directors and
officers worry about the shame and embarrassment-the "disdain
in the eyes of one's acquaintances"' 3-they might suffer when, for
example, they are scorned in the papers or on CNBC for rejecting
good corporate governance practices, allegedly looting the business
by receiving an excessive compensation package, or simply taking
the company in some ill-advised direction.'0 4 One from time-to-time
101. See generally O'ELLY & THOMPSON, supra note 76, at 11-12 (summarizing the role
of markets in corporate law). Mark Roe has recently stressed the importance of markets and
other nonlegal pressures when it comes to monitoring bad business decisions. See Roe, supra
note 58.
102. For more on market-based responses to the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and
elsewhere, see Paredes, supra note 69; Ribstein, supra note 70.
103. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1104 (1997).
104. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1793-97 (2001); Eisenberg, Social
Norms, supra note 93, at 1268-71; Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information
Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003); Rock,
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sees full-page advertisements in the Wall Street Journal urging
management to take some course of conduct or criticizing manage-
ment for some ill-advised behavior. These types of "shaming"
sanctions are an important complement to other sanctions and
monitoring mechanisms holding directors and offices accountable.
No company or top executive is immune from market pressures
or shame and embarrassment. Microsoft and Jack Welch, for
instance, provide two recent examples of the significant impact
these influences can have. Microsoft has decided to give employees
restricted stock instead of stock options and has declared its first
dividend. 105 The highly respected Welch, after retiring at the end of
a very successful run as CEO and chairman of General Electric,
decided to restructure his retirement package in the face of the
public's outcry over what it saw as an outlandish exit package for
him.' °
The U.S. corporate governance system also relies on directors
and officers "to do the right thing" by voluntarily taking steps to
maximize firm value even when nobody is watching and there is
little if any risk of market or legal sanction. Norms have received a
great deal of recent attention as an important extralegal governance
device."°7 By "norms" I do not mean those steps that managers take
to please the market or to avoid shame or a lawsuit, although
sometimes "norms" is used broadly this way. Rather, I am referring
to a sense of right and wrong-a sense of duty and responsibil-
ity-that directors and officers internalize and enforce on them-
supra note 103; Rock & Wachter, supra note 93, at 1694-97; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001); see also Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339 (2000) (developing an expressive theory of the
law that depends on the preference of people for approval).
105. See Ken Brown, As Taxes Fall, Dividends Rise-And Executives Reap Big Gains, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 11, 2003, at Al; Robert A. Guth & Joann S. Lublin, Tarnished Gold: Microsoft
Ushers Out Era of Options, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2003, at Al.
106. See Carol Hymowitz, In the Lead: Investors Have to Lead the Charge .to Keep Big
Bosses in Line, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2002, at B1.
107. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note 93; Donald C. Langevoort, The Human
Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence
and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797 (2001); Rock, supra note 103; Symposium, Norms and
Corporate Law, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1607 (2001); see generally Symposium, Law, Economics, &
Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996). For more on the closely related concept of trust, which
is also important in corporate law, see Blair & Stout, supra note 104.
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selves simply because it is the right thing to do.' °8 We could think of
this in terms of a self-enforced obligation to act in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders.0 9 As Delaware Supreme
Court Chief Justice Veasey has stated:
There is a significant self-governing aspect to the corporation
law in that daily functions of the enterprise are based largely on
norms .... Self-governance works for the most part because of the
sensitivity of directors to do what is right, what is professional,
what is honorable, and what is profitable."0
108. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 104 (explaining the importance of trust and
trustworthiness in corporate law); STOUT, supra note 45, at 10 ("In lay terms, corporate
insiders act like fiduciaries not only because they fear external sanctions, but also because
they have internalized a sense of obligation or responsibility toward others ..... ); LYNN A.
STOUT, OTHER-REGARDING PREFERENCES AND SOCIAL NORMS (Georgetown Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 265902, 2001), available at http:/ssrn.com/abstract=265902. Rock
explains:
All of us internalize rules and standards of conduct with which we generally try
to comply. We do this not only because we may fear some sanction, formal or
informal, but also because doing so is important to our sense of self-worth,
because we believe that doing a good job is the right thing to do.
Rock, supra note 103, at 1013; see also ROBERT COOTER, Do GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD CITIZENS?
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INTERNALIZING LEGAL VALUES (UC Berkeley Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 2000-8, 2000), available at http//ssrn.com/abstract=229950 (providing an economic
analysis of values).
109. Self-enforcement is particularly important because it eases the burden on the market
to monitor management and does not depend on the risk of legal sanctions to deter directors
and officers. Lynn Stout states:
[E]xternal incentives, alone, can only influence the behavior of the rationally
selfish actor when two criteria are met. First, her behavior must be observable
to others. Second, some one [sic] (or something) must be willing and able to
reward her good behavior and to punish her bad behavior-and to reward or
punish sufficiently.
STOUT, supra note 108, at 20. Further, many obstacles compromise the ability of the market
and of the law to discipline managers. Plus, by the time market or legal sanctions are
imposed, the damage is often already done.
110. Veasey, supra note 68, at 2180. Former Chancellor Allen amplified the point this way:
Corporate directors are, for the most part, morally of the same sort as the rest
of us. They prefer to do the right thing .... Moreover, like the rest of us, they will
even prefer to incur some cost to be able to say to themselves (and their families)
that they have done the right thing.
William T. Allen, 20th Century Evolution and Growth of Delaware Corporation Law, 17 WTR
DEL. LAW. 16, 20 (2000). Chancellor Allen's point echoes the argument above that shaming
and embarrassment are important control devices. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying
text.
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The duty of care is often cited as evidence that managers regulate
themselves. Directors and officers widely comply with the standard
of care to act reasonably, although there is very little risk of legal
liability for falling short, as explained earlier."'
How norms get internalized is unclear. It might be that we feel
good about ourselves when we do what we think is right; or we
might in fact be genuinely concerned about the welfare of others, a
purer form of altruism. Whatever the explanation, studies show that
people often act in an other-regarding manner or in a way that
seems to benefit others, and not in their narrow self-interest like
homo economicus.1
Consistent with the view that the law serves an expressive
function,"' the Delaware judges are active and influential "norm
entrepreneurs.""' Despite taking a more-or-less hands-off approach
when it comes to holding directors and officers liable for breaching
their fiduciary duties, Delaware judges nonetheless encourage
management to adopt standards of good corporate conduct. Ed Rock,
for example, has argued that judges are able to successfully
inculcate good corporate conduct through their opinions-which he
111. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 104, at 1789-99; Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra
note 93, at 1266-71; Rock & Wachter, supra note 93, at 1663-70; STOUT, supra note 45, at 10.
112. See Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects within Corporate Agency Relationships,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 31-32 (2002); Blair & Stout, supra note 104, at 1789-99; STOUT, supra
note 45, at 3; STOUT, supra note 108, at 4. "Homo economicus" refers to the model of human
behavior that assumes that individuals are rational and act in their narrow self-interest,
affording no room for individuals to act in the best interests of others. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout,
The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 410 (2002) (describing members of the
"species homo economicus" as "cool, calculating and purely self-interested actors").
113. For more on the expressive function of law, see infra notes 278-82 and accompanying
text.
114. See Blair & Stout, supra note 104, at 1789-99; Eisenberg, Social Norms, supra note
93, at 1266-71; Rock, supra note 103, at 1015. Lynn Stout explains:
The natural implication is that courts and legislatures can change or support
norms through their pronouncements of what people "ought" to do, and so
influence behavior without actually imposing legal sanctions. In other words (as
many scholars have suggested) the law can change behavior through its
"expressive function." Conversely, when a social norm is not supported by the
law (or by some other respected authority, such as a religious institution), it will
likely prove far more ephemeral.
STOUT, supra note 108, at 30; see also STOUT, supra note 45, at 30-31 (discussing the role of
the Delaware courts in shaping norms). For more on "norm entrepreneurs" generally, see
Robert C. Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 10-17 (2001); Cass
R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909, 929-30 (1996).
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describes as "corporate law sermons'"-by expressing how manage-
ment should act, in effect leveraging the other-regarding prefer-
ences of directors and officers."' The Delaware judges often express
their views of the best corporate practices in dicta, laying out
"roadmaps" instructing management how to conduct itself, while at
the same time finding the defendants in the particular case at hand
not liable." 6 Many judges also take the opportunity to exhort
directors and officers to "do the right thing" through speeches and
writings. Chief Justice Veasey has regularly encouraged directors
to adopt the seven specific "aspirational norms for good corporate
practice" that he has offered,"' and Vice Chancellor Strine is as
prolific a writer on corporate law as many top legal scholars. 118 In
addition, it is fair to assume that some judges pass along their views
even more informally through casual conversations with members
of the bar and participation in conferences. The relevant legal and
business communities are, for all intents and purposes, small and
tight-knit, which helps ensure that the judges' views, whether
expressed in opinions or otherwise, are spread throughout the legal
115. Rock states:
[T]he Delaware courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of
conduct (which influence the development of the social norms of directors,
officers, and lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as "corporate
law sermons." ... Taken as a whole, the Delaware opinions can be understood as
providing a set of parables-instructive tales-of good managers and bad
managers, of good lawyers and bad lawyers, that, in combination, fill out the
normative job description of these critical players. My intuition is that we come
much closer to understanding the role of courts in corporate law if we think of
judges more as preachers than as policemen.
See Rock, supra note 103, at 1016.
116. See Douglas M. Branson, Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group
Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L. REV. 85, 104-05 (1990); Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role
of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061,
1079-80 (2000).
117. See, e.g., E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in
Corporate Law, 53 Bus. LAW. 681 (1998); Veasey, supra note 68.
118. See, e.g., William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards
of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287 (2001); William B. Chandler III
& Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American Corporate Governance System:
Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2004); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Categorical Confusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock
Merger Agreements, 56 Bus. LAW. 919 (2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Professorial Bear Hug:
The ESB Proposal as a Conscious Effort to Make the Delaware Courts Confront the Basic "Just
Say No" Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863 (2002); Strine, supra note 87.
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community and ultimately reach top executives and boardrooms. 119
It is not only lawyers who pass what the Delaware judges say along
to senior management and directors; the financial media, share-
holder watchdog groups, and legal academics also disseminate the
message the Delaware bench puts forth. The judiciary's role in
expressing best practices has the added effect of reinforcing the role
of shaming and embarrassment described earlier.
These judicial pronouncements serve two additional benefits
unrelated to encouraging internalized norms. First, the best practice
standards of conduct that the Delaware judges articulate reinforce
the market mechanisms that discipline management. The Delaware
judges express to shareholders what they should expect from
directors and officers, and it is harder for management to reject the
market's demands in the face of what at least some influential
judges-indeed, those who are likely to preside over any disputes
and cases involving alleged fiduciary duty breaches-have set forth
as the proper standards of behavior. 20 In short, these norms serve
119. See Allen, supra note 90, at 73 ("Moreover, informal processes of interaction that are
possible in small communities between judges and between lawyers are more possible and are
enriching both to the judges and the lawyers."); see generally ROBERT C. ELLIcKSON, ORDER
WImoUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPTrEs (1991). Rock has described the relevant
community as follows:
The subjects of the study of U.S. corporate governance-the senior managers
and directors of large, publicly held corporations, and the lawyers who advise
them-form a surprisingly small and close-knit community. The directors of
large, publicly held corporations number roughly four to five thousand. A small
group of lawyers, centered in New York and Wilmington, with others in Chicago
and Los Angeles, specialize in Delaware corporate law. The community has its
own court, the Delaware Chancery Court, with review by the Delaware Supreme
Court. It has its own newspapers: the Wall Street Journal and, for the lawyers,
the New York Law Journal. People know each other and ... apparently care
about their reputation in the community.
Rock, supra note 103, at 1013. Lawyers, of course, have a strong incentive to deliver the
message to their clients, and it will become readily apparent if they fail to, given, for example,
the flurry of client memos law firms distribute highlighting key legal developments.
120. Cf Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1674-75 (1996)
(explaining that while states typically do not strictly enforce no-smoking ordinances, the
posting of such ordinances can embolden private citizens to enforce the rules against
smokers); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1180
(1989) ("The chances that frail men and women will stand up to their unpleasant duty are
greatly increased if they can stand behind the solid shield of a firm, clear principle enunciated
in earlier cases."). For more on how a clear articulation of best practices can facilitate
cooperation, see infra notes 281-88 and accompanying text.
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as a checklist that the market can use to monitor and hold manage-
ment accountable. The flip side is that directors and officers can
signal that they are good, honest, and loyal managers by complying
voluntarily with the judicial suggestions, in effect going above and
beyond what the law mandates. 2' Second, through their informal
communications with the bar and business leaders, the Delaware
judges can give a kind of "preview" of future doctrinal developments,
injecting additional predictability and certainty into corporate
law. For example, Chief Justice Veasey recently remarked, as the
leading financial press reported, that the Delaware courts would
take a harder look at executive compensation in applying the
fiduciary duty of good faith.'22 By way of another example, Vice
Chancellor Strine recently found that a number of Stanford
University colleagues serving on a special litigation committee of
Oracle's board were not independent because of their social and
professional connections to each other and to the defendants,
including Larry Ellison, Oracle's CEO and chairman. 2 a Vice
Chancellor Strine's Oracle decision portends an important doctrinal
turn in Delaware, where directors typically have been found to be
independent unless they have a financial relationship with an
interested party or an interested party otherwise exercises "domin-
ion and control" over the director."24 The case, however, should come
as no surprise to anybody who read the Vice Chancellor's 2002
article suggesting that the Delaware courts should reconsider their
standard of independence in light of the recent wave of corporate
scandal and abuse.'m
One could think of the Delaware judiciary, particularly the
Delaware Court of Chancery, 126 in terms of a specialized administra
121. See infra notes 283-86 and accompanying text.
122. Tom Becker, Delaware Justice Warns Boards of Liability for Executive Pay, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 6,2003, at A14. For a recent "hard look" at executive compensation, see In re The Walt
Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
123. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003). For more on
board independence generally, see, for example, Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. LAW. 921
(1999); Victor Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95
HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors
and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998).
124. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 810-11 (Del. 1984).
125. See Strine, supra note 87, at 1372-74.
126. For an extensive discussion of the unique role played by the Delaware courts in
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tive agency like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 12 7
Members of the Delaware bench are well respected and are
sophisticated and experienced in corporate law matters, often
having been plucked from the ranks of the corporate bar.128 The
large number of cases they see allows the judges to remain current
on important legal questions and to develop a textured approach to
fiduciary duties. 129 The judges are also able to keep their fingers
both on the pulse of the legal community and on governance
practices by remaining actively engaged in legal and business circles
after taking a seat on the bench. 131 Consequently, the judiciary
remains attuned to the kinds of legal developments that might be
necessary to better shape governance structures and corporate
practices. On a more practical level, the Delaware courts are known
corporate law, see Fisch, supra note 116, at 1089 (emphasizing the responsiveness and
sophistication of the Delaware judiciary, including its ability to "fine-tune" its case law in
response to "business developments"); see also Black, supra note 60, at 585-91; John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989); Rock, supra note 103.
127. See Fisch, supra note 116, at 1077-78 (describing Delaware courts as "specialized
courts"); see also Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 29-31 (discussing the role of
"specialized courts" generally).
128. Rock notes:
Because of the enormous discretion exercised by Delaware Chancery and
Supreme Court judges, the personnel are critical. If one is to depend on the
courts to fill out the details of proper behavior in the corporate community, the
judges must be respected by the community. Delaware accomplishes this in two
ways. First, a substantial number of the judges are drawn from the very world
at issue, that is, they are experienced and respected practitioners of Delaware
corporate law. Second, the Delaware courts have traditionally been
characterized by a very high degree of collegiality among the judges, so that even
those judges who did not practice in the area are socialized into the peculiar
practices after joining the court.
Rock, supra note 103, at 1102.
129. See Black, supra note 60, at 589-90.
130. As former Chancellor Allen notes:
Moreover, informal processes of interaction that are possible in small
communities between judges and between lawyers are more possible and are
enriching both to the judges and the lawyers. You have better information on
both sides than you can have in New York, for example. And in small
professional communities such as the Delaware bench and bar, pride in the
tradition of excellence and the importance that Delaware law has played
nationally act as an important non-economic incentive for judges who serve
under the light of national publicity to work hard and do their best. Part of the
secret of Delaware law is you have judges who are very, very diligent.
Allen, supra note 90, at 73.
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to decide cases very quickly,13' which is particularly important
for fast-moving transactions where timing is key. The Delaware
Supreme Court also has a history of acting unanimously in signifi-
cant cases, dampening legal uncertainty by speaking with a unified
voice. 132
Finally, although the judges do not hesitate to express their
aspirations for management, the Delaware judges generally exer-
cise judicial restraint, at least when it comes to imposing liability
and second-guessing management's business decisions. Judicial
restraint is essential to an enabling approach to corporate law,
which allows the parties to organize their affairs as they see fit and
does not interfere unnecessarily in business. 13 3 It is possible that the
Delaware judges have themselves internalized a norm of judicial
restraint.3  Regardless, the judges are able to ensure judicial
restraint, as well as institutional discipline to shareholder primacy,
by holding each other accountable to these standards of judicial
conduct and decision making. The corporate bar, moreover, is itself
a constant monitor of the bench.135 At bottom, a simple observation
might best capture the important role the Delaware courts play: The
Delaware legislature has taken minimal action in response to
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, Global Crossing, and other scandals. It has
been left to the Delaware judiciary to update Delaware corporate
law, primarily through the evolving law of fiduciary duties.
An important set of "second-order" institutions ensures that the
rest of the corporate governance system works. These institutions
include investment bankers, securities analysts, accounting firms, 13
6
131. See Black, supra note 60, at 590.
132. See Fisch, supra note 116, at 1078-79; David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in
Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127 (1997). This explains part of the surprise over
the Delaware Supreme Court's 3-2 split in a recent and important takeover case. See
Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
133. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 93.
134. See Veasey, supra note 117, at 694 (explaining that courts have the obligation to: "(i)
be clear; (ii) be prompt; (iii) be balanced; (iv) have a coherent rationale; v) render decisions
that are stable in the overall continuum; (vi) be intellectually honest; and (vii) properly limit
the function of the court").
135. The Delaware judges can monitor each other because it is a very small and tight-knit
community. Furthe-rmore, the Delaware and New York corporate bars can in turn monitor the
entire Delaware bench to ensure that the judiciary does not overreach by intruding too much
into internal corporate affairs and business matters.
136. Also included are institutions supporting the accounting industry, such as generally
1094 [Vol. 45:1055
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lawyers, 37 credit-rating agencies, broker-dealers, shareholder
watchdog groups, shareholder service firms, and proxy solicitation
firms.138 The financial media is also important. These supporting
institutions, which by and large comprise experienced and sophisti-
cated professionals who see a great amount of "deal flow," 1 39 perform
a number of essential functions that are required for an enabling
model of corporate law to work where atomized share ownership
undercuts shareholder monitoring. These functions include:
ensuring financial transparency; valuing securities; interpreting
and filtering disclosures; monitoring management; evaluating
companies' creditworthiness, and now, their governance structures;
structuring transactions; negotiating settlements; bringing lawsuits
against directors and officers; marketing and underwriting securi-
ties offerings; advising shareholders on how to vote; articulating
"best practices"; and spotting takeover targets. 40 These institutions,
especially underwriters, lawyers, and auditors, also serve an
important role as reputational intermediaries. Specifically, these
institutions facilitate securities offerings and other transactions
when engaged by new or less mature companies that investors
accepted accounting principles, generally accepted auditing standards, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board, and the new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
137. The broader litigation infrastructure of law firms, contingent fees, experienced
attorneys, and relatively easy access to the judicial system should also be noted. Cf. Coffee,
Do Norms Matter?, supra note 11, at 2164-65 ("Together, these three elements-the class
action, the contingent fee, and the American rule on fee shifting-have created in the United
States (but basically nowhere else to any equivalent degree) an entrepreneurial system of
private law enforcement."). Active private law enforcement eases the need for more active
public enforcement of corporate law.
138. For a more extensive accounting of these institutions, see Black, supra note 15, at 793-
96, 799-801; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (explaining that lawyers are "transaction cost
engineers"); Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West, The Dark Side of Private Ordering: An
Institutional and Empirical Analysis of Organized Crime, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 41, 58 (2000)
(discussing "transaction cost engineers"). One might also include corporate law and securities
regulation scholars in the mix.
139. By "deal flow," I mean a steady stream of transactions and matters on which to work.
140. For an argument that breakdowns at investment banks, accounting firms, law firms,
and other "gatekeepers" are largely responsible for the recent scandals, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,"57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002). The
blame lumped on the gatekeepers, and the extensive regulatory reforms enacted to address
gatekeeper conflicts of interest and other gatekeeper-related concerns, are testaments to the
critical role these supporting institutions play in U.S. corporate governance.
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might steer clear from because they are largely unknown and have
no track record or history for the market to evaluate.""
Notwithstanding these important institutions, not all sharehold-
ers can be passive. Institutional investors, therefore, as well as
individual shareholders with significant holdings in companies, also
have an active role to play in overseeing and monitoring companies
and their management. These actors tend to be more active because
of their large financial stakes and better ability to coordinate.
4 2
Not surprisingly, shareholder activism is on the rise in the wake of
the recent scandals. 4 ' Not all shareholder influence is exercised
through the formal channel of the vote or even by selling or suing.
Institutional and large private investors can also bring pressure to
bear on management more informally, such as through phone calls,
letters, and meetings, thereby influencing a corporation's gover-
nance and business plans from behind the scenes.'"
141. Companies can signal that they are honest and reputable businesses with solid
management teams by, in effect, renting the reputation of reputational intermediaries (i.e.,
by hiring top law firms or engaging well-respected underwriters). See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 619-21
(1984); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict
Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001).
142. Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Court of Chancery explained: "[Q]uite bluntly,
it is questionable whether costly government policies ought be directed at placing crutches
under well-heeled investors who can walk for themselves. The most vigorous enforcement of
director fiduciary duties cannot hope to substitute for careful monitoring performed by
rational and active investors ... " Strine, supra note 87, at 1402. For more on institutional
investor activism, including questions that have been raised about the motivations of
institutional investors and portfolio managers, see Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity
Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990); Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional
Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 1277 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time
Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 117 (1988); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863
(1991); Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001).
143. See, e.g., Claudia H. Deutsch, Revolt of the Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003,
§ 3 (Money & Business), at 1; INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CTR. & INTERFAITH CTR.
ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, 2003 SHAREHOLDER PROXY SEASON OVERVIEW: SOCIAL AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESOLUTIONS TRENDS (2003), available at http://www.
shareholderaction.org/filesproxy-seasonoverview.2003.PDF.
144. For more on the "political model" of corporate governance, which depends in large part
on informal pressures being brought to bear by institutional investors on directors and
officers, see John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and
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Although U.S. corporate law is state law, the mandatory disclo-
sure regime of the federal securities laws makes possible the
market-based corporate governance system of the United States."'
Mandatory disclosure, backed by stringent antifraud provisions,
plays a critical role in U.S. corporate governance by ensuring that
investors, with the assistance of the supporting institutions
described above, have adequate information to exercise their rights
to vote, sell, and sue.'" The ability to exercise these rights allows
investors to protect their interests without the need for more
substantive regulation of internal corporate affairs at either the
state or federal level. Further, consistent with the notion of
Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1993).
Corporate law in the United States has traditionally been left to the states. The states, and
not the federal government, have primary responsibility for the substantive regulation of
corporate governance. (Noticeably, state attorneys general, especially Attorney General Elliot
Spitzer of New York, have shown an increased willingness to get involved in regulating
capital markets-although not internal corporate affairs as such-following the recent
scandals.) Companies can choose which state's corporate law to be subject to by their choice
of where to incorporate, with Delaware emerging as the jurisdiction of choice. The resulting
regulatory competition among the states for corporate charters is another enabling feature
of the U.S. system of corporate governance. Whether it is better characterized as a "race to
the top" or "to the bottom," regulatory competition helps ensure that corporate law does not
become too management-friendly and constrains what otherwise could be legislative and
judicial swings in the law that could harm shareholders if there were no "market check" on
regulators. The literature debating whether there has been a race to the bottom or to the top
is extensive. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw (1993);
Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1775 (2002); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?,
62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001); Fisch, supra note 116; Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth
of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002); Joel Seligman, The Case
for Federal Minimum Corporate Law Standards, 49 ND. L. REV. 947 (1990); Ralph Winter,
Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD.
251 (1977). Further, as Sarbanes-Oxley indicates, Congress always can regulate corporate
governance if state corporate law is perceived as too lax. For an interesting article arguing
that the real race is not among states, but between states (namely, Delaware) and the federal
government, see Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
145. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer have recently found that securities laws,
coupled with effective private enforcement, promote initial public offerings of stock.
Interestingly, their study found little evidence that the public enforcement of securities laws
promotes IPOs. LA PORTAETAL., WHATWORKS IN S.CURTIES LAws? (Tuck School of Business
at Dartmouth, Working Paper No. 03-22), available at http'//ssrn.com/abstract=425880.
146. For a summary of the mandatory disclosure regime of the federal securities laws, see
LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 80, at 25-37; Paredes, supra note 104, at 421-31; Robert B.
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869-86 (2003).
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shaming, mandatory disclosure can indirectly affect corporate
governance by deterring misconduct.147 As Louis Loss has stated,
"People who are forced to undress in public will presumably pay
some attention to their figures."'" In addition, as Louis Lowenstein
has explained, disclosure requires directors and officers to focus on
aspects of their own conduct and corporate performance that might
otherwise go unnoticed,'49 in effect forcing insiders to confront
"disagreeable realities" about the business "in detail and early
on."15 ° Consequently, the process of disclosure might bring the
directors and officers to a level of self-awareness about how the
company is being run that will result in steps to improve corporate
performance.' Along similar lines, Robert Thompson and Hillary
Sale reveal in an interesting study that securities fraud class
actions often focus on how the business has been operated, in effect
regulating corporate managers by subjecting them and their
business decisions to greater scrutiny.
152
147. For more on how mandatory disclosure reduces agency costs, see Merritt B. Fox,
Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 113 (1999);
Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763
(1995); Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335 (1996); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure
as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995); A. A. Sommer, Jr.,
Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 263, 263-66 (1976).
148. Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 36 (st ed. 1983).
149. See Lowenstein, supra note 147, at 1342-45; see also Fox, supra note 147, at 123-25
(supporting Professor Lowenstein's reasoning).
150. Lowenstein, supra note 147, at 1342.
151. Id. at 1342-52. Professor Fox has done a good job summarizing Lowenstein's position:
Professor Louis Lowenstein has argued that required disclosure can improve
managerial performance simply by forcing managers to become more aware of
reality .... When managers have the legal obligation to disclose certain
information, they may have to gather and analyze information they would
otherwise ignore. The proposition that this consciousness raising will lead to an
improvement in shareholder welfare rests on two assumptions. First, without
required disclosure, management will not gather and analyze all of the
information that could, in a cost-effective fashion, help it pursue its own
objective function. Second, the managerial objective function is sufficiently
congruent with the best interests of shareholders so that if management,
because of required disclosure, determines how to better pursue its objective
function, the actions it will take will also improve shareholder welfare. Both
assumptions, though debatable, are plausible.
Fox, supra note 147, at 123-24.
152. See Thompson & Sale, supra note 146.
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Notwithstanding its disclosure orientation, the federal securi-
ties laws regulate corporate governance more directly in important
ways. The federal securities laws, for example, regulate proxies,
shareholder proposals, and tender offer bids, generally in a manner
protective of shareholders.' They also regulate broker-dealers and
investment companies, 154 as well as authorize the SEC to oversee
the stock exchanges. 155 To the extent the law on the books matters
in the United States, it is the federal securities laws that have the
most impact. 56 Indeed, the principal regulatory response to the
scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and elsewhere was Sarbanes-Oxley,
which revamped the federal securities laws to require more
disclosure and to redress flaws in the U.S. corporate governance
system that allegedly compromised many of the institutions on
which the market relies, particularly such gatekeepers as analysts,
accountants, and lawyers. Not to be overlooked when considering
federal securities regulation is that the SEC, responsible for admin-
istering the federal securities laws, is a highly regarded federal
administrative agency with a sophisticated and experienced staff of
professionals." '
The stock exchanges are a final source of rules to mention. To
list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or NASDAQ, for
example, a company must comply with extensive listing require-
ments, which, to a greater extent than the federal securities laws,
regulate internal corporate affairs; but unlike the enabling approach
of Delaware corporate law, listing requirements are mandatory in
nature, at least for companies who choose to list on a particular
exchange.5 8 Following Enron and the other scandals, the NYSE and
153. See Loss & SELiGMAN, supra note 80, at 488-630.
154. See id. at 753-836.
155. See id. at 715-34.
156. For a more extended consideration of this point, see Roe, supra note 144.
157. Although the federal securities laws are extensive and complex, "no-action letters"
help reduce transactional and legal uncertainty and provide some measure of predictability.
Also, the SEC, together with the Department of Justice, is facing its own regulatory
competition lately, as state attorneys general, most notably New York Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, have stepped up their efforts to prosecute directors, officers, corporations, major Wall
Street firms, analysts, and others for alleged corporate abuses and frauds. See Deborah
Solomon, Zealous States Shake Up Legal Status Quo, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2003, at A4.
158. Stock exchange listing standards are voluntary in the sense that a company can
choose not to list on a particular exchange; they are, however, mandatory once a company is
listed and begins to trade on the exchange. For more on the potential role of listing standards
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the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) have
adopted extensive revisions to their listing standards, especially
when it comes to the board of directors, perhaps filling a gap left by
the state legislatures. 159
Lastly, the importance of the backdrop of political, economic, and
social stability against which all of the foregoing plays out cannot be
overstated. There is confidence, for example, that the rules of the
game will not change too dramatically too quickly, that bribery and
corruption are not rampant, that the government will not national-
ize businesses or industries or direct capital flows, that the corpo-
rate governance system works effectively, and that people can trust
one another and have reason to cooperate. In short, the rule of law
and governmental respect for private property, individual auton-
omy, and the private control of business matter, as do a host of other
legal and enforcement institutions that are in the background, not
the least of which being the institutions of contract law and property
law. At an even more basic level, in the main, there is no concern in
the United States about violence over a business deal. In contrast,
recent reports suggest that the fear of violence and an overhang of
general insecurity are deterring business and investment in Iraq.160
However disgruntled some people might be with how things are
done in the United States, the concerns are not so great as to
seriously disrupt order. Further, because people expect, or at least
hope, to be repeat players, in business tomorrow and into the
foreseeable future, their reputations matter, making market and
shaming sanctions workable and facilitating cooperation.
The real harm from Enron, WorldCom, and the other scandals
was not the billions of dollars that investors lost or the thousands
of jobs lost, troubling as this was, but the fact that these scandals
shook the confidence upon which our corporate governance system,
our securities markets, and our overall economic structure depend.
Interestingly, for a corporate governance system dependent on
relatively little law, strong regulatory steps were taken to restore
confidence.
to financial development, see Coffee, supra note 18; CHEFFINS, LAW AS BEDROCK, supra note
18.
159. The NASD, of course, also regulates broker-dealers and securities analysts.
160. See King, supra note 49 (reporting that "continuing shootings and explosions ... have
snuffed out much of the early investor enthusiasm").
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C. Overall Coherence and "System Logic"
The U.S. model of corporate governance does have a coherent
"system logic." It strikes an important balance between managerial
discretion for directors and officers to run the business on the one
hand and adequate shareholder protection on the other, while
allowing parties to organize their corporate affairs as they see fit
giv-3n their company's particular needs over time. 161 U.S. corporate
law generally achieves this balance through a set of nonmandatory
default rules that the parties can contract around. To be sure, there
can be too little shareholder protection-in other words, too little
managerial accountability-but there can also be too much. The
concern is that too much accountability, especially legal accountabil-
ity, will regulate risk out of the market as managers become overly
cautious and tentative to the detriment of shareholders and
economic growth more broadly. To encourage innovation, entre-
preneurism, and risk taking, the balancing of the U.S. system errs
on the side of managerial discretion, particularly when it comes to
substantive corporate law.'62 Further, wide leeway for directors and
officers in steering the company's course encourages thick capital
markets by easing the managerial burden on shareholders who
either prefer to be passive or are simply unable to coordinate.
Managerial discretion, then, is part and parcel of the specialization
of function-where professional managers specialize in managing
161. For more on this balance and the benefits of flexibility, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1, 31-33 (2002) (discussing the
tradeoff between managerial discretion and corporate accountability); Black & Kraakman,
supra note 57, at 1920-21 (explaining that developed economies can rely on private control
mechanisms, instead of mandatory rules, to discipline management); Pistor et al., supra note
47, at 796 (explaining that corporate law regimes fall on a "flexibility-rigidity continuum" and
that greater flexibility depends on the presence of nonlegal "complementary control devices"
that hold management accountable).
162. See, e.g., Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1921 ("These multiple private and legal
controls shoulder much of the burden of protecting investors in public companies, so that the
corporate law itself can tilt far in the direction of providing managerial discretion and
enhancing transactional flexibility."); Strine, supra note 68, at 1279 ("Delaware corporate law
generally permits corporate managers wide flexibility and errs on the side of managerial
freedom.").
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and shareholders specialize in bearing economic risk-that is a
hallmark of dispersed ownership." 3
Even after the recent corporate scandals, investor confidence has
been restored. U.S. equity markets and the U.S. corporate gover-
nance system have been able to withstand the fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement that inevitably creep in as a cost of managerial
discretion and private ordering and that often leave shareholders
exposed to insider abuses. 64 In fact, the cost of rooting out more
fraud, abuse, and mismanagement is too high in terms of forgone
risk-taking, the distraction of management's attention from running
the business to focusing on governance matters, and out-of-pocket
costs of complying with a host of new requirements.'65 Perhaps the
best indicator of the resilience of the U.S. system is that U.S. stock
markets have rebounded following the major sell-off after the wave
of scandals broke starting with Enron. Although concerns remain,
the market discount for corporate governance troubles has largely
been wrung out of stock prices, and there was never any serious
concern that U.S. equity markets would collapse or become so
illiquid as to cease being functional.
This is not to say that the U.S. corporate governance system, or
Delaware in particular, is perfect or that the balance referred to
above does not tilt too heavily in management's favor from time to
163. In this view, specialization is an efficiency-based argument for separating ownership
from managerial control. For more on the specialization of function between managers and
shareholders, see Fama & Jensen, supra note 30, at 307-17; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder
Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV.
347, 353 (1991); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA.
L. REV. 259, 261 (1967); CHEFFniS, LAW AS BEDROCK, supra note 18, at 15-30.
164. Pistor and her co-authors explain:
Our analysis of the evolution of corporate law suggests that the function of
corporate law is much more complex, involving a tradeoff between agency
problems and flexibility.... [A] corporate law that allows greater flexibility
implies more misuse, and thus higher agency costs. The historical challenge of
the corporate law has been to balance these two conflicting interests and develop
complementary legal control mechanisms that afforded corporations (i.e.,
corporate management) with substantial flexibility without creating a control
vacuum.
Pistor et al., supra note 47, at 796. There is, of course, a dark side to confidence, which is
complacency. See Ribstein, supra note 70, at 24-25.
165. These very concerns have been expressed about the new requirements Sarbanes-Oxley
mandates.
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time. 166 In fact, the scandals signaled that the balance had gone
awry and that the governance system suffered from a number of
deep flaws. U.S. corporate governance has reequilibrated itself,
however. In addition to a strong regulatory response from Congress,
the SEC, and the stock exchanges (not to mention New York
Attorney General Spitzer and the U.S. Department of Justice),
several strong market-based responses occurred, including a major
sell-off of stocks and a rise in shareholder activism, to which issuers,
accounting firms, investment banks, individual directors and
officers, and others have responded. 167 The ability of the U.S. capital
markets to withstand a series of scandals on the scale of Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia, to name just a few, demonstrates
the U.S. corporate governance system's overall effectiveness and
resilience. Can a market-based model of corporate governance like
that of the United States be replicated elsewhere, though? Should
policymakers even try?
III. IS THE U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM
TRANSPLANTABLE?
In the U.S. corporate governance system, the corporate law on the
books is a small part of a more complex system. What matters for
U.S. corporate governance, or any other market-based approach to
corporate governance, is the overall set of relationships, duties,
obligations, interactions, customs, and practices that discipline
insider abuses and encourage managers to maximize share value
while giving them enough leeway to do so. Put differently, formal
and informal institutions are what matter; a view that others have
emphasized in various settings, including corporate governance, and
166. For example, norms can be sticky and inefficient; stock options and other incentive-
based executive compensation packages can create perverse incentives for management to
manage earnings or otherwise "cook the books"; companies often have to underperform for a
sustained period of time before being out-competed by rivals; the interests of mutual fund
managers and institutional investors often conflict with the interests of individual investors;
directors have a great deal of discretion to fend off hostile bids, insulating themselves from
the disciplining pressures of an active market for corporate control; and states, in competition
with one another for corporate charters and the fees and other benefits that go along with
them, might adopt corporate law regimes that are favorable to management which decides
where to incorporate, potentially at the expense of shareholders.
167. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 69; Ribstein, supra note 70.
20041 1103
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
which is closely related to the school of thought known as "new
institutional economics."'68
On one level, the "institutions matter" perspective, in which
corporate law takes a backseat to other factors in explaining
dispersed share ownership in the United States, is at odds with the
"law matters" thesis. After all, "law matters" adherents claim that
the formal rules of the game are largely determinative. On a more
general level, however, the "institutions matter" perspective is
entirely consistent with the "law matters" thesis. The functional
core of the "law matters" thesis is not that law matters as such, but
that investors need to be protected adequately for thick securities
markets to develop.'69 The law can certainly protect shareholders,
but so can a range of other factors that influence incentive struc-
tures.' The formal rules of the game, in other words, are simply
one of many ways to regulate corporate conduct and behavior. As
Nobel laureate Douglass North has explained: "Enforcement [can
be] carried out by the first party (self-imposed codes of conduct), by
the second party (retaliation), and/or by a third party (societal
sanctions or coercive enforcement by the state)."' The United
168. For more on the new institutional economics approach, see generally THE FRONTIERS
OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (John N. Drobak & John V.C. Nye eds., 1997);
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1990); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, LookingAhead,
38 J. ECON. LIT. 595 (2000); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, WHY LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
ORGANIZATION? (U.C. Berkeley School of Law, Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 37, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=255624; see also infra notes 171-72, 178-
79.
169. See supra notes 17-39 and accompanying text.
170. As Professor Coffee writes:
[Tihe relative success of self-regulation in the United States may initially seem
inconsistent with the "law matters" hypothesis, much depends on what we count
as "law." Stripped to its essentials, the LLS&V hypothesis asserts (or, at least,
need assert) only that strong equity markets require strong minority rights.
Those minority rights could in principle come from any source (legislative,
judicial or self-regulatory), or from a combination of sources.
Coffee, supra note 18, at 60.
171. Douglass C. North, Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis, in INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 35, 36 (Sven-Erik Sjbstrand ed., 1993); see also
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 359,360 (1994)
[hereinafter North, Economic Performance] ("Institutions are the humanly devised constraints
that structure human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g., rules, laws,
constitutions), informal constraints (e.g., norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes
of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics. Together they define the incentive
structure of societies and specifically economies.").
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States has the necessary institutions to rely on a heavy dose of
enforcement that does not depend on state-imposed sanctions to
protect shareholders from expropriation. Do developing economies?
A. Complementarities Critique
Many commentators have studied in greater depth than I do here
various nonlaw features of corporate governance.'72 In extending
their analyses beyond the formal rules, these commentators tend to
fasten on some other part of the system. By taking a still broader
perspective, the systems approach this Article takes better captures
the numerous interdependencies and complementarities that
contribute to corporate governance. Further, by revealing the
overall complexity of corporate governance, a systems approach
should better impress on policymakers the challenges of economic
reform and, in particular, the risks associated with trying to fit
the law of another country into an "importing" country's different
institutional makeup.'73 Notwithstanding that scholars have
stressed the important role that norms, market influences, and
bonding strategies play in the United States, there is still a
tendency to focus on U.S. corporate law when considering corporate
governance reform elsewhere. Policymakers who adopt a systems
approach should develop a more pragmatic outlook and a better
sense of the realistic opportunities for promoting equity markets in
172. For other examples of corporate governance analyses that explicitly or implicitly adopt
a complementarities perspective, consistent with the view that institutions matter, see
Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Firm as a System ofAttributes: A Survey and Research Agenda,
in THE JAPANESE FIRM: THE SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE STRENGTH (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald
Dore eds., 1994); Berkowitz et al., supra note 23; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57; Black et
al., supra note 57; Black, supra note 15; Black et al., supra note 48; Bratton & McCahery,
Case Against Global Reference, supra note 31; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
Complementarities and Systems: Understanding Japanese Economic Organization, 9
EsTuDios ECONOMIcos 3 (1994); Milhaupt, supra note 37; Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization
and Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 199 (2001); Milhaupt, supra note
38; PISTOR ET AL., supra note 18; Pistor, supra note 50; Schmidt & Spindler, supra note 31;
RALPH P. HEINRICH, COMPLEMENTARITIES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: OWNERSHIP
CONCENTRATION, CAPITAL STRUCTURE, MONITORING AND PECUNIARY INCENTIVES (Kiel, Inst.
of World Econ., Working Paper No. 968, 2000), available at httpj/ssrn.com/abstract=216389.
173. Cf Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 1189 ("This suggests that policymakers and private
actors should tread carefully before importing foreign governance technology into their own
institutional framework. Without a clear understanding of alternative systems, let alone a
vision of a 'model' system, intellectual arbitrage has its limitations.").
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developing economies-an important first step in designing an
effective reform agenda.17 Quick success is not only important
because it results in economic growth sooner rather than later, but
also because policymakers cannot depend on a generous public that
will afford them two or three chances to get it right. Economic
reform is not easy. Even under the best circumstances, the transi-
tion can cause painful and difficult economic, social, political, and
cultural disruptions. When the high hopes for reform are not met,
people are not always willing to try it again. As political and social
support for reform erodes, people sometimes agitate for the old order
to return. A less-than-full step forward can lead to several steps
back. The long-run success of economic reform, then, depends on
modest short-run goals that are achievable.
What does this mean for corporate governance reform efforts
modeled after U.S. corporate governance? In other words, is a
market-based approach to corporate governance feasible for
developing countries? The answer should be clear: Developing
countries lack most of the formal and informal institutions that are
necessary to complement an enabling corporate law, characterized
as having relatively few shareholder protections, to create an
effective system of governance.' 5 For example, of immediate note,
developing countries lack the capital markets and market for
corporate control that are keys to the U.S. system. Indeed, the whole
point of the reform efforts is to create securities markets. Further,
developing economies often lack an effective judicial system,
including basic property right and contract enforcement mecha-
nisms, let alone a highly regarded judiciary with the sophistication
and experience of the Delaware courts.' 6 And judges in a civil law
system may be reluctant to exercise the kind of discretion required
174. According to Professor Milhaupt:
[Wihat matters is that we continue to refine our understanding of the attributes
of successful and unsuccessful governance systems and the potential for reform
within a given system. For that, we need to unpack the black box of property
rights and explore the political dynamics of institutional change across
countries.
Id. at 1193.
175. For a similar view, see Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1913-14, 1920-29
(explaining that emerging economies lack the institutions that support corporate governance
regimes in developed countries).
176. Indeed, it is not certain that any state other than Delaware has the requisite judiciary.
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to apply open-ended fiduciary duties. The law of fiduciary duties is
ineffectual ifjudges are not willing to exercise their discretion when
called on to apply those standards or if the judges are not respected
enough for their decisions to have legitimacy. In addition, to the
extent developing countries have closed economies, protectionist
trade policies, or businesses otherwise subsidized by the state,
managers are insulated from the pressures of stiff competition for
goods and services. Moreover, the "second-order" institutions, such
as investment bankers, accountants, lawyers, and the like, are
largely nonexistent; at the very least, they are not as experienced
and ubiquitous as in developed economies. In fact, there might be
few experienced managers to run companies in developing coun-
tries, which challenges a basic presupposition of the Berle and
Means firm that it is efficient for dispersed shareholders to hire
expert managers. Finally, the proclivity to internalize norms of good
corporate conduct might be less in certain countries than among
U.S. managers, as studies suggest that the inclination toward other-
regarding behavior varies across cultures.177 The bottom line, then,
is that enacting substantive corporate law similar to the United
States, including attempts to codify the law of fiduciary duties, will
not replicate the U.S. corporate governance system, or even
approximate it, in developing countries that lack the requisite
complementary institutions that make up the U.S. system. 7 In
other words, a market-based model of corporate governance cannot
be expected to result in broad and deep securities markets in
developing economies.
177. See STOUT, supra note 45.
178. For similar observations, see Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1913 ("[Elmerging
economies cannot simply copy the corporate laws of developed economies. These laws depend
on highly evolved market, legal, and governmental institutions and cultural norms that often
do not exist in emerging economies."); Milhaupt, supra note 37, at 2124 (explaining that "legal
rules are highly complementary within a given legal system, so that legal improvements
require reforms of entire legal systems," not simply substantive corporate law); North,
Economic Performance, supra note 171, at 366 (explaining that the "formal rules" of one
country will perform differently in another country because of different norms and
enforcement institutions); accord STOUT, supra note 45, at 35 ("Perhaps the most basic lesson
is that the adoption of formal rules of law that resemble U.S. corporate law may not, alone,
be sufficient to produce results similar to those observed in U.S. corporations."). For extensive
and insightful analyses of the challenges associated with corporate law transplants, see
Berkowitz et al., supra note 23; Pistor et al., supra note 47; Pistor, supra note 50; PISTOR &
Xu, supra note 50.
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Developing countries are still better off by importing U.S.
corporate law than doing nothing at all. These are not, however, the
only choices a country faces. The complementarities framework
described above has its root in more formal economic models." 9 In
these models, a part is said to be complementary to a system-
whether a corporate governance system, a manufacturing system,
or something else-if adding it increases the returns to the other
components."s When complementary parts fit together, they create
a system that, because of synergies, is greater than the sum of its
parts.'8 ' There is, however, a flip side to these "systems effects."8 2
If an "importing" country cannot replicate the preferred corporate
governance system in its entirety, not only will it fail to achieve the
desired results by only instituting part of it, but the country
probably can do better by adopting an entirely different system for
which it does have all the components."8 3 This is the case even if the
alternative system is generally thought to be inferior to the
preferred one. As Paul Milgrom and John Roberts have explained,
the "organizational 'mix-and-match'" that results when a country
copies part of a governance system leads to an "ill-adapted misfit.")8 4
More to the point, although the U.S. corporate governance system
is associated with the thickest capital markets-and thus might be
considered the "preferred" system-a developing country that lacks
179. See, e.g., Aoki, supra note 172; Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Complementarities and
Fit: Strategy, Structure, and Organizational Change in Manufacturing, 19 J. ACCT. & ECON.
179 (1995); Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 172; Schmidt & Spindler, supra note 31; NICOLAI
J. Foss, UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS SYSTEMS: AN ESSAY ON THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY
OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (Copenhagen Business School, Working Paper No. 97-6, 1997),
available at www.cbs.dk/departmentsivs/wp/wp97-6.pdf.; HEINRICH, supra note 172.
180. See Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 172, at 6 ("[W~e say that a group of activities are
(Edgeworth) complements if doing more of any subset of them increases the returns to doing
more of any subset of the remaining activities.").
181. Id. at 4.
182. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 179, at 180.
183. See, e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 172, at 11 ("[A]dopting only some of the
features of the better performing pattern may actually worsen performance. Thus, in
particular, adopting only some of the features of a successful economic system while adhering
to other elements from another coherent system may be disastrous."); see also id. at 12 ("Even
if a coordinated adjustment on all relevant dimensions might yield an improvement in
performance, it may be that until all the features of the new pattern have been implemented,
the performance of the system may be much worse than in the original position.").
Complementarity, therefore, might help explain path dependence. See id. at 13; Schmidt &
Spindler, supra note 31.
184. Milgrom & Roberts, supra note 172, at 5 (describing Japanese economic organization).
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a sophisticated judiciary, competitive product markets, experienced
investment bankers, and a mandatory disclosure regime likely will
fare better by adopting an entirely different approach to corporate
governance and finance than the United States has. For example,
a country lacking the panoply of institutions from which the U.S.
governance system benefits would be better suited with a more
mandatory legal regime that affords managers less discretion and
gives shareholders more control or even one that encourages the
formation of blockholders who can more effectively monitor
management." 5 The broad lesson of the complementarities take on
corporate governance is that no optimal model of governance and
finance can be identified in the abstract. 8 The best model for a
country is highly contingent on its complement of institutions; one
size of corporate governance and finance does not fit all.
B. Private Ordering Critique
The above complementarities-based critique highlights some of
the technical barriers countries face in creating a system of
corporate governance like that employed in the United States. In
short, many, if not most of the key components are simply missing.
Beyond these challenges, however, is another set of hurdles that
more directly bears on the feasibility of private ordering, and thus
of an enabling corporate law in developing economies. Private
ordering is not spontaneous. It is not workable to turn an economy
loose, so to speak, and to instruct the parties to organize their
affairs as they see fit, even if the formal corporate law provides a
general framework for contracting. Rather, successful private
ordering as the basis of corporate governance depends on certain
preconditions, three of which I focus on here: (1) the contracting
parties need to know what to contract for; (2) transactions costs
must be relatively low; and (3) tomorrow has to matter. Each of
these factors is important, whether we are talking about large-scale
185. For more on the blockholder model of governance, see supra note 31.
186. See Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 1194 (explaining that "there appears to be no optimal
corporate governance system, only collections of complementary mechanisms that fit or fail
within a country's institutional framework").
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contracting across capital markets, ranchers in Shasta County,'87 or
diamond merchants in New York.'
For private ordering effectively to fill in the gaps of an enabling
corporate law, the relevant parties need to know what to negotiate
for. For example, parties can negotiate over such complex matters
as independent directors, dual-class voting stock, special litigation
committees, debt covenants, lead directors, shareholder ratification,
board committees, shareholder action by written consent, share-
holder special meetings, shareholder proposals, staggered boards,
cumulative voting, supermajority voting requirements, separating
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board, exculpatory charter
provisions, standstill agreements, no-shop provisions, fiduciary outs,
termination fees, appraisal, tag-along and drag-along rights, golden
parachutes for senior management, poison pills, and antitakeover
charter provisions. For private ordering to work, particularly on a
scale similar to the United States, the parties involved in negotiat-
ing, or at least "pricing," what amounts to the corporate contract
need to understand these and other contract terms. 8 9 In other
words, the parties need to know how to organize a corporation's
internal affairs, how to implement a governance structure, and
how to evaluate various terms and governance practices. This
requires more than spotting the issues. The parties need a textured
understanding of all sides of the issues and of the possibilities
for addressing each party's concerns, as well as insight into what a
reasonable allocation of rights, duties, and risks might be for a
particular company given its characteristics, such as its manage-
ment team, track record, financing needs, operating history, finan-
cial condition, business prospects, and capital structure.
U.S. capital markets are populated by sophisticated entrepre-
neurs, directors, officers, and financiers, not to mention sophisti-
cated judges. Equally important is that U.S. capital markets are
populated by what Ron Gilson calls "transaction cost engineers.""9
187. ELLIcKsoN, supra note 119.
188. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
189. For more on the corporate contract, see infra note 200.
190. Gilson, supra note 138, at 255; see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1923
(explaining the importance of "savvy investors and issuers" to an enabling approach to
corporate law); Milhaupt & West, supra note 138, at 43 ("[Iln order to be effective, private
ordering often requires the participation of intermediaries who possess information, time, and
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Broadly speaking, these are the investment bankers, securities
analysts, accountants, and lawyers who, as market intermediaries
supporting both issuers and investors, are largely responsible for
structuring, interpreting, monitoring, and evaluating corporate
governance structures and practices. Along these lines, in Enron's
wake, shareholder watchdog groups and credit-rating agencies have
started grading a company's corporate governance structure,just as
Standard & Poor's or Moody's might grade its debt.'91
These intermediaries are effective because they are experienced
in corporate matters and have an appreciation for what does and
does not matter.9 2 Their expertise goes far beyond taking the
present value of a stream of earnings, pricing options using Black-
Scholes, deciding over what period an asset should be depreciated,
or drafting a Form 10-K annual report. Notwithstanding the
importance of such formal training, the requisite sophistication can
only be achieved by "deal flowr-namely, the experience that comes
by structuring and monitoring transactions. Much of what these
intermediaries do and know is not written down in any book, but is
learned on the job. Further, bankers, lawyers, accountants, and
other market intermediaries generally draw from a similar set of
experiences and a shared mental model of business dealings and
corporate governance.193 This can reduce transactions costs by
ensuring that the parties are "on the same page," which is to say by
creating a common understanding of the consequences of various
corporate governance practices and a common set of expectations
regarding what a reasonable governance structure is.
skill .... ).
191. Such corporate governance ratings are growing more common and more accessible to
the public. See, e.g., Governance Metrics International Home Page, at http://www.gmiratings.
corn (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Institutional Shareholders Services Home Page, at
httpJ/www.isscgq.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2004); Standard and Poor's Home Page, at
httpJ/www.standardandpoors.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2004).
192. Recent concerns about gatekeeper conflicts of interest, however, suggest that relying
on investment bankers, securities analysts, lawyers, accountants, and other market
intermediaries to undergird the system has its risks.
193. See North, Economic Performance, supra note 171, at 362-63 (explaining the
importance of "learning" and "mental models" by economic participants); see also Lynn M.
LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REV.
1498, 1504-21 (1996) (explaining that legal communities "forge and share a mental model of
the community's work").
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Intermediaries can only gain experience over time as the private
sector develops and as they are repeatedly called on to structure
transactions, evaluate business opportunities, and resolve disputes.
It is overly optimistic, therefore, to expect many of the "transaction
cost engineers" who work in developing economies to have the
experience and sophistication on which private ordering depends.
The lack of experience gives rise to a more particular problem for
legal transplants. Not only does a country fall short of replicating
the U.S. corporate governance system when it imports U.S corporate
law, it also falls short of importing U.S. corporate law. An "import-
ing" country can copy the law on the books and possibly codify the
law of fiduciary duties. Although as Lynn LoPucki has explained,
much of the law is neither on the books nor in cases; it is in lawyers'
heads. 94 Based on experience, lawyers have a mental model of
the law. If you talk to experienced lawyers, they often refer to
the unwritten "lore" they draw on or to the "gloss" on a statute or
regulation.'95 Further, and echoing some of the points made earlier,
lawyers also know, without having to give it much thought, the
steps needed to close a deal or to litigate a case and, in many
instances, how the negotiations or case will take shape. Whether
they are right or wrong in their understanding of the law, lawyers
bring it to bear everyday to solve complex problems; it is not worth
the time and effort to question the received wisdom, and it might
not be possible to convince others that the law in their heads is
194. LoPucki, supra note 193, at 1510-16.
195. Dean Clark offers a useful analogy:
Even the most ordinary house results from a set of construction activities that
are guided by literally thousands of traditional rules of practice. Most of these
rules were the result of a conscious assessment by someone in the past of the
consequences of alternative practices and of their costs and benefits. Yet present
contractors and workers mostly follow the rules rather than make them or
"choose" to follow them. The carpenters place rafters no more than 16 inches
apart, and use wood no smaller than two by eight inches wide. They understand
in a rough way why these guidelines exist, but usually do not have anything like
a precise knowledge of what would happen if they deviated from them to this or
that extent. The plumbers know that they ought to install P-traps under every
drain, but some of them may not even have an accurate general knowledge of
why this requirement exists (to create a water barrier that will prevent backup
of disease-carrying sewer gas).
Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1703, 1727-28 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
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wrong.196 Transactions costs would skyrocket if lawyers felt the need
to research and consider in detail every issue. To a great extent, it
is the law in lawyers' heads that matters and that is seen in
action. 197 Yet, it is the law in lawyers' heads that cannot readily be
transplanted and in some cases is difficult to identify or pin down.
Any legal transplant, therefore, will necessarily be incomplete.' 8
Parties responsible for structuring and monitoring internal
corporate affairs in developing countries can help offset their lack
of experience by undergoing formal training, often a part of
reform efforts, or seeking advice and counsel from top investment
banks, accounting firms, and law firms in the United States or
other developed countries.'" Nonetheless, the transactions costs of
"getting up to speed" and of hiring outside advisors are significant,
which raises a related concern that further challenges effective
private ordering in developing countries-that is, the lack of
standardized corporate contracting.' Standardization in corporate
196. Dean Clark has expressed concern, however, that:
With either type of tradition, those who follow their rules usually do so without
a full and critical awareness of the reasons for the rules. In the case of technical
traditions, this happens because of the sheer information processing limits of
individual human brains. The amount of received lore is enormous; it is hard
enough to find the rules or models relevant to one's specific task. Mental power
is limited, and life is too short and full of alternative tasks yielding a higher
value for one's efforts than reexamination of traditional lore. Consequently, very
few who use a technical tradition will find it sensible to try to master all its
parts and all its reasons. In the case of organic traditions, rule followers do not
acquire a full and accurate appreciation of the rationale of the rules because
virtually no preceding individuals ever did, and it is too hard to fathom them.
Id. at 1729.
197. See LoPucki, supra note 193.
198. See Berkowitz et al., supra note 23, at 167 (explaining that the failure to understand
the meaning of transplanted rules, including their origin, history, and development,
undermines the efficacy of legal transplants); Frank, supra note 54, at 916-17 ("At home it is
surrounded by many usages which are never written down but taken for granted and more
or less unconsciously accepted ... blut those checks can seldom be exported."); Pistor, supra
note 50, at 112 ("Assuming that a cognitive gap exists between any rule that is supplied and
the understanding of that rule by its end-users, and that this gap impedes the effectiveness
of transplanted rules, the question arises, how this gap could be closed."); PISTOR & Xu, supra
note 50, at 5 ("The same qualities that make the concept of fiduciary duties so resilient over
time make it.extremely difficult to transplant to other legal systems. The meaning of fiduciary
duty cannot easily be specified in a detailed legal document.").
199. U.S. firms often seek business in developing economies, frequently opening an office
in such countries.
200. The following discussion of standardized contracting builds on the work of Marcel
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contracting, which is an important feature of U.S. corporate
governance, reduces drafting and haggling costs. Further, there is
likely to be more case law interpreting a standard term and common
usages of the term. Accordingly, standard terms are generally easier
and cheaper to understand and they reduce uncertainty; they
require less expertise and sophistication to evaluate. This is not to
say that standardization does not present problems. It can, for
example, impede innovations in contracting and lock in inefficient
governance practices. More importantly, for countries undergoing
economic reform, standardized contracting facilitates transactions
and allows parties to allocate their resources to productive uses,
such as managing businesses or investing in them, as opposed to
wasting resources on corporate contracting matters. Repeat usage
of terms, moreover, allows contracting parties to develop the kind
of expertise and sophistication that comes from experience and that
is ultimately drawn on when structuring corporate affairs. Although
easy to do, copying the corporate contracts from elsewhere is of
limited benefit because standardized contracts reflect any number
of important factors, such as the law in lawyers' heads, specific risk-
allocation strategies, and a host of legal developments that may not
be appropriate for the "importing" country.
Finally, for a model of corporate governance that depends on
relatively few legal mandates to work well, tomorrow has to matter.
Tomorrow has to matter in the sense that the long-term payoffs of
Kahan and Michael Klausner. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in
Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U.
L.Q. 347 (1996) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence]; Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of
Boilerplate'), 83 VA. L. REv. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation]; Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). In addition to the particular provisions of a corporation's articles of
incorporation and bylaws, the "corporate contract" comprises the relevant corporation code
and a company's governance practices. Even fiduciary duties can be thought of contractually
as the protections shareholders would negotiate for, if given the opportunity. Not only are
there standard article and bylaw provisions from which companies usually choose, but the
corporation code also provides a standard "off-the-rack" contract that can be used as a default.
Certain widely accepted corporate governance practices provide additional standard terms
that many companies follow as a matter of course. As a practical matter, little face-to-face
negotiation takes place over a company's governance structure, although more negotiation
takes place post-Enron than before. For the most part, the contracting process is implicit as
investors, with the support of market intermediaries, "price" a company's governance
structure.
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cooperation exceed the short-term benefits of defection, which can
be thought of in terms of opportunistic behavior by directors,
officers, controlling shareholders, or any other corporate constitu-
ency. Tomorrow matters more when a person expects to engage in
a series of repeated transactions, where his reputation for coopera-
tion and honest dealing is essential.2"' At least when it comes to
doing business, there is reason to believe that tomorrow matters
less in developing countries than in the United States. The pros-
pects of economic reform are always uncertain, particularly when
coupled with background political, social, and economic instability.
Consequently, the future payoffs from cooperating today are in
doubt and should be heavily discounted. 2 Further, reputation is
beside the point if the market cannot readily detect defections. The
lack of sophistication and experience discussed above can make it
difficult for market participants to police one another and detect
uncooperative behavior. The dominant strategy for many, therefore,
is probably to defect (i.e., not to cooperate but to try to expropriate
value from others), especially if judicial enforcement of the law and
other terms of the corporate contract are lax. Even those who are
"cooperators" will find it hard to signal their willingness to cooper-
ate if they have no track record or reputation of cooperation to
speak of. It might also be difficult to commit credibly by contract or
201. For more on complex strategies of cooperation, see, for example, ROBERT AXELROD,
THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND
COLLABORATION (1997); SERGIO G. LAZZARINI ET AL., ORDER WITH SOME LAW:
CoMPLEMENTARITY VS. SUBSTITUTION OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS (John M. Olin
School of Business Working Paper, 2001), available at http://ssrn.coniabstract=293803; see
also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1770-71 (2001) (discussing
the importance of "making the future more important relative to the present" in encouraging
cooperation); North, Economic Performance, supra note 171, at 365 (discussing the importance
of repeated interactions to change payoffs in favor of cooperation).
202. Professor Roe explains:
Some societies are in such turmoil that complex private institutions cannot be
built. Reputations are not worth developing, because there are no assurances
that, once built, the reputation can be used. Private ordering via, say, a stock
exchange would not work, because investors lack confidence in the exchange and
fear who might capture it. But once a society has sufficient regularity that
reputations, private institutions, and, if need be, corporate law can be built, then
if political and economic conditions are otherwise ripe, large enterprises can
arise and ownership can separate.
Roe, supra note 58, at 265.
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otherwise to cooperate if the courts and other enforcement institu-
tions are not well established or trusted.2" These factors set the
stage for a "lemons" problem as "cooperators" exit the market.2"'
This, of course, explains why well-regarded investment banks, law
firms, and other intermediaries whose reputations can, in effect, be
rented are important; but as noted above, these institutions, too, are
lacking in developing economies.
C. Nonshareholder Primacy Critique
A shareholder-oriented model of corporate governance is probably
inappropriate for many developing countries. Shareholder primacy
might not fit with the cultural values of a country if it has a weak
tradition of markets or capitalist values or places greater emphasis
on equality and community than the U.S. corporate governance
system does.2"e These countries might be willing to sacrifice some
capital formation and economic growth to accommodate other
values or might simply be hostile to and distrustful of capitalism
and capitalists, especially outside foreign investors. Mark Roe, for
example, has recently argued that "[slocial democracies and the
American-style public firm mix badly." 6 Roe's core point is that the
shareholder orientation of the U.S. approach, and specific parts of
the U.S. governance system, such as hostile takeovers and incentive
compensation, are inconsistent with the values and politics of social
democracies, where employee interests and distributional concerns,
and not shareholder value, are the top priorities.0 7 It should be
203. See Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining that "managers and
shareholders are thrown together as legal strangers" during privatization, making it difficult
to contract or pledge reputational capital, which they have not been able to "carefully [build]
up over years of service"); Fox & Heller, supra note 48, at 1762-65 (explaining that a similar
breakdown contributed to the failed privatization efforts in Russia). There is, accordingly, a
"catch-22" quality to cooperation. Established reputations facilitate cooperation and
transacting; but it is difficult to get a reputation without a history of deal making.
204. See Akerlof, supra note 15, at 489-90; see also Black, supra note 15, at 838.
205. For more on the relationship between a country's culture and values and shareholder
primacy, see Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance Regulation, 112 YALE
L.J. 1829, 1865-66 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Can Culture Constrain the Economic Model of
Corporate Law?, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1251, 1261-62 (2002); BLAIR, supra note 47, at 7-8; LICHT,
LEGAL PLUG-INS, supra note 35, at 19-23.
206. Roe, supra note 18, at 542.
207. Id. at 543; see also Roe, supra note 205, at 1260-62.
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noted that shareholder primacy in the United States is itself subject
to ongoing challenge, although it is holding firm as a core gover-
nance principle. There are heated debates over the role nonshare-
holder corporate constituencies, especially employees, should play
in United States corporate governance and over the proper role of
corporations in society; and as a practical matter, managers do have
discretion to take nonshareholder interests into account, at least at
the margins. °8
Equally important as these questions of cultural and political fit
is the question of what the theory of the firm predicts about the
allocation of corporate control and shareholder primacy in develop-
ing countries. The influential contractarian model of the firm, as
applied to publicly held firms in the United States, starts with the
assertion that shareholders are a corporation's sole, or at least
primary, residual economic claimants. This is because they receive
a return on their investment only after the corporation's fixed
claimants, such as its employees and creditors, are paid.2" Share-
holders, in this view, have better incentives than other corporate
constituencies to maximize firm value.210 In addition, shareholders
are said to be less able than other corporate constituencies to protect
themselves contractually against the risk of expropriation. As Oliver
208. For various arguments against shareholder primacy and in favor of a greater role in
governance for nonshareholder constituencies, see EMPLOYEESAND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
supra note 74; PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Blair & Stout,
supra note 14; Gulati et al., supra note 89; Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REv. 579 (1992);
Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate
Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993).
209. For more on the contractarian model of the firm and the residual claimant status of
shareholders, see, for example, EAsTERBROOK & FIScHEL, supra note 68; Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 14; Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); see
also BLACK, supra note 14. But see Blair & Stout, supra note 14 (arguing a contrary view
based on the "team production" model of the firm). In the traditional principal-agent model
of the firm, shareholder primacy and the sole right of shareholders to vote is easy to justify,
as shareholders are considered the "owners" of the firm. For more on the principal-agent
model of the firm, see Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, supra note 30; Thompson & Smith, supra note 75, at
268-69.
210. Embedded in this argument is the normative view that the goal of corporate law
should be to maximize firm value. To be sure, not everybody agrees with this goal. See supra
note 208.
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Williamson, in the context of the closely related transaction cost
model of the firm, explains:
Stockholders as a group bear a unique relation to the firm. They
are the only voluntary constituency whose relation with the
corporation does not come up for periodic renewal. Labor,
suppliers in the intermediate product market, debt-holders, and
consumers all have opportunities to renegotiate terms when
contracts are renewed. Stockholders, by contrast, invest for the
life of the firm and their claims are located at the end of the
queue should liquidation occur.211
Accordingly, shareholders are said to value control rights more
than other suppliers of inputs and ultimately to bargain for them.
Due to coordination problems, however, dispersed shareholders are
unable to exercise control over the firm on a day-to-day basis.
Consequently, they delegate managerial control to managers who
specialize in running the business on the shareholders' behalf, and
the board of directors is then engaged to monitor the managers.212
Shareholders, however, retain key control rights-the right to elect
and remove members of the board and to vote on certain fundamen-
tal matters. The bottom line is that directors and officers have broad
discretion to exercise their delegated authority over the enterprise,
so long as they act in the best interests of shareholders. Further,
shareholders are at the top of the governance hierarchy, but other
corporate constituencies have no formal role to play in corporate
211. Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1210 (1984) (footnote
omitted). Williamson specifically addresses the ability of other constituencies, including labor,
lenders, suppliers, customers, communities, and managers, to protect themselves other than
through governance mechanisms. Id. at 1207-20.
212. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 402-03 (stating that because the cost
of voting is high, shareholders will reserve its use for important situations and leave the day-
to-day operations of the firm in the control of the managers); see also Larry E. Ribstein,
Takeover Defenses and the Corporate Contract, 78 GEO. L.J. 71, 79 (1989) (stating that
decision making is done by managers for reasons of expertise, efficiency, and lack of ability
on the part of shareholders). In Fama and Jensen's terminology, shareholders retain "decision
control," which includes the ratification (choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented)
and monitoring (measurement of the performance of decision agents and implementation of
rewards) of decisions. Shareholders delegate "decision management," which includes the
initiation (generation of proposals for resource utilization and structuring of contracts) and
implementation (execution of ratified decisions) of decisions. Fama & Jensen, supra note 30,
at 304, 309-10, 322-23.
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governance.213 For the most part, positive corporate law and
governance practices in the United States reflect the governance
structure the contractarian model of the firm predicts.214
This is a simplified explanation of the theory of the firm, but it
serves present purposes. Two key assumptions at work in the model
are unlikely to obtain in many developing countries. First, other
values and interests might trump the goal of maximizing firm value,
calling into question the contractarian model's normative dimension
favoring shareholder primacy. Second, nonshareholder constituen-
cies in developing countries might not be better able to protect
themselves from opportunism than shareholders are, thus undercut-
ting a standard assumption of the contractarian model of the firm.
In the United States, creditors protect themselves through highly
negotiated credit agreements or indentures, while employees are
protected by labor codes, unions, employment contracts, common
law doctrines such as wrongful discharge, the ability to negotiate for
higher wages given labor market conditions, and ERISA. The full
panoply of devices that protect creditors, employees, and other
stakeholders from the risk of expropriation are unlikely to exist in
developing economies. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny have themselves shown that creditor protections vary across
countries.21 The bottom line is that nonshareholder constituencies
probably should play a greater role in corporate governance in many
developing countries than in the United States, at least in the view
of the contractarian model.216 In the hypothetical, and sometimes
213. For similar reasons-namely, that shareholders are subject to a greater risk of
opportunism because of their firm-specific investment and are least able among the various
corporate constituencies to protect themselves contractually-the transactions cost model of
the firm also places shareholders at the top of the corporate governance hierarchy. For more
on the transactions cost model, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE
171-94 (1996); Thompson & Smith, supra note 75, at 269-70, 272-73; Williamson, supra note
211, at 1198-1230.
214. But see Stout, supra note 89, at 1195-99, 1201-07 (challenging shareholder primacy
on both positive and normative grounds).
215. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 20, at 1151 (showing that common law
countries provide creditors the most protection, while civil law countries provide the least
protection).
216. In fact, labor has asserted itself into corporate governance in the United States
through union pension funds. See, e.g., Marleen A. O'Connor, Organized Labor as Shareholder
Activist: Building Coalitions to Promote Worker Capitalism, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1345 (1997);
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018 (1998).
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actual, bargain that drives the contractarian model of the firm,
these stakeholders will often bargain for additional control rights.
By reducing the risk of opportunism the various inputs to produc-
tion face, dispersing corporate control more broadly can also
serve an important industrial organization function. In short, firm-
specific investments that increase the value of the firm can be
encouraged.217 Shareholders may be willing, therefore, to give up
some control in order to increase the value of their stake in the
firm.
2 18
Finally, however control is ultimately allocated among sharehold-
ers and other corporate constituencies in developing economies,
there is reason to think that directors and officers would be dele-
gated less control and afforded less discretion over the enterprise
than they enjoy in the United States.219 To the extent nonlegal
control devices do not adequately discipline management, the
alternative is for shareholders, possibly together with employees,
creditors, and other constituencies, to exercise additional authority
over the business. This would create additional "negative" control
217. In explaining the structure of Japanese corporate governance, Ronald Gilson and
Mark Roe have also focused on the ways corporate governance structures can encourage
certain inputs to production, such as employees, to make firm-specific investments. See
Ronald J. Gilson, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Japanese Corporate Governance Through
American Eyes, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 203, 207-12; Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial
Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 884-85 (1993).
218. This recalls recent arguments made by some in the United States against shareholder
primacy, as well as the debate relating to the use of antitakeover charter provisions as pre-
commitment strategies that insulate nonshareholder constituencies from the risk of
expropriation associated with hostile takeovers. For more on the debate over antitakeover
provisions and other pre-commitment strategies, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Dead Hand and No Hand Pills: Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law (2002), available
at http'//ssrn.com/abstract=347089; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover
Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); Robert Daires & Michael Klausner, Do
IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protections in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
83 (2001); Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter
Provisions as Pre-Commitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); Michael Klausner,
Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and Anti-takeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152
U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease
Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post /Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845 (2002);
Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: An Empirical Exploration of Why Public
Corporations Are Controlled by Boards of Directors, 152 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
219. In the United States, however, shareholders are becoming more active and are
pushing for more control. In addition, union pension plans, by turning labor into shareholders,
have pulled out a seat for labor at the corporate governance table.
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rights, in the sense of heightened fiduciary duties, as well as ad-
ditional "positive" control rights, in the sense of having the right to
vote on a number of important business decisions that directors and
officers currently have authority to decide in the United States.22 °
D. Capital Structure Critique
There is no reason to assume that the majority of companies in
developing economies will be capitalized by selling common stock to
public investors. Not every company is ready to be publicly held.
Indeed, not every company's capital needs merit a public offering.
It is very risky to invest in an early stage company. For example, an
early stage company, even if past the start-up stage, has only a
limited track record for investors to evaluate and faces a number of
future challenges and decisions that will determine the company's
fate. 221 Ron Gilson has explained it this way: "Virtually all of the
important decisions bearing on [an early stage] company's success
remain to be made, and most of the significant uncertainties
concerning the outcome of the company's efforts remain un-re-
solved."222 Complicating matters, young companies often have
inexperienced management teams. In the United States, these
companies are financed by venture capital, not public shareholders,
and the venture capitalists contract for significant control over the
business. 22 Venture capitalists are far from passive; ownership and
control are not separated. It takes time before companies are
mature enough to go public, a lesson recently learned by U.S. capital
markets with the bursting of the dot-coin bubble. In short, many
companies are simply not "IPO ready" as a matter of business and
finance, even if the preconditions exist for ownership and control to
separate.
Why, then, do corporate governance reform efforts focus on
creating the preconditions for publicly held companies to exist?
220. This basic insight motivates the mandatory model of corporate law. See infra Part IV.
221. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the
American Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1076 (2003).
222. Id. at 1076-77.
223. For a good overview of venture capital markets, see Gilson, supra note 221; Ronald J.
Gilson & Bernard S. Black, Does Venture Capital Require an Active Stock Market?, 11 J.
APPLIED CoRP. FIN. 36 (1999).
2004] 1121
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Instead of emphasizing the Berle and Means firm with "strong
managers" and "weak owners,"224 it might be more effective to focus
on establishing the institutional mix that supports the venture
capital markets that incubate companies until they are ready to go
public. Although the two reform agendas certainly overlap-Ron
Gilson and Bernard Black, for example, have argued that an active
securities market is necessary for venture capital to flourish
because it gives private investors a profitable exit strategy225 -
venture capital raises its own unique governance and finance issues.
The question of how to develop venture capital markets deserves
attention, although it is beyond this Article's scope.226 My more
modest point here is simply that by fixating on how to develop thick
equity markets, economic reform agendas might be putting the cart
before the horse, emphasizing the capital and governance structures
of mature companies when most businesses in developing countries
are early stage companies or, at the very least, more akin to small-
and micro-cap companies than to Fortune 500 corporations.227
IV. LESSONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A FRAMEWORK FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
A. When Law Really Matters
Ronald Coase said in his Nobel Prize lecture, "[Elx-communist
countries are advised to move to a market economy, and their
leaders wish to do so, but without the appropriate institutions no
market economy of any significance is possible. If we knew more
about our own economy, we would be in a better position to advise
them."228 Coase's sentiment-that institutions matter and that
224. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNER: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AmicAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
225. Gilson & Black, supra note 223.
226. For insightful consideration of this question, see id.; see also Gilson, supra note 221;
Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture
Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 865 (1997).
227. See Black et al., supra note 57, at 297 ("[Venture capitalists are likely to be important
sources of equity capital in emerging economies, where most companies are highly risky
because of a rapidly changing economic environment, whatever their size or prior track
record.").
228. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 714
(1992).
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policymakers should be cautious in advocating market-based
reforms for economies that might not have the institutional
infrastructure to support a meaningful market economy-captures
the purpose behind a systems approach to corporate governance
reform. By carefully taking stock of the U.S. corporate governance
system, it becomes clear that few, if any, developing countries have
the necessary institutional mix to replicate the U.S. model of
governance. To place this point in the context of broader economic
reforms, successful privatization programs require the state to do
more than simply distribute formal property rights to the private
sector. In an important study of the prospects for capitalism in
developing and former communist nations, Hernando de Soto urged
governments to formalize interests in land and allocate clear title to
property owners, in effect giving a property owner a piece of paper
he can brandish when his interest is challenged.229 While important,
this is too simplistic of an approach. While formal title to property
is important, whether evidenced by a deed to a parcel of land, a
valid patent, or a stock certificate, property rights need to be
secured by a myriad of institutions, of which the law is only one.23°
Formal property rights are of little value if they cannot be
exploited for economic gain and enforced effectively against both
individuals and the state.23' Accordingly, many now recommend
staged privatization, which buys time for the development of market
229. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 39-67 (2000).
230. See, e.g., Black & Tarassova, supra note 48 (explaining the importance of institutions
to successful privatization); Milhaupt, supra note 38 (discussing the importance of different
property rights institutions in the United States, Japan, and South Korea). Shareholders, for
example, need adequate control rights over the corporation that are enforceable in order to
realize their economic claim on the company.
231. Oliver Williamson has explained it this way: "The merits of privatization ... need to
be assessed with reference to both the rules of the game and the play of the game."
Williamson, supra note 168, at 611. Similarly, according to Milhaupt:
[S]imply moving assets from the state to private hands does not ensure a climate
conducive to growth, investment, and effective corporate governance. Thus, the
quality of institutional design trumps several other important considerations in
the formulation of a privatization plan for Korea, including speed and mass
participation in the process.
Curtis J. Milhaupt, Privatization and Corporate Governance in a Unified Korea, 26 J. CORP.
L. 199, 200-01 (2001); see also PISTOR ET AL., supra note 18 (stressing the importance of
enforcement).
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institutions that support and give practical meaning to formal
property rights.232
A corporate governance regime based on private ordering and
market monitoring cannot be achieved overnight. Even under the
best of circumstances, it can take decades to develop the necessary
institutions. As Douglass North explained, institutions are the
"product of a long gestation" and the "process of [institutional]
change is overwhelmingly incremental."233 Complicating things, it
is difficult for policymakers to nurture institutions along or to
accelerate their development because the process of institutional
change and development is uncertain. Much work remains to be
done to understand how and why institutions develop the way they
do and to ascertain what the right institutions are in each setting.
In developing a corporate governance regime, a country could
speed things up by "piggybacking," to some degree at least, on the
law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, and credit rating
agencies of developed countries. 234 "Piggybacking," however, goes
only so far; although these market-supporting institutions are
important, they fall far short of what it takes for a market-based
governance system to work.
Copying the U.S. model of corporate governance, including the
importation of U.S.-style corporate law, is not the answer-at least
not in the near term-for developing countries hoping to reform
their corporate governance regimes to achieve broad and deep
capital markets.' The necessary institutional infrastructure cannot
simply be put into place overnight, but takes sustained effort to
232. See, e.g., Black et al., supra note 48 (addressing the flaws with the "rapid, mass
privatization" in Russia); Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 31-33 (suggesting a "gradual
form of privatization" as a model); Williamson, supra note 168, at 609 (counseling a "more
cautious and selective program of privatization"); see also Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of
the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 87 (1996)
(explaining that the necessary institutions to support privatization and a market-based
economy can only develop as the market develops).
233. NORTH, supra note 168, at 192.
234. See Black, supra note 15, at 816-31 (discussing "piggybacking"); Gilson, supra note 9,
at 345 (noting that "these substitutes can facilitate adoption during the period that local
institutions develop to achieve formal convergence"). Cross-listing on another country's stock
exchange, thereby opting into its legal regime, at least in part, is a variation on the idea of
"piggybacking" on another country's institutions. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3 (examining
cross-listing of shares).
235. See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
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develop. Further, nothing assures that by privatizing or adopting a
market-based corporate governance model today that the requisite
market institutions will follow to fill the gaps left by an enabling
corporate law that offers relatively few shareholder protections. As
some of the leading architects of the Russian corporate law in the
early and mid-1990s have written of Russia's privatization:
The weak legal and institutional framework was no secret to the
privatizers. But writing good laws can take years and building
good institutions takes decades. The privatizers weren't willing
to wait. They chose to privatize immediately, and hope[d] that
the laws and institutions would follow later. The laws did indeed
follow.... But the privatizers hoped for more than just decent
laws. They hoped that broad private ownership would create a
constituency for strengthening and enforcing those laws. That
didn't happenY
Bernard Black and Anna Tarassova summed up the postmortem on
Russia's rapid privatization attempt this way: "[Tihe shock therapy
shortcut did not deliver the desired results."237
The instincts of the Russian privatizers, though, were partly
right. Developing countries do not have the luxury of waiting for
institutions to develop before taking steps to reform their econo-
mies. As Oliver Williamson has explained, "Real-time events ...
cannot be put on hold. Hard choices have to be made."3 ' One hard
choice is what type of corporate governance regime should be
adopted if a market-based enabling approach similar to the U.S.
model is not a feasible option. Markets are just one mode of
governance; there are many ways parties can organize their
affairs.23 When market failures persist, such as when contracting
236. Black et al., supra note 48, at 1753.
237. Black & Tarassova, supra note 48, at 216. For more on Russia, see supra note 48.
238. Williamson, supra note 168, at 609.
239. See, e.g., id. at 602-04 (discussing alternative governance modes of "spot markets,
incomplete long-term contracts, firms, bureaus, etc."); WILLIAMSON, supra note 168, at 9
("Markets, hybrids, firms, bureaus, etc. are simply alternative modes of governance with
distinctive strengths and weaknesses. The need is to uncover the strengths and weaknesses
of each. Organization theory is pertinent to all."). From a transactions cost perspective, one
could think of law in terms of hierarchy-in particular, as the law giving shareholders in
developing countries additional say at the top of the corporate hierarchy as compared to their
counterparts in the United States.
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and information costs are -high, or when nonlegal modes of gover-
nance are otherwise inadequate, there is a strong case to be made
for more law.240 Market failures are significant in developing
countries where the very goal of corporate governance reform is to
establish well-functioning securities markets.24' I therefore agree
with the view that stronger corporate law, providing minority
shareholders greater protection from insider abuses, is needed to
promote securities markets in developing countries.242 The "more
law" prescription is part and parcel of the "law matters" thesis.
Even though law plays a secondary role in U.S. corporate gover-
nance, law really matters in developing countries.
In considering how corporate law should be crafted from scratch,
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Jonathan Hay (BKH),
drawing from their experience drafting Russia's new corporate law
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, offered an important "self-
enforcing" model of corporate law for developing countries that
responded to many of the same concerns this Article raises about
the need for stronger law to compensate for the lack of market
institutions outside developed economies.24 The essence of BKH's
self-enforcing model is to grant shareholders additional procedural
protections that they can enforce directly, as much as possible,
without having to appeal to or rely on others to secure their
property rights, such as judges, regulators, law firms, accounting
firms, or the media.2" The self-enforcing model stands in contrast
240. See generally Williamson, supra note 168; WILLIAMSON, supra note 168; OLIVER E.
WILLIAMSON, THE LENS OF CONTRACT: PRIVATE ORDERING (Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley Haas
School of Business, Working Paper, 2002), available at http'//groups.haas.berkeley.edu/
bpp/oew/lensofcontract.pdf.
241. See Black et al., supra note 57, at 247 (explaining that in emerging economies without
market institutions, the "'market' cannot fill the regulatory gaps that an enabling-type
corporate law leaves behind"); Rapaczynski, supra note 232, at 91 ("It is this complex
institutional framework of a market economy that constitutes, in large part, the background
regime necessary to support modern forms of private property, which, consequently, cannot
be 'put in place' in advance of its creation.").
242. See supra Part I.A; see also Black et al., supra note 57 (arguing that shareholders need
more legal protections in developing countries in advancing a self-enforcing model of corporate
law); Black & Kraakman, supra note 57 (developing further a self-enforcing model of corporate
law with greater shareholder protection). For a leading article that makes the case for
mandatory corporate law in the United States, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory
Structure of Corporate Law, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 1549 (1989).
243. See Black et al., supra note 57; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57.
244. Black et al., supra note 57, at 249-51, 256-57; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at
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to a more mandatory "prohibitive" model, rejected by BKH,
which would simply prohibit certain "suspect" transactions. 245
Self-enforcing corporate law relies primarily on bright-line rules
that are easier to understand, administer, and implement than
standards.246 BKH made a number of specific recommendations,
including requiring shareholder approval, by a supermajority vote
in some cases, of self-interested transactions and major transactions
(e.g., mergers, large sales or acquisitions of assets, reorganizations,
and liquidations); cumulative voting for directors; no staggered
boards; no dual-class stock; generous appraisal rights for sharehold-
ers; preemptive rights that protect shareholders against dilutive
share issuances; and "tag-along" rights that allow minority share-
holders to sell their shares on the same terms and conditions as a
controlling shareholder sells its shares.247
The self-enforcing model is an important step toward more law,
but it does not go far enough. Self-enforcing corporate law still
depends on a host of institutions to be effective. 2 Shareholders,
investment bankers, lawyers, judges, and others still need experi-
ence and sophistication to evaluate many open-ended governance
terms; tomorrow has to matter to achieve the voluntary compliance
the model anticipates; and effective enforcement mechanisms,
including an uncorrupted judiciary, are needed so shareholders can
enforce their rights when insiders ignore a shareholder vote or
otherwise do not comply voluntarily with what the law requires. The
self-enforcing model, therefore, suffers the same shortcomings as
the enabling model, even if to a somewhat lesser degree.
Ultimately, what developing countries need is a more mandatory
model of corporate law, still comprising bright-line rules, that gives
shareholders additional "negative" and "positive" control rights. In
other words, a corporate law regime that is both more prescriptive
and proscriptive in nature, placing further restrictions and im-
posing additional requirements on directors and officers, as well as
1916-17, 1932.
245. See Black et al., supra note 57, at 255-56 (explaining the "prohibitive" model); Black
& Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1930-32 (explaining the "prohibitive" model).
246. Black et al., supra note 57, at 251, 286; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1916,
1934-43.
247. Black et al., supra note 57, at 258-86; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1943-67.
248. See Black et al., supra note 48, at 1756-57 (explaining the institutional shortcomings
that compromised Russia's self-enforcing model of corporate law).
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controlling shareholders, and giving shareholders a greater role
in corporate governance and a greater say over the business. 249
Further, the mandatory regime should be more rigid than the
default rules central to Delaware corporate law, which limits the
flexibility of entrepreneurs, investors, and other corporate constitu-
encies to contract around the law; the parties should be able to opt
out of few, if any, of the legal requirements. Even the United States
started off with a much more restrictive corporate law regime than
it has today, 2 ° and Congress, the SEC, and the stock exchanges
have adopted an historic set of demanding corporate governance
mandates in response to the recent wave of corporate scandals.
Coupled with more mandatory legal rules should be a greater degree
of public enforcement, especially if the judicial system or other
private enforcement mechanisms are not adequately developed and
consequently are ineffective.2 1 The United States, for example, has
well-developed and respected regulatory bodies, such as the SEC,
the NASD, the NYSE, and the new Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, not to mention the Department of Justice, state
attorneys general, and even state securities commissioners. Even
the Delaware judiciary, especially the Chancery Court, resembles a
249. As noted earlier, in formulating the self-enforcing model of corporate law, BKH
expressly rejected a mandatory, which they termed "prohibitive," approach to corporate law.
See Black et al., supra note 57, at 255-56; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1930-32.
250. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1930 (explaining that the "prohibitive
model" of corporate law is "familiar from nineteenth-century corporation statutes in the
United States"); PISTOR & XU, supra note 50, at 4 ("As many have pointed out, the corporate
law in the U.S., especially in Delaware, has developed from a (fairly) prohibitive, or
mandatory law into an enabling corporate law, which allows shareholders to opt out of many
legal provisions and substitute their own contractually determined arrangements."). Poland,
particularly when contrasted with Czechoslovakia as it often is, is a recent example of how
a more mandatory approach to corporate governance can lead to success. See generally Coffee,
Privatization, supra note 11, at 9-25; La Porta et al., supra note 11, at 22-23; SIMON JOHNSON
& ANDREI SHLEIFER, COASE V. THE COASIANS, 14-38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7447, 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/paperIw7447.pdf. For an
interesting study of how stronger law resulted in the separation of ownership and control in
the Japanese cotton textile industry as early as the turn of the last century, see Yoshiro Miwa
& Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar
Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 171 (2000).
251. For more on public enforcement versus private enforcement, see generally A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON.
LIT. 45 (2000); JOHNSON & SHLEIFER, supra note 250; RAFAEL LA PORTA ET AL., WHAT WORKS
IN SECURIIES LAW? 4-5, 11-18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 03-22,
2003), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=425880; PIs'oR & XU, supra note 50, at 13-17.
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regulator in some ways, because of its expertise in corporate law
matters. Delaware judges do not simply wait for parties to bring
cases to them but are more proactive than most courts, engaging in
what might be characterized as a form of informal rulemaking
through speeches, articles, and networking.252
The chief criticisms of mandatory corporate law are that it
deprives managers of the flexibility needed to run the business and
that one size of corporate governance is not appropriate for every
company. 23 More to the point, the give-and-take of an enabling
corporate law comprising default rules allows a more efficient set of
governance techniques to evolve over time and for each company
and its shareholders to pick and choose the measures that work
best for the enterprise in light of its changing needs. Further, a
market-based governance system is less likely to regulate risk out
of the market than a more mandatory approach, especially one
that is backed by stiff legal sanctions. I have made these very
points elsewhere in arguing against the mandatory one-size-fits-all
approach of Sarbanes-Oxley and the amendments to the NYSE
listing standards and in favor of market-based responses to the rash
of corporate abuses at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other compa-
nies.2"4 I take a different tack when considering corporate gover-
nance reform in developing countries where the institutions do not
exist to allow the market to hold managers accountable without
more law. In addition, although the balance appropriately tilts in
favor of managerial discretion in the United States,"' the balance
should tilt in favor of shareholder protection in developing coun-
tries, where a premium should be placed on reducing agency costs
and boosting investor confidence.
The real concern of a mandatory approach to corporate law in
developing economies is not that management will find its hands
tied in some instances, because constraining management is the
whole point of a more mandatory governance structure, and the
upside of mitigating agency problems outweighs the cost of some
forgone business opportunities and additional compliance costs. The
real concern is that the state will ultimately insert itself into the
252. See supra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
253. See infra notes 270, 293-95 and accompanying text.
254. See Paredes, supra note 69.
255. See supra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
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economy too much, undercutting privatization and the private sector
and blocking a broader move to free markets. Admittedly, manda-
tory corporate law is in tension with a move to free markets and a
capitalist economic system, but an important distinction needs to be
made. Mandatory corporate law is about shifting authority from
directors and officers to shareholders, and possibly other stake-
holders. Mandatory corporate law, at least as envisioned here, does
not call for the state to substitute its business judgment for the
business judgment of managers and investors. My argument for
more mandatory corporate law in developing countries is not a call
for a command-and-control economy in which the government
bets on specific companies by influencing capital flows or funding
businesses directly; picks particular industries to promote; or
decides which factories to open or shut, which technologies to
employ in production, or whether a company should make red or
blue widgets. Business decisions should be left to directors, officers,
and shareholders, together with other corporate constituencies with
a role in corporate governance. In short, the market, not the state,
should make business decisions.
The corollary is that while strong legal protections should shield
shareholders from the risk of expropriation and insider opportun-
ism, shareholders should not be shielded from business risks;
companies should be allowed to go under and investors should be
allowed to lose money. Assuming that a country's overarching goal
is to develop a market economy, the state's involvement in corpora-
tions will have to be cabined so that businesses are not in effect
nationalized, or even propped up, through an overreaching corporate
law regime that ultimately retards economic advancement by
serving as a basis for greater state intrusion into the private
sector.256
For those who are particularly reluctant to embrace mandatory
corporate law, even for developing countries, it is worth noting that
an initial mandatory governance system might ultimately give way
to an enabling market-based approach. As investors enter the
256. This view is consistent with a broad theme of the "law matters" thesis, which claims
that the common law tradition promotes financial development because it elevates the
individual over the state and respects private property, a critical aspect of which is private
decision making in economic affairs. See supra note 42 and accompanying text; see also
Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 1166-79 (stressing the importance of economic freedom).
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market in response to strong legal protections, market-supporting
institutions are likely to follow, though it could take years.257
Financial development creates business opportunities for lawyers,
bankers, and accountants, among others, and one can expect both
the growing investor class as well as issuers to welcome these
"transaction cost engineers." Indeed, issuers might seize on the
chance to leverage the arrival of these professionals to argue that
legal mandates should be scaled back. To be clear, however, the
mandatory approach to corporate law that I recommend in this
Article does not depend on its ultimately giving way to a more
flexible scaled-back legal regime. In fact, there are no assurances
that a more flexible system will be achievable in most countries;
even if the requisite market institutions develop, path dependence
might keep an economy from switching gears to a more enabling
governance regime.258 It might be inefficient to switch from a
mandatory system that has been in place for some time and around
which practices and customs have evolved, and entrenched interests
who benefit from the extant (mandatory) regime might wield enough
political influence to block any future reforms.
It is easier to change the law on the books than to implement
other institutional reforms or to change norms of conduct.259 In fact,
many of the important governance institutions discussed earlier
cannot arise in any meaningful way until capital markets have
257. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 696 ("[Wlhere legal forces exist to protect the
minority shareholder, an institutional and cultural infrastructure--composed of such
important actors as security analysts, rating agencies, and business journalists-soon
follows."). This recalls Coffee's suggestion that as an influential investor class takes hold, it
pushes for additional legal protections, challenging the causal story behind the traditional
"law matters" thesis. See supra note 37. My point here is that as an investor class develops
and markets mature, it might be possible to scale back strong legal shareholder protections
as markets are able to hold management accountable more effectively. For a broader
discussion of how markets, property rights, and legal and nonlegal institutions develop hand-
in-hand in a "gradual, incremental and evolutionary process," see Rapaczynski, supra note
232.
258. For more on path dependence, see Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 34; see also Coffee,
Privatization, supra note 11, at 9 ("In a path-dependent world, it may simply be politically
impossible to get from here to there, even when it is clear to most that such a transition would
be efficient and would yield significant economic growth.").
259. See, e.g., NORTH, supra note 168, at 192; Milhaupt, supra note 38, at 2096-2119
(explaining the process by which norms are created and destroyed); Richard A. Posner,
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, in WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1,
3-4 (1998) (describing a "rules-first strategy" of law reform).
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already begun to develop and take shape."6 Still, the kind of law
reform suggested here is challenging; and the challenges should not
be understated, nor should the benefits of reform be overpromised.
There is sure to be resistance to changing the "rules of the game."
Financial development and the transition to freer markets are
certain to cause painful disruptions for many people, and others who
are simply losing valuable rents they have accumulated in the
current regime will presumably seek to preserve them one way or
another. If political support wanes, reform efforts could be doomed.
Simply adopting a mandatory corporate law regime is not enough.
The law's substance matters. Just as a systems approach is
important when studying U.S. corporate governance, a systems
approach is also important when developing the corporate law
regime of any other economy. A complementarities perspective
teaches that Indonesia, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Colombia, Ghana,
and Iraq all need different corporate governance structures; and it
may turn out that some developing countries actually can sustain
a more enabling approach to corporate law. As stressed earlier,
simply copying the law on the books from elsewhere or cobbling
together a corporation code by mixing and matching the laws of
other countries, while relatively quick and easy to do, is a shortcut
that can have disastrous consequences for the "importing" country.
Coming up with the appropriate corporate law regime for an
economy takes deliberate consideration of the country's institutional
makeup, history, political economy, social structure, and cultural
values; it is a process that should not be rushed. The work is not
finished, but is just beginning, once the new rules are in place. The
legal regime needs to be implemented, monitored, and revised
if necessary to ensure it fulfills its function. Patience is needed,
both in taking the time required to craft and enforce an effective
new legal system and in awaiting its benefits. I offer some specific
suggestions for reform below.
260. Bernard Black and his co-authors note:
Moreover, many of the necessary institutions can develop only as the market
develops. The securities commission and criminal prosecutors need fraud to
practice on, if they are to become skilled at combating fraud. Accountants,
investment bankers, and other reputational intermediaries also learn from their
mistakes-from the frauds they didn't catch.
Black et al., supra note 48, at 1798; see also Rapaczynski, supra note 232 (explaining that
market-institutions and the market develop in tandem).
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Finally, even if a country adopts the "right" corporate law, there
are no guarantees that thick securities markets and economic
growth will follow. Although an effective corporate governance
system is key, financial development and economic growth depend
on much more. Corporate governance is itselfjust one of many parts
that need to fit together for investors to invest and for an economy
to grow.26'
B. "Ground-Level" Benefits of Mandatory Corporate Law
Having made the philosophical case for a mandatory model of
corporate law, I want to describe further some of its practical
"ground-level" benefits.2 62 A mandatory corporate law system
should, to the extent possible, comprise bright-line rules, as opposed
to more ambiguous open-ended standards.263 The rules versus
standards debate is well-known, so I can be brief here in outlining
the virtues of rules.264 First, bright-line rules generally are more
straightforward and clearer than standards and are therefore
more predictable.2 65 The Delaware law of fiduciary duties is itself
more rule-like and predictable than many standards, having been
fleshed out by an extensive body of case law precedent that reflects
a consistent underlying norm of shareholder primacy. 6 Legal
261. For a discussion-and a very detailed chart--of the range of institutions needed for
economic growth, see, for example, Black & Tarassova, supra note 48.
262. The following discussion draws from and builds on two overlapping literatures: (1) the
literature discussing the relative merits of rules and standards; and (2) the literature
discussing the relative merits of mandatory versus enabling approaches to corporate law. See,
e.g., Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395 (1989);
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 86; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUE L.J. 557 (1992); Russell B. Korobkin, Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form:
Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23 (2000); Strine, supra note 68. For analyses
focusing on developing economies, see, for example, Black et al., supra note 57; Black &
Kraakman, supra note 57; Jonathan R. Hay et al., Toward a Theory of Legal Reform, 40 EUR.
ECON. REV. 559 (1996); Posner, supra note 259.
263. The distinction between rules and standards is not so clear in practice. There is a
continuum between laws that are more rule-like and those that are more standard-like, and
how clear and understandable the law is-whether more rule-like or more standard-like-has
a great deal to do with the drafting.
264. See supra note 262.
265. Having bright lines is not enough to ensure a rule's clarity. There can be so many
rules, subrules, exceptions, and the like that rules become a complicated maze that is too
difficult to make one's way through. The Internal Revenue Code comes to mind as an example.
266. Securities regulation, of course, comprises an extensive set of detailed statutes, rules,
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certainty, which is part and parcel of well-defined property rights,
is a valuable asset that facilitates business and investing, aside
from how the law actually allocates rights and responsibilities.267
Stating the strong form of this view, Justice Scalia has explained:
"There are times when even a bad rule is better than no rule at
all."268 Second, bright-line rules should be simpler to interpret and
apply than standards. As Judge Posner explained, "determining
whether [rules] have been violated is a relatively mechanical, cut-
and-dried process rather than one requiring the exercise of discre-
tion or the determination of numerous facts."269 A key virtue of
standards-that they are more efficient than rules since courts can
more precisely tailor them to fit the case at hand, whereas rules
are inflexible and tend to be both overinclusive and underinclusive
-is unlikely to be realized in developing countries where courts
generally lack the sophistication and experience necessary to apply
open-ended corporate law standards in a textured, fact-specific
manner. ° When exercising the kind of discretion on which
standards depend would strain judicial competency too much, easily
administered bright-line rules have a comparative advantage.
and regulations. For an argument that the United States built a "regulatory structure" based
on rules-namely, the SEC and the federal securities laws-to improve on the standards-
based law of fiduciary duties, see Roe, supra note 41, at 4-7.
267. See, e.g., Neil King, Jr., Iraq's Business Elite Gropes in the Dark: Absence of a Legal
System and Fear of Foreign Investors Sow Confusion and Doubt, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2003,
at A4; see also Gordon, supra note 242, at 1564-67 (explaining that the desire to achieve
greater certainty is a basis for mandatory corporate law).
268. Scalia, supra note 120, at 1179; see also id. at 1178 ("Much better, even at the expense
of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear,
previously enunciated rule that one can point to in explanation of the decision.").
269. Posner, supra note 259, at 4; see also Hay et al., supra note 262, at 566-67 (explaining
the importance of bright-line rules that are easy for courts to apply); Posner, supra note 259,
at 5 ("The first is that the application of rules places fewer demands on the time and the
competence of the judges and is therefore both cheaper and more likely to be accurate.").
270. According to Judge Posner:
The accuracy [of rules] is a little illusory, because it is a property of governance
by rules that they never quite fit the complex reality that they govern. But this
observation is consistent with their being more efficient than standards if
administered by a judiciary that has a limited capability for the kind of nuanced
and flexible decisionmaking that standards require.
Posner, supra note 259, at 5; see also Hay et al., supra note 262, at 566 ("[Vlague rules would
leave courts too much discretion, and would therefore either not be used at all, or be abused
by courts."); JOHNSON & SHLEIFER, supra note 250, at 854 ("Judges must be able, and more
importantly willing, to read complicated contracts, verify whether the events triggering
particular clauses have actually occurred, and interpret broad and ambiguous language.").
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Corruption is an especially acute problem in many developing
countries and undercuts the rule of law and economic growth,
whether a legal system is based on rules or standards.2  If judges,
together with regulators and other public enforcement agencies, are
more effectively monitored, it can go a long way to instilling trust
and confidence in the legal system. If people have trust and
confidence in the legal system, they are more likely to use it to
resolve their disputes as opposed to relying on self-help remedies,
such as organized crime. 2  In addition, they are more likely to
comply with the law themselves, with the added benefit of reinforc-
ing trust and confidence in the legal system. To be sure, even
under the best of circumstances, judges will sometimes misapply
the law, and the judiciary will always have some bad actors in it.
However, judges need to be seen as applying the law fairly,
equitably, and in good faith, with at least a minimum degree of
competency.1 4 As Justice Breyer has remarked, people need to
"perceive" that judges actually "decide [cases] independently
271. For example, corruption has been identified as a major corrosive influence in Russia
that compromised its attempt at privatization and corporate governance reform. See, e.g.,
Black & Tarassova, supra note 48, at 226-38.
272. For an interesting analysis of how organized crime arises to fill gaps between formal
property rights and their effective enforcement, see Milhaupt & West, supra note 138.
273. Cf Posner, supra note 259, at 5 (observing that "understanding and acceptance are
important to achieving voluntary compliance as well as to the sensible decision of cases by lay
adjudicators").
274. H.L.A. Hart expressed a similar point this way:
Up to a certain point, the fact that some rulings given by a scorer are plainly
wrong is not inconsistent with the game continuing: they count as much as
rulings which are obviously correct; but there is a limit to the extent to which
tolerance of incorrect decisions is compatible with the continued existence of the
same game, and this has an important legal analogue. The fact that isolated or
exceptional official aberrations are tolerated does not mean that the game of
cricket or baseball is no longer being played. On the other hand, if these
aberrations are frequent, or if the scorer repudiates the scoring rule, there must
come a point when either the players no longer accept the scorer's aberrant
rulings or, if they do, the game has changed. It is no longer cricket or baseball
but "scorer's discretion"; for it is a defining feature of these other games that, in
general, their results should be assessed in the way demanded by the plain
meaning of the rule, whatever latitude its open texture may leave to the scorer.
In some imaginable condition we should say that in truth the game being played
was "scorer's discretion" but the fact that in all games the scorer's rulings are
final does not mean that that is what all games are.
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 141 (1961).
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according to law.""' As Justice Breyer's colleague, Justice Scalia,
put it, "the trouble with the discretion-conferring approach to
judicial law making is that it does not satisfy [a] sense of justice
very well."276 When the law is made up of clear-cut rules that afford
judges relatively little discretion, directors, officers, shareholders,
and others can more readily police the courts because it is cheaper
and easier to detect when the law has been misapplied. Greater
judicial accountability should not only encourage judges to make a
greater effort to apply the law correctly, but should also mitigate
judicial corruption and dissuade judges from giving preferential
treatment to certain corporate interests.27 v
Clear rules offer additional advantages over standards by
encouraging forms of self- and market-enforcement of the law and
good corporate governance practices. One way the law "works" (i.e.,
deters undesirable conduct, such as insider looting) is by relying on
the heavy hand of the state to impose legal sanctions on wrongdoers.
In addition to its sanctioning role, the law can shape conduct in
two other notable respects, which are sometimes associated with
the law's expressive function.2 78 First, directors and officers might
275. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J.
989, 996 (1996).
276. Scalia, supra note 120, at 1178.
277. Posner notes:
[Riules facilitate monitoring of thejudges and so reduce the likelihood of bribery
and the influence of politics in the judicial process. The less discretion a judge
has in making decisions, the easier it will be to determine whether a case has
been decided contrary to law or whether there is a pattern of favoring one class
or group of litigants over another.
Posner, supra note 259, at 5; see also Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1942 ("A corrupt
judge can twist a 'reasonableness' standard to reach the decision he was paid to reach, but
cannot so easily twist a requirement that the company provide cumulative voting or appraisal
rights."). For the same reason, bright-line rules make it easier to monitor regulators and hold
them accountable. The monitoring of judges and regulators, however, is only effective if
aggrieved parties are able to seek remedies from a competent higher authority that is not
itself corrupted or subject to the influence of special interests.
278. The view that the law serves an expressive role contends that, above and beyond
imposing legal sanctions, the law can make a statement about how people are supposed to
behave-that is, it can express certain social values and expectations-and thereby shape
conduct. For different views on the expressive function of the law, see Matthew D. Adler,
Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (2000); Elizabeth
S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585
(1998); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35 (2002);
Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 (2000);
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internalize the values and expectations expressed by a clear set of
legal rules aimed at rooting out insider abuses, possibly holding
themselves to an even higher standard of conduct than what the law
technically requires." 9 A mandatory corporate law that clearly
pronounces society's expectations, and that parties cannot contract
around, is more likely to change norms than ambiguous standards
that send a more muffled message.28 ° A clear statutory mandate
might be particularly important in developing countries, especially
those with a civil law tradition, where judges lack the stature of the
Delaware judiciary.
Second, clear rules can facilitate cooperation, even when parties
do not develop an internal "taste" for it.28 1 There is always some
incentive to circumvent the law, particularly if the law is especially
burdensome or seen as invalid and illegitimate. It is usually easier,
however, to detect when bright-line rules are being circumvented
than when ambiguous standards are. To use a common example, it
is easier to verify that a person is driving sixty-five miles per hour
than to determine whether she is driving "carefully," particularly if
there is no extensive body of case law interpreting what it means to
drive "carefully." Similarly, it is easier to monitor whether directors
and officers are following specific legal mandates than to verify that
they are running the business in good faith, loyally, and with due
care. Bright-line rules should, therefore, assist burgeoning capital
markets in holding insiders accountable, adding to the deterrent
effect of legal sanctions.282
Bright-line rules also help insiders signal to the market that
they are "cooperators" (i.e., honest, trustworthy, and loyal).283 By
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996); RICHARD
H. McADAMs & JANICE NADLER, A THIRD MODEL OF LEGAL COMPLIANCE: TESTING FOR
EXPRESSIVE EFFECTS IN A HAwK/DOVE GAME (2003), available at http'//papers.ssrn.con/
abstract=431782.
279. See supra notes 107-25 and accompanying text.
280. See Korobkin, supra note 262, at 55 ("[Rlules, because of their ex ante clarity, are more
likely to affect social norms than are more ambiguous standards.... The problem is that such
a vague standard sends an unclear signal ...."); STOUT, supra note 45, at 30-31 (discussing the
role of authority in shaping norms). Indeed, one of the messages Sarbanes-Oxley sends, as did
the Securities Act and Exchange Act after the 1929 stock market crash, is that fraud and
other corporate misconduct will not be countenanced.
281. For a similar point, see supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 121, 201-04 and accompanying text.
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developing a track record of law compliance that the market
recognizes, a manager can cultivate a reputation as a "cooperator"
in whose company investors should be willing to invest, assuming
the company has a worthwhile business model.2"4 In fact, honest-
dealing managers might prefer stringent legal mandates that are
strictly enforced.285 If legal rules are less demanding, or if their
enforcement is lax or the sanctions for noncompliance are weak, it
is easier for disloyal and untrustworthy managers to mimic the
behavior of cooperating managers because complying with the law
is relatively cheap. When the law is weak, a reputation for law
compliance is less meaningful to the markets since it sends a
weaker signal that a manager is willing to cooperate. From the
perspective of a more explicit game-theoretic framework involving
shareholders and management,8 6 noncompliance with the law
becomes more costly for management when corporate law primarily
284. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1786-91 (2000) (offering a model of tax compliance in which people comply with the
tax law in order to signal that they are "good types" with low discount rates who are likely to
cooperate and thus less likely to cheat). Lisa Bernstein notes:
In general, in order for cooperation to emerge in a particular market, transactors
must each adopt strategies of cooperating at the beginning of each contracting
relationship and thereafter responding to cooperative behavior with cooperation
and responding to uncooperative behavior (defection) with punishment (such
strategies are called "tit-for-tat" strategies). Each transactor must also be able
to obtain information about the reputations of other market participants, and
reputation must be at least partially dependent on how a transactor behaved in
previous transactions. In addition, each transactor must be able to observe
whether the person he is dealing with has cooperated or defected.... Because
these noncooperative responses tend to reduce his future trading opportunities,
the long-run cost of defection will often be greater than the short-term gain from
defection, so a transactor who is not in financial distress is more likely to
cooperate than to defect.
Bernstein, supra note 201, at 1763-64 (2001). For a general discussion of signaling, see
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ETAL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 122-58 (1994); PAUL MILGROM & JOHN
ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION & MANAGEMENT 154-59 (1992); A. MICHAEL SPENCE,
MARKET SIGNALING: INFORMATION TRANSFER IN HIRING AND RELATED SCREENING PROCESSES
(1974).
285. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 141, at 605 (explaining that "trade associations
that are dominated by high quality firms often lobby for more stringent legislative standards
and greater enforcement of those standards" in order to drive lemons from the market).
Another way companies signal that they are "good" is by renting the reputation of
reputational intermediaries, for example by hiring top law firms or engaging well-respected
underwriters. See supra note 141.
286. For such a model, see, for example, Cooter, supra note 120.
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consists of strict, clear-cut rules. The payoff to defection decreases
because noncooperation will more likely be detected and punished,
whereas the payoff to cooperation increases because "cooperators"
are better able to distinguish themselves from defectors. The bottom
line is that we should expect more cooperation, reducing agency
problems.
In addition to lowering agency costs, there are two additional
benefits of cooperation worth mentioning. The first is straightfor-
ward: voluntary compliance with the law places fewer demands on
the legal system. The strain on the system is further reduced if
insiders voluntarily comply with the best corporate governance
practices that the judiciary, a respected regulatory body, or
market intermediaries might articulate. Second, there is a positive
externality from cooperation. Cooperation begets more cooperation.
As people cooperate more, they might develop a preference for
cooperation and begin to internalize a norm of cooperation and
trustworthiness.2 87 Even if no such norm takes hold, as parties begin
to cooperate more and to expect cooperation from others, the
expected payoffs from cooperation should increase. Tomorrow
should matter more as the opportunity for repeated interactions
increases with more cooperation throughout the private sector,
making a party's reputation and the future both more valuable.
Recognized patterns of cooperation in business and finance can
increase trust and confidence in transactions throughout the
economy, overcoming a big obstacle to wealth-increasing transac-
tions and economic growth. There is, in other words, a sort of
snowballing effect: as more and more parties adopt a strategy of
cooperation, others should too.288
A number of other benefits flow from a mandatory approach to
corporate law. For example, capital market participants have to
understand and evaluate fewer terms and corporate governance
practices when the range of options is narrowed, and because there
are fewer options, contracting and information costs should
decrease.289 Investors, analysts, bankers, and others can focus more
287. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 104; STOUT, supra note 108.
288. "More cooperation increases the level of trust, which increases the expected value of
the game to all of the players. Consequently, everyone enjoys a positive externality when more
agents cooperate and fewer agents appropriate." Cooter, supra note 120, at 1666.
289. See Bernstein, supra note 201, at 1741-42 (explaining how a well-defined set of
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attention on a company's operating and financial performance.2"
Further, there is less uncertainty when investing, at least from a
corporate governance perspective. With key features of the gover-
nance regime fixed, transactions are less likely to reach an impasse
over corporate governance concerns. In addition, by engaging in
repeated dealings with respect to fewer corporate contract terms
and governance practices, investors, managers, investment bankers,
lawyers, judges, and others should gain valuable experience, as well
as a common perspective on governance.291 The parties' experience
standardized rules "reduce[s] the negotiation costs, specification costs, information costs, and
relational costs of contracting, as well as the risk of transaction breakdown") (footnotes
omitted); Coffee, supra note 126, at 1678 (averring standardized terms reduce "information
costs"); Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 200, at 350 (noting "[tihe benefits
of [standardized] terms include avoidance of formulation errors, ease in drafting, availability
of judicial rulings on the validity and interpretation of the term, and familiarity among the
investors and securities analysts who, implicitly or explicitly, will put a price on the term");
Kaplow, supra note 262, at 571-72 (explaining that it is cheaper to learn about a rule than a
standard).
290. Cf. Coffee, supra note 126, at 1677 (stating that a benefit of mandatory corporate law
is that "both investors and securities analysts can virtually ignore the corporate charter and
focus exclusively on disclosures that relate to cash flow and breakup value").
291. Kahan & Klausner explain:
Contractual network benefits [from standardized contracting] include higher
quality and lower cost legal and professional services in the future, as lawyers
and accountants gain (and retain) expertise by encountering questions or
disputes regarding a particular contract term. They also include the availability
of a large number of investors and securities analysts who will learn how to
price a firm's securities at later public offerings and on the secondary market.
Finally, network benefits include judicial interpretations that courts issue
during the period in which a firm has a term in its contract.
Kahan & Klausner, Standardization and Innovation, supra note 200, at 726 (footnotes
omitted); see also Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 200, at 350-53
(summarizing the "learning benefits" and "network benefits" of standard terms); Klausner,
supra note 200, at 761. Jeffrey Gordon adds:
More judicial precedents [relating to standard contract terms] can be expected,
on average, to enhance the clarity of the termts]. Common business practices
implementing the termis] may become established, further reducing uncertainty.
Legal advice, opinion letters and related documentation will be more readily
available, more timely, less costly, and more certain. Finally, firms may find it
easier to market their securities.
Gordon, supra note 242, at 1567-69 (discussing a "public good" rationale for mandatory
corporate law that depends on repeat usage of terms); cf Bernstein, supra note 201, at 1741
n.82 (explaining that in many contexts, parties contract "With an idea of how similar
transactions are usually structured; they have in their minds an implicit form contract made
up of clauses such as price that are commonly negotiated, boilerplate provisions, and legal
default rules land extralegal provisions]").
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and shared mental model should not only facilitate transactions and
the resolution of disputes when they do arise, but eventually can be
leveraged in urging policymakers to move to a more flexible
corporate law system as the marketplace and the judiciary become
more sophisticated. Particularly important for the judiciary is the
credibility judges should earn as they build expertise and a body of
case law to which parties have acceded.292 In short, mandatory
corporate law replicates many of the transactions cost-reducing
benefits of standardized contracting. With the caveat that corporate
governance is complex, and that trying to simplify it too much runs
the risk that an unacceptably inefficient set of rules will be crafted,
policymakers should attempt to draft a corporate law for developing
countries that is straightforward and easy to interpret and apply.
The strongest critique of mandatory corporate law is that it
denies directors and officers the flexibility they need to run the
business profitably and that it chills management from taking
prudent business risks, especially when the law is backed by strict
sanctions.293 In this sense, mandatory rules are overinclusive,
prohibiting, or at least discouraging, corporate conduct that is in
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. If
anything, the balance between managerial discretion and share-
holder protection in the U.S. governance system tilts in manage-
ment's favor, erring on the side of underregulation. Even with
Sarbanes-Oxley and the other recent regulatory reforms, some
mismanagement, fraud, shirking, and disloyalty is tolerated as the
price that has to be paid for entrepreneurism, innovation, and risk
taking. Although these agency problems can certainly stress the
markets if widespread, the U.S. capital markets can withstand
them, as the rebound of equities after Enron and WorldCom attests.
Indeed, the sell-off of stocks after the scandals came to light is part
and parcel of how capital markets discipline management and it
292. See Hay et al., supra note 262, at 567 ("As laws are used more, courts will begin to
gain credibility as places to resolve disputes. They will also become more predictable as a body
of precedents develop ...."). As judges develop expertise and a corresponding body of precedent
with respect to a limited range of corporate contract terms and governance practices, the legal
risk facing parties should be mitigated.
293. Even mandatory corporate law rules, though, have a voluntary quality to them in that
a corporation can avoid most of the requirements by choosing not to issue shares to the public.
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validates that the U.S. corporate governance system can rely on
relatively little corporate law.
The calculus is different in developing countries. Whatever one
thinks of the balance struck in the United States, shareholders
should be afforded greater protection in developing countries, at the
expense of managerial leeway for directors and officers. Returning
to the logic of the "law matters" thesis, nascent and emerging
capital markets are unlikely to pass the stress test of corporate
scandal and insider abuse. Developing economies have not yet built
up any sort of resilience to agency problems and lack the self-
corrective mechanisms needed to keep the abusive practices and
fraud from spreading. By way of contrast, in addition to the major
sell-off of equities in the United States after the wave of scandal,
there were numerous market-based responses that addressed a
number of flaws in the U.S. governance system, and investor
confidence was ultimately restored.294 A more fragile and immature
capital market might very well collapse under similar pressure.
Thus, agency problems-or even just the perception of them-pose
a greater risk to developing countries in an earlier stage of financial
development than to developed capital markets in advanced
economies. Consequently, even at the risk of going too far and
overregulating, policymakers should be willing to regulate more
entrepreneurism, innovation, and risk taking out of the market in
developing economies by affording management less discretion and
allocating additional control to shareholders.295 Reducing agency
problems is worth the price of tying management's hands and
forgoing some business opportunities. As between regulating some
risk out of the market or not having much of a capital market to
regulate, the former is preferable. Furthermore, without stronger
294. For a discussion of market-based responses to the wave of corporate scandal, see
Paredes, supra note 69; Ribstein, supra note 70.
295. In criticizing Stephen Choi's proposal favoring regulatory competition and issuer
choice as means to promote financial development, John Coffee has also recently suggested
that overregulation may be preferable to underregulation. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and
Regulatory Competition: Can They Co-Exist?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1733-34 (2002) (noting
that "underregulation may be a greater danger to financial development than overregulation"
and that a company in an emerging economy should therefore be precluded from "exiting" its
home country's laws by opting into the "weak" legal regime of another country). But see Choi,
supra note 11, at 1702-26 (arguing in favor of regulatory competition to promote financial
development).
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legal protections for shareholders in developing countries, the
balance of power would tilt even more heavily in management's
favor than it does in the United States, because developing coun-
tries lack the rest of the U.S. system that constrains managers.
Even if the goal were to replicate the U.S. balance between manage-
rial discretion and shareholder protection, it would not be achieved
simply by transplanting U.S.-style corporate law.
To cast this point in slightly different terms, capital markets,
including those in advanced economies, depend on investor confi-
dence. Instilling investor confidence and promoting capital market
integrity are more important goals in developing countries than
managerial discretion to run the business.29 By adopting a demand-
ing mandatory corporate law, policymakers can boost investor
confidence and shore up the integrity of securities markets by
signaling that shareholders will be protected adequately and by
convincing the markets that there is a cop on the beat. The United
States itself is a case in point. Congress responded to the stock
market crash of 1929 and the erosion of investor confidence that
followed with a historic regulatory regime: the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.297 More recently,
Sarbanes-Oxley, coupled with numerous rules and regulations
adopted by the SEC, helped restore investor confidence in the
aftermath of the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and elsewhere.
The distinction between the public and the private spheres is not
as clear when it comes to corporate law as many claim. Self-dealing,
shirking, or fraud at a few companies can destroy overall investor
confidence.29 The United States provides another example. After
296. See Black et al., supra note 57, at 246 ("[I]n many emerging markets, corporate law
must serve a second goal: to foster public confidence in capitalism and in private ownership
of large firms."); Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 22 (noting that the "true independent
variable in [a model of legal development designed to promote securities markets] may be
investor confidence").
297. For a history of the SEC and the federal securities laws, see JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE (2003).
298. See Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1925 (explaining that scandals create
negative externalities "that become more serious as legal rules allow greater insider
discretion"); Coffee, Privatization, supra note 11, at 23 (explaining that "anything that invites
public scandal (including weak legal protections) creates a negative externality" and that
policies that foster investor confidence can be justified even if they compromise capital
formation); Cooter, supra note 120, at 1666 (NAIll players suffer a negative externality when
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the scandals at a few leading companies broke, investors became
skittish about all companies-waiting for the proverbial other shoe
to drop-and left stocks for more-secure investments. Private
ordering cannot be relied upon to ensure that enough confidence is
injected into developing securities markets. There is no reason to
expect directors, officers, and shareholders to take the negative
externalities of agency problems at their company into account
when organizing their internal corporate affairs. Indeed, some
investors will be more than willing to assume a greater risk of
governance failure and simply price the risk into a company's stock
price, even though any resulting abuses can jeopardize the capital
markets as a whole. A more heavy-handed legal regime, then, is
required to remedy the externalities stemming from what otherwise
might appear to be localized abuses at particular companies in
developing economies.
Throughout most of the foregoing discussion, I have implicitly
assumed that policymakers will at least try their best to craft an
effective corporate law. In reality, though, the lawmaking process
is likely to be subject to forceful lobbying efforts from influential
interests and to an array of other well-known public choice pres-
sures.2 In addition, policymakers do not have perfect information,
and because of bounded rationality, they cannot consider the full
range of eventualities a company might encounter or all the
possibilities for dealing with them. Complicating matters, policy-
makers, like everybody else, are subject to a host of cognitive biases
that can affect their decision making."
These concerns obtain whether policymakers are crafting a
mandatory or an enabling corporate law. However, default rules act
more players appropriate.").
299. See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997); PUBLIC
CHOICE AND PuBLIc LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (Maxwell L. Stearns ed., 1997).
300. The study of cognitive biases and other deviations from rationality are at the core of
behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., BEHAviORALLAW &ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998); Russell Korobkin, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach to Legal Scholarship:
Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Evolutional Psychology, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 319 (2001);
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000); Jennifer
Arlen, Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1765
(1998). For an interesting behavioral analysis of the SEC, see Stephen J. Choi & Adam C.
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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as a sort of safety valve. If the law primarily consists of defaults,
parties can contract around them if they are too inefficient. By their
nature, mandatory rules are harder to contract around. The real
safety valve is to convince the legislature to change the law on the
books, which is no easy task. Similarly, mandatory corporate law,
as compared to fiduciary standards that evolve over time, is less
likely to accommodate new finance and governance developments
that might argue for new rules. How the lawmaking process might
play out in developing countries is beyond this Article's scope, but
deserves further study. The more modest point I make here is that
any corporate governance reform program has to ensure that the
lawmaking process goes as smoothly as possible, and that steps are
taken to avoid regulatory capture, to counter the influence of special
interests, and to provide policymakers with expert advice and
counsel, as well as the information they need to make informed
decisions both in enacting the law and in ensuring its effective
implementation over time.
C. Some Proposals to Consider
To summarize, this Article has stressed a variety of factors that
need to be taken into account when crafting a country's corporate
law regime to ensure that it fits with the rest of the country's
institutional mix, and has cautioned that a country's corporate
governance system needs to mesh with its economic organization,
politics, social structure, history, and cultural values. Further, to
help ensure that the private sector develops, and that there are
business opportunities worth financing, it is important that the
corporate law regime does not mutate into a form of industrial
policy that displaces a growing market economy. The government's
more visible hand in shaping corporate governance should not be so
heavy as to stifle private economic activity. Rather, as capital
markets mature, policymakers should revisit corporate law reform
to accommodate the evolving needs and concerns of businesses and
shareholders to ensure that the country's legal regime remains up-
to-date.
Two additional considerations should be weighed when crafting
a country's corporate law. The first concerns early-stage financing
(i.e., venture capital), which is an important step toward economic
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growth."0 ' Venture capital financings are largely contractual in
nature, relying on a high degree of private ordering in structuring
internal corporate affairs. a 2 As compared to a set of default rules
that parties can contract around, such as the Delaware corporation
code, a mandatory regime could compromise the kind of private
ordering on which venture financing depends.3 3 The corporate law
of developing countries, therefore, should have enough play in the
joints, at least for private companies, to avoid crowding out venture
capital. It is by no means easy to design a mandatory model of
corporate law that strikes the right balance between stronger
shareholder protections on the one hand and enough flexibility for
early-stage financings on the other. Fortunately, although it is a
legitimate concern that needs to be accounted for, the worry that
mandatory corporate law will undercut venture capital might be
overstated. In the United States, venture capitalists typically
contract around default rules to assume a much greater governance
role and are more active in managing the business. If the same is
true elsewhere-and there is no reason to think it would not
be-then early-stage financiers in developing countries might
contract for more protections and a greater say over the enterprise
than even a mandatory corporate law regime provides.
Second, a corporate law regime that shifts control to shareholders
will require more shareholder participation in corporate governance
and a company's business affairs. More demands, therefore, will be
placed on shareholders to be informed, to be active, and to find a
way to coordinate better. These are real challenges and are a key
reason, at least in theory, why ownership and control separate-so
managers can specialize in running the company and shareholders
can specialize in bearing risk. (It should be noted, however, that a
market-based approach to corporate governance also requires at
least some investor activism to hold managers accountable. Even
Berle and Means did not view shareholder passivity as an unmiti-
301. See supra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
302. For more on the private ordering on which venture capital depends, see Gilson, supra
note 221; Gilson & Black, supra note 223.
303. Proponents of the self-enforcing model of corporate law expressed similar concern that
the self-enforcing model-which is more constraining than Delaware's enabling approach,
although less restrictive than the mandatory model proposed here-would frustrate venture
capital markets in emerging economies. See Black et al., supra note 57, at 297.
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gated good, but rather as a source of agency problems as senior
executives hijacked control of the board." 4) Ensuring that share-
holders are adequately informed and can readily communicate,
then, are important factors in crafting a corporate law regime that
calls for greater shareholder involvement.0 5 Policymakers also
need to account for a range of shareholder voting strategies that
present a host of complex social choice and game-theoretic questions
that argue against shareholder control." 6 The corporate law regime
in developing countries also must be sure to protect minority share-
holders from expropriation by controlling shareholders. To the
extent shareholders are expected to be more involved in governance
and corporate affairs, equity markets might be thinner and share
ownership might be more concentrated in developing economies.
Some investors might opt for more passive investments, while
others accumulate enough shares to make it worth their while to
participate actively in the company.307 Nonetheless, securities mar-
kets should still be broader and deeper with a legal system that
provides shareholders greater protection, even if it requires greater
shareholder involvement.
While the mandatory corporate law framework outlined here is
a call for shareholders in developing countries to be closer to
corporate decision making, it is not a call for a system of direct
corporate democracy and does not anticipate that shareholders will
weigh in on each issue or business opportunity the company faces.
In broad terms, the law will fix certain features of the corporate
governance structure to enable shareholders to hold management
more accountable and to otherwise protect them from insider abuses
by precluding certain transactions. Shareholders will also have
direct say over additional big-ticket items that management has the
discretion to pursue on its own in the United States. Although
afforded less leeway, directors and officers will still have primary
304. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 10, at 122-25.
305. By simply precluding directors and officers from engaging in certain transactions and
by mandating particular governance practices, without allocating to shareholders many
additional "positive" control rights, the corporate law regime eases the burden placed on
shareholders and market intermediaries.
306. Jeffrey Gordon has explored many of these concerns in arguing against greater
shareholder control in the United States. See Gordon, supra note 163.
307. Strong legal protections, therefore, must guard minority shareholders from potential
controlling or majority shareholder abuses.
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responsibility for managing the business and affairs of the corpora-
tion.
When shareholders do vote, requiring a supermajority vote
would probably be prudent in many, if not most, instances. The
tougher question is whether to require a supermajority vote of
shares cast, of shares outstanding, of shareholders voting, of share-
holders holding shares, or of some combination. Matters become
more complex still if nonshareholder constituencies are given a role
in governance.
These and other important features of a developing country's
corporate law regime will have to be resolved. There are no easy
answers, and the solutions are complicated by the possibility that
legal requirements should vary for different sized companies to
avoid overburdening small businesses and for established compa-
nies with solid track records, such as companies that have traded
publicly for a minimum number of years or that satisfy minimum
capitalization requirements. It is important, though, that steps be
taken toward concrete proposals, and specific code provisions must
be crafted. Accordingly, I conclude by moving beyond the conceptual
case for a more mandatory corporate law regime to offer some
specific provisions, keeping in mind that one size of corporate
governance regime does not fit all countries. Many of the recommen-
dations build on recent regulatory reforms and best governance
practices proposed in the United States in the aftermath of Enron
and WorldCom and on corporate governance reform programs that
have been advocated, and in some instances adopted, to promote
financial development around the globe. °8 The suggestions offered
308. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); Self-
Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 87,110,
at 88,647 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving NYSE and NASDAQ revised listing standards); CIPE
HANDBOOK, supra note 46; THE CONFERENCE BOARD, COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Part 2) (Jan. 9, 2003); Bernard
Black et al., Corporate Governance in Korea at the Millennium: Enhancing International
Competitiveness, Final Report and Legal Reform Recommendations to the Ministry of Justice
of the Republic of Korea, 26 J. CORP. L. 537 (2001); PISTOR ET AL., supra note 18, at Appendix
1; CalPERS, Global Corporate Governance Principles (1999), at http://www.calpers-
governance.org/principles/intemational; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Principles of Corporate Governance (1999), at http:/www.oecd.org. For specific
recommendations arising from the self-enforcing model of corporate law, some of which
overlap with the suggestions offered below in connection with the mandatory model, see Black
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here are not exhaustive, and the details of any code would have to
be worked out as part of the lawmaking process. Further, companies
might decide to opt into additional legal requirements by, for
example, cross-listing on the NYSE."°
Although both insider disloyalty and mismanagement can destroy
shareholder value, corporate law reforms intended to promote
securities markets in developing countries should emphasize rooting
out and punishing insider self-dealing and looting. Whether
investing in developing or advanced economies, shareholders cannot
avoid the risk that their managers will exercise poor business
judgment, that the company's business plan will prove to be poor, or
that the company's competitors will simply execute their corporate
strategy more effectively. Investors are willing to assume these
types of business risks, but they understandably are unwilling to
assume the risk of insider disloyalty. Indeed, from the perspective
of shareholders, insider self-dealing and looting are a form of "heads
you win, tails I lose." Furthermore, mismanagement is self-correct-
ing, at least to some extent, as better run companies outcompete
poorly managed ones, and as poor managers are replaced with good
managers, assuming that there is an active market for management
and that management is unable to entrench itself. As a market
economy develops, executives and directors, as well as middle-level
managers, should become more sophisticated and savvy in business
matters.1 °
In addition to focusing on rooting out disloyalty, early on,
corporate law rules should be simple, straightforward, and rela-
tively easy to interpret, apply, and understand.31 ' More complexity
and nuance can be added to the corporate law regime as securities
markets mature.
To address the core concern of disloyalty, at a minimum, a
developing country's corporation code could simply prohibit self-
et al., supra note 57, at 258-86; Black & Kraakman, supra note 57, at 1943-67.
309. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3; John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top? The
Impact of Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate
Governance, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1757 (2002); Gilson, supra note 9; LICHT, LEGAL PLUG-INS,
supra note 35.
310. Plus, as compared to rooting out self-dealing and looting, monitoring and disciplining
mismanagement requires a more nuanced approach, as evidenced by the business judgment
rule in the United States.
311. See supra notes 263-92 and accompanying text.
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dealing transactions. Although transactions between a corporation
and a director, officer, or controlling shareholder can sometimes be
in the corporation's best interests, interested-party transactions
pose a serious risk of insider abuse and provide a blatant opportu-
nity for insiders to expropriate value. A flat prohibition on self-
dealing transactions avoids the complexity of the U.S. approach,
which permits such transactions if they are ratified by an informed
vote of a corporation's disinterested directors or shareholders or if
they are otherwise fair to the corporation. An absolute ban on
transactions between a corporation and its insiders also sends a
clear message that ensuring insider loyalty and honest dealing is
paramount. If a flat bar is seen as too restrictive, policymakers
could prohibit self-dealing transactions above a certain size or allow
ex ante (although not ex post) approval by both the disinterested
shareholders and the disinterested independent directors of a
corporation.
Other anticipated avenues that insiders might take to expropriate
value also should be blocked. First, the cash compensation and
equity-based compensation of executives could be capped. Share-
holders could also have the right to vote on equity-based compensa-
tion packages.312 Second, cash-out mergers, whereby a controlling
shareholder squeezes out the minority, could be prohibited. The
concern here, of course, is that minority shareholders will be forced
to take an inadequate price for their shares. A more permissive
alternative would allow a cash-out merger so long as a majority of
the minority shareholders and a majority of the corporation's
disinterested independent directors vote in favor of it, or so long as
the controlling shareholder offers to acquire the minority's shares
for a minimum premium, such as fifty or seventy-five percent above
the highest price at which the company's stock has traded during
the preceding six months. Third, most people would probably agree
that insider trading on the basis of material nonpublic information
should be prohibited. Policymakers, however, could go further and
also limit the number of shares an insider can either purchase or
sell during a given time, such as during any three-month period. To
the extent insiders do buy or sell stock in their company, they could
312. Further, executives could be required to hold shares acquired upon the exercise of
options for a minimum period, such as one year.
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be required to disclose their planned trades at least three business
days before trading.
Although boards of directors serve many roles in a business, their
most important function in developing economies should be to hold
management accountable. The board should be actively engaged in
overseeing the enterprise and monitoring management, and a
premium should be placed on ensuring that directors are not
beholden to the CEO or other senior executives. Perhaps the
simplest reform-and one that has recently swept through the
United States-is to require that independent directors fill at least
a majority of the seats on the board, and "independence" could be
defined very strictly. Policymakers could also mandate term limits
for directors. For example, directors could be prohibited from
serving more than five years on a company's board, with a possible
exception for shareholder-nominated directors. In terms of the
board's structure, boards could be required to have separate audit,
compensation, and nominating committees that are composed
entirely of independent directors, with the chairman of each
committee rotating at least every three years. The corporation code
could also require that boards meet regularly, such as once a month,
with the independent directors meeting separately. More impor-
tantly, though, would be to require that separate people serve as
chairman of the board and chief executive officer, with the chairman
of the board possibly rotating at least every three years. Sharehold-
ers could even be given the right to remove the CEO without a board
vote.
To make it easier for shareholders to elect their preferred
representatives to the board, shareholders could be allowed to
nominate directors and to include their nominees on the company's
ballot at the company's expense, instead of being presented with
only the management-sponsored slate of nominees or the nominees
chosen by the board's nominating committee. A more far-reaching
provision would require that shareholder nominees actually fill a
minimum number of board seats. To avoid the risk that a control-
ling shareholder could elect its entire slate of nominees, the code
could require that minority shareholders have the right to elect at
least one or two directors, depending on the size of the board.
Cumulative voting, of course, is a more conventional way of en-
suring minority board representation.
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In addition to voting for the board, shareholders in the United
States have the right to approve mergers, the sale of all or substan-
tially all of the corporation's assets, and amendments to the
company's articles and bylaws, but otherwise have little, if any,
direct control over the business. In developing economies, sharehold-
ers could be allocated expanded authority, in effect affording
shareholders a greater say over how the enterprise is run, as
opposed to relegating them to voting for the board and on a handful
of fundamental corporate changes. For example, shareholders could
have the right to demand that the corporation pay a dividend.313 In
addition, shareholder approval could be required for the sale of any
division or line of business, or for the sale of any assets with an
aggregate value above some amount. Shareholders could also have
the authority to block any major acquisition or expansion by the
company, such as when the company makes a tender offer to acquire
a target or seeks to open a new factory.
In terms of financing transactions, the code could mandate
shareholder approval before a corporation pledges a substantial
portion of its assets as collateral or incurs material obligations, such
as by borrowing from a bank or issuing bonds. A corporation, for
example, could be prohibited from borrowing or selling bonds in
excess of some amount or if to do so would render the company too
leveraged, as determined, for example, by the company's debt-to-
equity ratio or debt-to-total assets ratio exceeding some threshold.
Shareholders could also be required to approve the issuance of
additional shares, or authorized but unissued shares could simply
be prohibited.
Finally, there is the possibility of a "catch-all." Policymakers could
adopt a provision to the effect that a shareholder proposal receiving
the affirmative vote of, for example, seventy-five percent of the
outstanding shares is binding on the board and the management
team, even if the proposal relates to the corporation's ordinary
business.
Regardless of how much authority shareholders ultimately are
allocated, they need the means to exercise their franchise effectively
for the right to vote to be meaningful. To this end, shareholders
could be given liberal rights to act by written consent, to vote
313. As an alternative, the code could mandate a minimum dividend payout.
1152 [Vol. 45:1055
A SYSTEMS APPROACH
confidentially, and to inspect corporate books and records. In
addition, shareholders holding some threshold of shares, such as
five percent of the corporation's outstanding shares, could be given
the right to call a special shareholders meeting at any time without
significant delay. Whether a controlling shareholder holds super-
voting shares is perhaps of greater concern to minority shareholders
than whether various procedural protections that facilitate the
franchise exist. Accordingly, dual-class voting structures could be
prohibited (i.e., one share/one vote could be mandated) or, at the
very least, a shareholder's voting interest could be capped at some
multiple of its economic interest in the company, such as three-to-
one. To further amplify the voice of minority shareholders, voting
procedures could be established that neutralize the votes of
directors and officers when voting in their capacity as shareholders.
For example, when a shareholder vote is called for, the majority vote
of nonmanagement shareholders could be required.
Shareholder voice in corporate governance is important, but so is
the right of shareholders to exit. In addition to the right to sell
their shares into the market-the equivalent of the "Wall Street
Rule"-shareholders in developing countries could be afforded
greater discretion than their U.S. counterparts to sell their shares
collectively to a bidder for the entire enterprise. The code could
allocate shareholders greater control over the decision to sell the
company by limiting a board's authority to take defensive steps to
fend off unsolicited takeover attempts. Indeed, target boards could
be obligated to run a fair auction for the company once a bid is
made, and the code could articulate minimum steps a board must
take in satisfying its obligation to sell the company to the highest
bidder. The goal, of course, would be to limit the ability of an
incumbent board and management team to entrench itself and to
spur an active market for corporate control.
To protect minority shareholders against the risk of looting once
a shareholder acquires a controlling stake, policymakers could
require any shareholder who crosses a certain percentage owner-
ship, such as forty percent of the company's outstanding shares,
to offer to acquire the rest of the company's outstanding shares
at the highest price the shareholder paid for its shares during
the preceding year. The flip-side concern, of course, is that a major
shareholder might sell out, leaving the other shareholders behind.
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To address this risk, minority shareholders could have "tag along"
rights. If a shareholder holding more than, for example, thirty
percent of the company's shares agrees to sell its stake in a
negotiated transaction, the minority shareholders could have the
right to "tag along"-that is, to sell their shares to the buyer on the
same terms and conditions as the controlling shareholder is selling
its interest.
Shareholders, though, might want greater ability to exit even
when there is no control transaction. To this end, shareholders could
be given the right, without a board vote, to liquidate the corporation
or to put it in bankruptcy if its market-to-book value drops below
some threshold or if its debt-to-equity or debt-to-total assets ratio
exceeds some ceiling.
Whatever the substantive provisions are of the corporation code
in a developing country, investors need access to accurate, timely,
and understandable information to exercise their rights effectively
and in an informed manner. A mandatory disclosure regime is
therefore recommended, although the regime could be simpler than
the U.S. disclosure system under the federal securities laws. The
mandatory disclosure requirements could be supported by a
straightforward antifraud provision that avoids the nuances and
complexities of the U.S. approach to securities fraud. For example,
those charged with making, or even aiding and abetting, a material
misstatement or omission could be held strictly liable without
inquiring into such matters as scienter (i.e., intent to defraud) or
whether investors relied on the material misstatement or omission
in deciding to buy or sell or how they were going to vote their
shares.
Finally, a corporate law regime will not be effective if it is not
enforced." 4 Shareholder rights are only meaningful to the extent
they are protected. Simple bright-line rules and greater transpar-
ency facilitate enforcement, but more is needed. Rooting out
corruption is essential to promoting the rule of law and is a
precondition to any effective legal system. The law must be crafted
314. See, e.g., Berkowitz et al., supra note 23 (stressing the importance of enforcement to
the law's effectiveness, which the authors refer to as the law's "legality"); PISTOR ET AL., supra
note 18 (arguing that the law on the books will not promote financial development unless law
enforcement is effective); see also Hay et al., supra note 262 (proposing reforms to transform
dysfunctional legal systems into well-functioning ones that parties will use).
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and enforced by honest-dealing and competent judges, lawmakers,
and regulators, and scores cannot be settled by bribes, violence, and
politics. On the ground, countries could consider establishing
specialized courts (like the Delaware Court of Chancery), adminis-
trative agencies (like the SEC), and self-regulatory organizations
(like the NYSE and the NASD) to resolve corporate law and
securities disputes and to regulate in the area. Steps could also be
taken to make it easier and cheaper for private individuals to access
the judicial system so that private enforcement can supplement the
public enforcement of the law. One important reform would be to
create institutions such as the class action lawsuit. At a minimum,
procedural hurdles such as the demand requirement could be
avoided so that shareholders have a greater say over whether a suit
is brought against a corporation's directors and officers. Until the
institutions that support private litigation are in place, the even-
handed public enforcement of corporate law by regulators is critical.
As compared to designing and fostering institutions to ensure the
effective enforcement of the law, crafting the substantive provisions
of a corporate law regime for a developing country might be easy.
CONCLUSION
At bottom, corporate governance reform is a matter of compara-
tive institutional analysis. The right corporate governance regime
for a country depends on its unique institutional makeup. In
adopting a program of reform, therefore, policymakers ultimately
must be pragmatic, looking past ideals and ideologies to what is
possible and realistic. Even if the market-based corporate gover-
nance model of the United States, with its enabling corporate law,
is the most effective system of governance for realizing the broadest
and deepest securities markets, the U.S. approach is not achievable
everywhere. Although not news to many of us, others need to be
reminded that the institutions supporting the U.S. system of
governance cannot be wished into existence or created overnight in
developing countries. In other words, developing economies cannot
leapfrog the process of development to land at the finish line of
developed markets. With the U.S. approach off the table for most
countries, policymakers are in a world of the second best, where the
remaining best option is a mandatory model of corporate law.
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A current debate in comparative corporate governance centers on
whether corporate governance systems around the world will
converge toward the U.S. model. A systems analysis calls into
question the likelihood of corporate convergence toward the U.S.
model or any other model of governance, especially at the level of
the formal rules of the game. The very point of this Article, for
example, is to recommend mandatory corporate law-the scheme
the United States has eschewed-for developing countries and to
suggest that U.S.-style shareholder primacy is probably inappropri-
ate in many places around the world. A systems approach helps
remove blinders that can otherwise prevent policymakers and their
advisors from identifying a host of viable options and alternatives,
many of which might have been rejected elsewhere. To the extent
convergence does take place, it will likely be at the general level of
function and not form, with corporate governance practices of
various shapes and sizes developing around the globe to provide
minority shareholders adequate protection from insider abuses,
inducing ownership and control to separate to a meaningful degree,
even if to a lesser extent than in the United States.1 5
Successfully reforming the economic structure of a country is
difficult. A healthy dose of humility on the part of the policymakers
charged with developing and carrying out new regimes is an
essential ingredient to any effective reform program. One of the
benefits of a systems approach to corporate governance reform is
that it impresses the complexities of corporate governance-and the
corresponding challenges of corporate governance reform-on
policymakers and the administrators and bureaucrats responsible
for implementing and monitoring the new regime. Policymakers
cannot foresee every eventuality, and when reforms are instituted,
there will always be surprises, both for better and for worse.
Even when a country's corporate law is itself mandatory, the
lawmaking process has to be nimble enough to accommodate
midstream corrections if necessary, which depends, in part, on the
willingness of lawmakers to admit mistakes.
Under the best of circumstances, let alone the worst, signifi-
cant reform of any kind can involve serious disruptions for large
315. See Gilson, supra note 9, at 337-40 (discussing the prospects of functional
convergence).
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segments of the population. Although people might be willing to
shoulder the burdens of transition in hopes for a better tomorrow,
they might very well, and understandably, become disillusioned if
the reforms are not successful in short order. Consequently, to
minimize the risk of unfulfilled hopes and goals, it is important to
manage expectations and to avoid overpromising the benefits of
reform. It is more important still that policymakers do not over-
reach, but strive for corporate governance reforms that are attain-
able with near-term tangible benefits. Early achievements are
critical to the long-run success of reform.
